a

THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/worksoflateright02boliiala

THE

WORKS

OF THE LATE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENRY ST. JOHN

LORD VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE.

WITH

THE LIFE

OF

LORD BOLINGBROKE

BY DR. GOLDSMITH,

NOW ENLARGED BY MORE RECENT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO HIS PUBLICK AND PERSONAL CHARACTER, SELECTED FROM VARIOUS AUTHORITIES.

A NEW EDITION,

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

London:

Printed for J. Johnson; Otridge & Son; Faulder & Son; T. Payne; Wilkie & Robinson; Scatcherd & Letterman; J. Walker; Vernor, Hood, & Sharpe; R. Lea; J. Nunn; Lackington, Allen, & Co.; Cuthell & Martin; Clarke & Sons; G. Robinson; B. Crosby; Longman, Hurst, Rees, & Orme; Cadell & Davies; C. Law; J. Richardson; E. Jeffery; R. Floyer; J. Asperne P. & W. Wynne; and W. Grace.

1809.

Printed by Luke Hansard & Sons,
near Lincoln's-Inn Fields.

College
Library
DA
27
B63
1809
v. 2

CONTENTS.

VOL. II.

The first Vision of CAMILICK - - - - - - - p. 3

An Answer to the London Journal of Saturday, December 21, 1728 - - - - - - - - - - - - p. 9

An Answer to the Defence of the Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain - - - - p. 49

Remarks on the History of England: written in 1730 p. 109

A final Answer to the Remarks on the Craftsman's Vindication; and to all the Libels, which have come, or may come from the same Quarter against the Person last mentioned in the Craftsman of the 22d of May 1731 - - - - - - - - - - - - p. 427

1426236

ERRATA.

P. 201. l. 16. *for* ever *read* never.

289. l. 2. *for* former *read* foreign.

THE

FIRST VISION OF CAMILICK:

AN

ANSWER TO THE LONDON JOURNAL;

AND

OTHER PIECES.

THE

FIRST VISION OF CAMILICK.

IN HOC SIGNO VINCES.

HAVING as yet given the reader little beside grave discourses on publick matters, and foreseeing that, during the session of parliament, I shall be obliged to continue daily in the same track, I am willing to take this one opportunity of presenting him with something, which has no relation at all to publick affairs, but is of a nature purely amusing, and entirely void of reflection upon any person whatsoever.

My friend Alvarez (a man not unknown to many here, by his frequent journies to England) did some time since make me a present of a Persian manuscript, which he met with while he followed the fortunes of Meriweis. An exact translation of the first chapter has been made at my request, by the learned Mr. Solomon Negri, and is as follows:

CAMILICK'S VISION.

IN the name of GOD, ever merciful, and of Haly his prophet. I slept in the plains of Bagdad, and I dreamed a dream. I lifted my eyes, and I saw

a vast field, pitched with the tents of the mighty, and the strong ones of the earth in array of battle. I observed the arms and ensigns of either host. In the banners of the one were pictured a crown and sceptre; and upon the shields of the soldiers were engraven scourges, chains, iron maces, axes, and all kinds of instruments of violence. The standards of the other bore the crown and sceptre also; but the devices on the shields were the balance, the olive wreath, the plough-share, and other emblematical figures of justice, peace, law, and liberty. Between these two armies I saw a king come forth, and sign a large roll of parchment; at which loud shouts of acclamation were heard from every quarter. The roll itself flew up into the air, and appeared over their heads, encompassed with rays of glory. I observed that wherever the second army moved, this glorious apparition attended them; or rather the army seemed only to move, as that guided or directed. Soon after, I saw both these hosts engaged, and the whole face of the land overspread with blood. I saw the king who had signed and broken that sacred charter drink out of a golden cup, fall into convulsions, gasp and die.

I then saw another king take his place; who, in the most solemn manner engaged to make the words contained in the roll the guide of his actions; but notwithstanding this, I saw both armies again encounter. I saw the king a prisoner. I saw his son relieve him, and I saw the chiefs of the other army put to death. Yet that victorious son himself

himself bowed his head to the parchment; which now appeared with fuller lustre than before. Several other battles ensued, with vast slaughter on both sides; during which the celestial volume was sometimes clouded over; but still again exerted it's rays, and after every cloud appeared the brighter. I observed those heroes, who fought beneath it, though ever so unfortunate, not once to abate their courage, while they had the least glimpse of that heavenly apparition in their view; and even those, whom I saw overthrown, pierced with ghastly wounds, and panting in death, resigned their lives in smiles, and with eyes cast up to that glorious object. At last the long contention ceased. I beheld both armies unite and move together under the same influence. I saw one king twelve times bow down before the bright phænomenon, which from thenceforward spread a light over the whole land; and, descending nearer to the earth, the beams of it grew so warm as it approached, that the hearts of the inhabitants leaped for joy. The face of war was no more. The same fields, which had so long been the scene of death and desolation, were now covered with golden harvests. The hills were clothed with sheep. The woods sung with gladness. Plenty laughed in the valleys. Industry, commerce, and liberty danced hand in hand through the cities.

While I was delighting myself with this amiable prospect, the scene entirely changed. The fields and armies vanished; and I saw a large and magnificent hall, resembling the great divan or coun-

cil of the nation. At the upper end of it, under a canopy, I beheld the sacred covenant shining as the sun. The nobles of the land were there assembled. They prostrated themselves before it, and they sung a hymn. " Let the heart of the king be glad; " for his people are happy! May the light of the " covenant be a lantern to the feet of the judges; " for by this shall they separate truth from false- " hood. O innocence, rejoice! for by this light " shalt thou walk in safety; nor shall the oppres- " sor take hold on thee. O justice, be exceeding " glad! for by this light all thy judgments shall " be decreed with wisdom; nor shall any man " say thou hast erred. Let the hearts of all the " people be glad! for this have their grandfathers " died; in this have their fathers rejoiced; and in " this may their posterity rejoice evermore!"

Then all the rulers took a solemn oath to preserve it inviolate and unchanged, and to sacrifice their lives and their fortunes, rather than suffer themselves or their children to be deprived of so invaluable a blessing.

After this, I saw another and larger assembly come forward into the hall, and join the first. These paid the same adorations to the covenant; took the same oath; they sung the same hymn; and added a solemn form of imprecation to this effect. " Let the words of the roll be for ever in " our eyes, and graven on our hearts; and accurs- " ed be he who layeth hands on the same. Ac- " cursed be he, who shall remove this writing from " the people; or who shall hide the law thereof

" from the king. Let that man be cut off from " the earth. Let his riches be scattered as the " dust. Let his wife be the wife of the people. " Let not his firstborn be ranked among the " nobles. Let his palaces be destroyed. Let " his gardens be as a desert, having no water. " Let his horses and his horsemen be overthrown; " and let his dogs devour their carcases."---In the midst of these execrations entered a man, dressed in a plain habit, with a purse of gold in his hand. He threw himself forward into the room, in a bluff, ruffianly manner. A smile or rather a sneer, sat on his countenance. His face was bronzed over with a glare of confidence. An arch malignity leered in his eye. Nothing was so extraordinary as the effect of this person's appearance. They no sooner saw him, but they all turned their faces from the canopy, and fell prostrate before him. He trod over their backs, without any ceremony, and marched directly up to the throne. He opened his purse of gold, which he took out in handfuls, and scattered among the assembly. While the greater part were engaged in scrambling for these pieces, he seized, to my inexpressible surprise, without the least fear, upon the sacred parchment itself. He rumpled it rudely up, and crammed it into his pocket. Some of the people began to murmur. He threw more gold, and they were pacified. No sooner was the parchment taken away, but in an instant I saw half the august assembly in chains. Nothing was heard through the whole divan, but the noise of fetters, and clank of

irons. I saw pontiffs in their ecclesiastical habits, and senators clad in ermine, linked together like the most ignominious slaves. Terrour and amazement were impressed on every countenance, except on that of some few to whom the man continued dispensing his gold. This he did till his purse became empty. Then he dropped it: but then too, in the very same moment, he himself dropped with it to the ground. That, and the date of his power, at once expired. He sunk, and sunk for ever. The radiant volume again arose; again shone out and reassumed it's place above the throne; the throne, which had been darkened all this time, was now filled with the effulgence of the glory which darted from it. Every chain dropped off in an instant. Every face regained it's former cheerfulness. Heaven and earth resounded with liberty! liberty! and the HEART OF THE KING WAS GLAD WITHIN HIM.

AN

ANSWER

TO

THE LONDON JOURNAL*

OF

Saturday, December 21, 1728.

THE family of the Publicolæ are surely very numerous. I pretend to no acquaintance with them, and I desire none. Far be it from me therefore to assign to any one of the fraternity his particular lucubration. I do not presume to say, for instance, that such a piece was writ by Ben, or such a one by Robin; but I can plainly distinguish, in their productions, a difference of style and character. In some, I feel myself lulled by a regular, mild, and frequently languid harangue; such as often descends upon us from the pulpit. In others, I observe a crude, incoherent, rough, inaccurate, but sometimes sprightly declamation; well enough fitted for popular assemblies, where the majority is already convinced.

The Publicola of the seventh of December quite jaded me. I handled the numb fish till I fancied

* This paper was supposed to be then under the direction of Dr. Benjamin Hoadley, lord bishop of Salisbury, and afterward of Winchester.

a torpor

a torpor seized my imagination; and perhaps you may think, that I am hardly yet recovered from the consequences of that accident. However, I shall venture to play a little with the Publicola of this day; for I think I can go through an answer to his paper. He returns the ball at leaft, and keeps up the game.

Before I come to this, give me leave to premise a word or two more.

As different as the Publicolæ are in other things, in one they are all alike. They are scurrilous and impatient. They call names, and grow angry at a sneer. Raleigh laid down his pen, rather than continue such a bear-garden contest. I took it up and answered them for once in their own style; but they must not expect so much complaisance from me any more. The matters we enter upon are serious, and by me they shall be treated seriously and calmly. I shall consider the dignity of the cause I plead for; the cause of truth; the cause of my country; and I shall look down with contempt on the invectives and menaces, which they may throw out; and by which they will suit their style with great propriety to their subject.—But let us come to the point.

The Publicola of this day sets out with stating, in a half light, a question which hath been much debated in the world. No man that I know of, no reasonable man I am sure, did ever find fault that we avoided a war. Our national circumstances are so well known, they are so severely felt, that ministers who maintained peace, and procured

to

to their country the blessings of peace, quiet, improvement of trade, diminution of taxes, decrease of debts, would be almost the objects of public adoration. But the exception taken to our conduct hath been this; that we provoked a war first, and showed a fear of it afterward. People recal the passages of three years past. They wish we had practised greater caution at that time; but then the same people very consistently wish, that we had exerted greater vigour since. If the honour and interest of his late majesty, and of the British nation, say they, were so severely wounded by the publick or private treaties of Vienna, that it was fit to keep no longer any measures, even such as have been thought of decency, with the emperor and the king of Spain; why this fear of disobliging them? Why this long forbearance under all the insults offered to us by the Spaniards? If we were in a condition, by our own strength, and by our alliance with France, to enter with a prospect of success into an immediate war; why again have we chosen to defer it, under so many provocations to begin it? Why have we endured some of the worst consequences of a war, without taking those advantages which acting offensively would undeniably have procured to us? But if all this was quite otherwise, continue the same political reasoners; if the honour and interest of his late majesty, and of the British nation, were not so severely wounded; if we were neither, by our own strength, nor by the alliance of France, in a condition to risk a war; nay more, if things were so unfortunately jumbled, that perhaps

perhaps " this war would have been more to our " own detriment than to that of our enemies," as the Publicolæ have more than once insinuated in their papers; what could we mean three years ago, when matters were carried to greater and harsher extremities than it is possible to find any example of among civilized nations, since the quarrels of Charles the fifth, and Francis the first? If our " principal ally would have been " dangerous to our interests in the operations of a " war, and is indifferent to them in the negotia- " tions of peace," for this hath been insinuated too from the same quarter, what a treaty was that which procured us this ally? What assurances were those which made us depend upon him? The difficulty of these dilemmas cannot, I think, be solved; and those who attempt it deceive themselves, while they mean to deceive the people.

But we are told that we went into a war, as far as the reason of things would give us leave. It seems then that the reason of things would neither give us leave to protect our trade, nor to make reprisals, when our merchants were plundered. If these words are to pass for any thing more than empty sound, it will follow either that Publicola is capable of affirming the grossest untruth, in a paper addressed to the people of England; or that our situation is worse than the least sanguine of our friends ever thought it, or the most malicious of our enemies ever represented it. Very bad indeed must it be, if the reason of things obliged us to bear from the Spaniards, at this low ebb of their

their maritime power, what would not have been borne when their proud armada covered the seas; what would hardly have been borne, even in the reign of king James the first.

But, God be praised! this is not our case; and therefore Publicola must be content to lie under the imputation which he hath drawn on himself by the boldness of his assertions.

He is frequently guilty of this fault; and the words which immediately follow those I have quoted afford a strong instance of it. "We did "not," says he, "take the galleons and bring them "home; but we blocked them up; which as com- "pletely answered the true end and design of "sending that fleet, as the actual taking of them. "The design was to keep the money out of their "hands (the Spaniards) and so disable them to "carry on the project of the treaty of Vienna." Very well. This matter is brought to a short issue. The blockade of the galleons is over. Our fleet is come back from the West Indies. The galleons are either come or coming. The Spaniards therefore are, according to Publicola, no longer disabled from carrying on the project of the Vienna treaty. I ask then, have they abandoned, have they renounced these projects? If our fleet blocked up the galleons till this was done, he is in the right. This answered the design of sending it. If they should, after this, break their faith, and renounce the most sacred obligations, none but they are to be complained of.

Publicola would have us believe, indeed, that they

they have renounced these projects; that they have granted us the main things in dispute; and that the congress is only to settle other affairs of less importance. But this I deny; and he shall be obliged to confess either that he advances here again a bold untruth; or that he reckons our keeping Gibraltar not among the main things in dispute, but among those of less importance. Let him show me, if he can, in the preliminaries, a particular and express confirmation of our right to this place, made by the Spaniards. I will undertake to show him the general words, by which the Spaniards will pretend in the congress, as it is notorious they do every where and on all occasions, that they have still a right to demand the restitution of Gibraltar, and that this right is to be discussed in the congress.

I know it hath been said more than once, in a very publick place, and in a very solemn manner, that Gibraltar should not be even mentioned at the congress; but it would be impertinent to lay any stress on the assurances of a person, who hath presumed to give so many groundless ones already: and who either hath been bantered most egregiously himself, or hath made no scruple of bantering his country.

Here then is one main point of our interests, to mention no more, still unsettled; not because the Spaniards have flown off from any agreement they had come to with us about it; but because it was never settled; and yet the galleons are left at liberty to come home.

If

If asserting our right to Gibraltar, and some other things, which were sounded so high by an acquaintance of yours, Mr. Publicola, (the author of the Enquiry) had no share in the ends which were proposed by sending our fleet to the West-Indies, such strange incomprehensible ends may, for aught I know, have been completely answered: but if these points, so essential to Great Britain, were any of the main things in dispute; if they were any of the ends proposed by what is called distressing the Spaniards; then is it false to assert, that these ends have been completely answered.

When we consider what numbers of able and useful subjects his majesty hath lost in the expedition to the West-Indies; and that we are, at least, as far off from a settlement of interests with Spain now, as we were before that expedition was undertaken, it is impossible not to feel great and unaffected concern.

If it be asked, what was to be done? I shall answer that, perhaps, it little becomes a private man to determine such great questions; but I will proceed to show, that all which Publicola advances against taking the galleons is trifling.

First then, if blocking up the galleons in the Spanish ports was of such consequence, taking them would have been a more effectual measure to all the same purposes.

Secondly, if he had taken them, as it is certain that Mr Hosier could have done with ease, and with all their treasure on board, immediately on his first arrival, we should have had a chance the more

more for taking the flota too, which stole away to Europe, while our squadron lay rotting before Porto-Bello.

Thirdly, if we had taken this treasure, we should have had in our hands a sufficient security for indemnifying our merchants, who have been the only sufferers, by the depredations of the Spaniards while the French and Dutch have sailed securely; and to one body of whom, I mean the South-Sea company, the king of Spain owes, for former seizures unjustly made, as much perhaps as his proportion in the treasure of the galleons amounts to.

Fourthly, to have taken the galleons would not have been liable to the same inconveniencies, as we have severely felt by pursuing another measure. The expedition would have been soon over. The expense of lives and treasure would have been infinitely less. It would have cost little or nothing to have kept the Spaniards out of their money by a seizure, as long as the true reason of things should have required it; whereas it hath cost us more than all that money is worth, to keep them out of it by a blockade only for a time; and for a time, which hath not been sufficient to secure us against their designs, or to make them lay aside their pretensions, "But "if we had taken them, says Publicola, we should "have taken the money of other people, as well "as of the Spaniards. We should have been "pirates." Let us see how this hangs together. If we had restored immediately to the proprietors their respective shares, as he supposes we must have

have done, the brand of piracy would not have stuck upon us. But suppose we had thought fit not to restore their shares to the Spaniards, till our differences with the court of Madrid had been settled; should we have been pirates in that case? He will be laughed at who affirms it. Would the king of Spain's share in this treasure have been no loss to him? would he not have missed the extravagant indulto, which he is now going to receive on this immense treasure? Should we have been pirates for punishing, in this manner, a prince who actually besieged one of our fortresses, who actually detained the ships and seized the estates of our merchants, and whose subjects every day killed, robbed, and plundered the subjects of Great Britain?

But I go a step farther; for if we stop with Publicola, it will be always short of the mark, and we shall never exhaust the subject, as I desire to do, because I desire to find the truth, and to be sure that I find it. What hath been said hitherto, hath been said on the supposition of a seizure only; and I hope the scruples of Publicola's timorous conscience are appeased. I hope he hath found out, by this time, that such a seizure might have been carried on without piracy. But suppose it had been a capture not a seizure; such a capture as can never be made but in time of open war; such a capture as entitles the captors, by our laws, to the whole profit of the prize. Why then we had commenced a war against Spain by this action, as Spain had done long before against us by a thou-

sand hostilities. Why then vice-admiral Hosier, and the officers and seamen of his squadron, had been in the same case as Sir Charles Wager, and the officers and seamen of his squadron were in the last war; and I do not remember that these gallant men were ever prosecuted as pirates at home; or reputed such abroad, or obliged to refund any part of the treasure they had taken.

Upon the whole matter, Publicola's argument proves nothing in the present case; or it proves, that, even when we are at war with Spain, we must not presume to attack these sacred galleons. Other nations are always interested in them, as well as the Spaniards. It will therefore be always unlawful, according to this excellent casuist, to make prize of them: and he is defied to distinguish himself out of this absurdity.

Having now gone through what Mr. Publicola calls, I know not why, the subject in general, we will examine the second part of his epistle. I pass over all the Billingsgate with which he ushers in this part; though I could make myself and you too very merry, if I would apply his criticisms on what Raleigh says, concerning one promise, to the interpretation which was given to another promise; by which we might have learned, among many other curious distinctions, the difference between a direct promise and a promise ministerially worded: but I shall leave him to his phrenzy, and proceed soberly to show you, that he says nothing, or that which is worse than nothing, in every line of this performance; in which he seems to triumph with such vast complacency.

The

The point he labours is to show, that the promise made by the lord Stanhope to restore Gibraltar, which hath not been complied with, and the destruction of the Spanish fleet on the coast of "Sicily, "threw the court of Madrid into the arms of the "emperor, and were the true root and real cause "of all that thorough hatred and deep malice "shown in the treaty of Vienna;" and by consequence that all our present difficulties with Spain proceed from hence; from causes laid many years ago, and when the present ministers were not in power. My business shall not be to blame or to excuse any ministers; but to make a true deduction of facts, and to reason clearly and justly upon them; and I charitably hope, that I may bring Publicola to do so in time; if for no other reason, at least by obliging him to take shame to himself often: for though I am not so bloody-minded as Publicola, who talks as if he had heads in his power, yet I assure him, that I will not let him alone while, among other enormities, he makes it his business to bury truth and common sense under such weekly heaps of rubbish.

I shall show immediately, that, in whatever terms or manner we suppose lord Stanhope to have made a promise of restoring Gibraltar to the Spaniards, it will be of no avail to Publicola's purpose. But since he hath told us what he hath heard, and Raleigh hath told us what he hath heard, for neither of them can pretend to speak on their own knowledge concerning this affair, I will likewise take leave to state what I have been informed

of, upon better authority than what my adversary hath often writ upon in his affirmative style.

I have been informed then, that lord Stanhope had been induced, or seduced, call it which you please, by the late regent of France, to make an overture of this kind at the court of Madrid. Lord Stanhope, says our author, might think that Gibraltar was to be "honestly given up for valuable considerations." He might so; and he was so honest a man, so sincere a lover of his country, that if he had thought in another manner, no consideration of private interest, no regard to the service of a ministry, could have prevailed on him to make, nor even to entertain the motion. But have a care of your insinuations, Mr. Publicola; and learn to make them with a little more delicacy. The case is vastly different now. The sense of our august monarch is known. The sense of the whole nation hath been loudly proclaimed; and I believe no minister, how presuming soever, will venture, at this time, to say that Gibraltar may be honourably or advantageously given up; and therefore no virtuous minister will think he can honestly give it up, or conspire in measures which may create the appearance of a necessity so to do.—But to return to my narration.

If such an overture was made by lord Stanhope, it was made to prevail on the court of Spain to desist from the enterprise they had then in hand; an enterprise, which we should have been obliged to prevent if the treaty of quadruple alliance had never been made, by virtue of our guaranty to the

neutrality of Italy. That this overture was not received is evident; since the Spaniards went on with their expedition, which ended in the destruction of their fleet. Now call this an overture, as I do; or call it a promise, as Publicola will affect to do; it was vacated to all intents and purposes by the Spaniards, who refused to comply with the condition on which it was and only could be grounded.

It hath been said by some, that this promise was renewed afterward, to pacify the Spaniards for the loss of their ships, and for their defeat in Sicily; but this deserves explanation; and will not stand in the light which those who urge it desire it should.

It is, I believe, true, that the French, who first induced us to make this overture, would, on the pretences just now mentioned, and on the pretence of the hopes which the regent had continued to give the Spaniards, have obliged us to acknowledge this vacated promise as a subsisting obligation; but I have been informed, that this was refused flatly to the minister sent over hither upon that occasion, and to the regent himself by our minister abroad. The promise then continued vacated; and we were as much disentangled from the snares which our good allies laid for us, as if no such promise or overture had been ever made.

But farther. If a promise of this kind had been made on our part, even after the expedition to Sicily, which there is no colour to affirm, yet that promise must likewise have been void, since it was made so, to all intents and purposes, by the king of Spain's accession to the*quadruple alliance.

* See the treaty.

That all possessions are mutually confirmed by that treaty, except such as are specified in it, cannot be denied. The possession of Gibraltar was therefore again confirmed to us by the king of Spain, when he acceded to that treaty; unless he can show, that our possession of it was excepted, or can produce any private article or declaration, which made a reservation of his right to this place, notwithstanding the cession of it made at Utrecht. But nothing of this can be shown; and it hath been said, I believe truly, that a contrary declaration was made solemnly and publickly by the British minister in Holland, at the very time when the accession was signed.

Thus far then the way is clear before us. When we came mediators to the congress of Cambray (for such we were at that place, though we have the misfortune to find ourselves principally and almost solely concerned in the disputes to be settled at Soissons) the king of Spain had no right, nor pretence of right, to demand of Great Britain the restitution of Gibraltar. Indeed, if he had then such a pretence; if a promise, on our part, to restore this place to him, which promise we refused to execute, had then subsisted, how could he have accepted of our mediation?

Ay, but (says this poor hunted author, who doubles and shifts and works and tries, at any rate, to save himself) lord Stanhope, according to Raleigh's own confession, was first in this affair, and laid the foundation of this expectation in the Spaniards.—It is plain the Spaniards had such assurances.

surances. It is allowed you, at least for argument sake, that lord Stanhope was first in this affair. The Spaniards had such assurances. Make your most of it. These assurances were discharged. These promises were released; and whatever lord Stanhope can be supposed to have done or said about Gibraltar hath no more relation to the present dispute, than what was done or said about Gibraltar in the time of king Rodrigue and the count Julian; so that our author is building up a right for the Spaniards upon foundations which were demolished as soon as laid. He is building up a right, or he is building up nothing; for to talk, as he does, of expectations, in cases of this nature, without establishing a right, real or plausible, is too frivolous to deserve an answer.

Let me illustrate this by a familiar instance; for things cannot be made too plain to him. I will suppose him a clergyman. I will suppose that by merit, of some kind or other, he gets a promise of a bishoprick. After this, he does something inconsistent with such a promotion. He forfeits all title. He renounces all pretensions to it. Shall his advocate be admitted to insist that, notwithstanding all this, he expects to be a bishop still; and, instead of grounding his expectations on his right, ground his right on his expectations? No certainly; such an advocate would be hissed out of court, and would deserve at least to have his gown pulled over his ears.

But the Spaniards are not so chimerical. They ground their expectations, and what they call their

right, on a new engagement taken by us, as they say, since all the transactions, mentioned above, were over; on a private article, in a treaty made with them in 1721, stipulating the contents of a letter to be written by the late king; and on the letter, written in pursuance of this article, the original of which they offer to produce; and which they pretend to be a positive engagement to restore Gibraltar to them.

With what front now could Publicola affirm, that what Raleigh says about the letter is nothing to his purpose; unless this mysterious letter had been wrote before this same kind of a verbal promise was made?—If this mysterious or ministerial letter had been writ before lord Stanhope's promise was made, it would have been nothing to Raleigh's purpose; because his purpose was to show, that the demand, which the Spaniards now make of Gibraltar, cannot be made on any thing which passed in lord Stanhope's time; but it was extremely to his purpose to show, that this letter was writ after lord Stanhope's death. Had Publicola taken upon him to ridicule the plainest and easiest demonstration in Euclid, he could not have rendered himself more ridiculous than he does upon this occasion.

I am at a loss what words to use. I have debarred myself from using hard ones; and none but the hardest are equal to what this writer deserves. Let him pass then without any animadversion from me. Let the reader pronounce sentence upon him.

To

To sum up the whole on this head. Publicola was to prove, that my lord Stanhope's promise to restore Gibraltar is one of the reasons of the present obstinacy of the Spaniards, and by consequence of our present difficulties. Now it is notorious, that in fact the Spaniards ground their demand on something which passed while he was not alive. Publicola says, it never appeared that the present ministry came into such assurances. If he means the assurances given by my lord Stanhope, and long ago made null, he is most certainly in the right, for a very obvious reason. But if he means the assurances still insisted upon, I have nothing to say but this. These assurances, or what the Spaniards call by that name, were given in the year of our Lord 1721.

The second reason assigned, by this profound politician, for the obstinacy of the Spaniards, is the resentment which hath lain at their hearts, ever since we destroyed their fleet. Here are no proofs offered; nor can there be any which are direct; because the assertion relates to what passes, and hath passed these many years, in the hearts of the king, queen, and ministers of Spain. It is a fact, which we are to take on the bare word of this author, or to reject. I make no scruple of rejecting it, because the probable reasons against it seem to me of much greater weight than his single authority in any case, and especially in a case of this nature. The Spaniards were certainly not very well pleased with us for destroying their fleet. But doth it follow from hence, that the resentment which

which they conceived upon this occasion operates thus strongly still? How often were the French beaten by us in the last war? Were not whole squadrons of their ships destroyed? How many of their armies were defeated? How many of their towns were taken? Notwithstanding which, we see with pleasure the most perfect harmony, the most intimate friendship, subsist between their court and ours; even from the time, when their disgraces were recent, and when their resentments against us must have run the highest, if it was true that resentment, and not the ragione di stato, as the Italians call it, governed the conduct of princes. But the Spaniards are more vindictive than the French. This may be said perhaps by people, who are apt to support one affirmation by another, and to call that proof. But then how came it to pass, that the Spaniards were so soon reconciled to the French, and entered into such close alliances with them immediately after the campaign of 1718? If the British arms beat the Spanish fleet, the French arms took the Spanish towns at the same time. The near relation, and the ancient friendship between the two courts of France and Spain, it may be said again, rendered their reconciliation easy. But this would be to suppose what is quite contrary to the natural course of human passions. According to that, the court of Spain must have been infinitely more piqued against their own family, for joining in opposition to them with the emperor, who had been so long their common enemy, than against the

the court of Britain, who had not the same ties to them, and who acted for an old ally. This is natural and probable. Nay, when we consider how many marks of the utmost resentment were shown at that time by the Spanish to the French court; how many intrigues the former carried on to subvert the government, and to raise a rebellion in France; I think we may justify affirming, that this is true in fact. And yet how soon was all this forgot at Madrid? how soon was the reunion of the two courts brought about in the closest manner, and cemented by marriages?

The king and queen of Spain might look on the proceedings of the French, in this affair, as a political quarrel, and a national wrong; but they looked on an affair, which happened a few years afterward, as a personal injury and affront. I mean the sending back the infanta in so abrupt, so unprepared a manner, without any softening, and with so many aggravating circumstances. Never resentment run higher, nor was expressed in terms of greater passion, than that of the court of Madrid upon this occasion; and yet one or two sacrifices, a little address, and a little management, pacified all; united the two courts again; and restored to the French, in a short time, such an influence in Spain, that it is marvellous we, who depend so much upon it, should not yet have found the least effect from it in our favour.

I have dwelt on these observations, in order to show to what poor expedients those writers are reduced, who attribute the present obstinacy of the Spaniards to the beating their fleet above nine

years

years ago. Surely it is strange, that the cardinal de Fleury should have been able, in seven or eight months time, to reestablish a good correspondence and friendship between the two courts of France and Spain, after so great and so sensible an affront as Philip and his queen thought was put upon them by his predecessor in the ministry; and that our ministers should not be able, in the course of as many years, to atone for what their predecessors did; nor to pacify the resentment of the Spaniards for their loss of the fleet, in an action which they might have avoided, and which they rendered, in some sort, unavoidable to us. It is impossible to believe, that such an incident should produce these effects; which seem to strengthen, rather than to grow weaker, the farther they are removed from this supposed cause of them. There must be something more recent than this anger, at a loss long since sustained and repaired too, as I believe. Perhaps we may begin to make some discovery of this kind, when we examine the next article; to which I shall proceed as soon as I have made a few reflections more on this head, which Publicola most prudently suggests to me, and which will be of wonderful service to his cause.

" Nor does the quadruple alliance" (says he; but he must mean the king of Spain's accession to this alliance) " being after the promise," (that is, lord Stanhope's promise or overture, concerning Gibraltar) " prove the Spaniards had given up " their expectations founded on that promise; " but only that they were not, at that time, in

" proper

"proper circumstances to insist upon it." I have shown how silly it is to talk of expectations, without any right to expect; and how the right of the Spaniards to Gibraltar, acquired by lord Stanhope's promise or overture, either real or supposed, was extinguished before the year 1721. But I agree, that if they had then had even a real right, they must have submitted to give it up, as they did at that time, because of the circumstances into which they were fallen. Let me ask Mr. Publicola what reduced them to these circumstances? He must answer, it was beating their fleet. They had been as obstinate before that time as it is possible for them to be now. Alberoni talked at least as high as the marquis de la Paz. But they grew complying as soon as this hostility was committed. Might not the taking their galleons have had the same effect lately? Would not our incomparable ministers, who run up and down the world negotiating and making treaties, with so much credit to themselves, and so much honour and advantage to the nation, have done better (I speak it with due submission to their approved wisdom) to imitate than to blame the conduct of their predecessors? From 1721 to 1725, we heard of nothing but the happy and flourishing state of our affairs. This must have been owing, according to Publicola, to the circumstances the Spaniards were in; and therefore this must have been owing to the defeat, which they received in the Mediterranean. How came we to hear from the very same persons, that all our difficulties, and the distresses we are in at present, ought

ought to be dated before the year 1721? Surely, to be in a flourishing state, a nation must be in a secure state; and how could that be true, if, during the four years I have mentioned, a powerful neighbour meditated revenge, and only waited an opportunity of striking home? How could it be declared, even from the throne, that* nothing more than the forms of a congress were wanting to establish the public tranquillity, if the grand quarrel between us and Spain did, in effect, subsist at that time?

There are people so very regardless of truth, and so very indifferent to the shame of being convicted of falshood, that they never consider, when they affirm a fact, any thing more than the present expediency. Strange, almost incredible instances of this might be quoted. I pass them over in silence for many reasons; and, among others, for this reason, that some of them are too recent to be forgot. I stick to the point before me; and shall conclude it by observing, that when Publicola assigns all the difficulties, which we have laboured under since the year 1725, to what passed before the year 1721, he is confuted not only by the reasons I have urged, which seem to me unanswerable, but likewise by an authority which every man will allow to be decisive.

The next article to be considered is this. Raleigh, who was not satisfied with Publicola's way of accounting for our present difficulties, and for the close alliance between the emperor and

* See the king's speech at the opening of the session, 1721.

Spain,

Spain, had ascribed both to our refusal of the sole mediation at Cambray. He is accused of maliciously concealing the truth, and of imputing that to ill management, extraordinary refinement, and great tenderness, which was the result of true reason. Now I think I can demonstrate, that Publicola is ignorant of the truth; or that he conceals it, I will not say corruptly, but unfairly.

That the treaty of Vienna was actually and in form signed, before it could be so much as known at Vienna that we had refused the sole mediation, I might grant in one sense, and for the sake of argument, though I do not believe that the fact is just as he states it; and yet I might safely deny the same thing in the only sense in which this fact can be of the least use to our author. I can grant that this treaty might be signed in form at Vienna, before it could be known there, in form, that we had refused the sole mediation; before the couriers from Cambray to London, from London to Paris, from Paris to Madrid, from Madrid to Vienna, could perform their journies, and the several courts could hold their councils and make their dispatches. But the certain knowledge of our refusing this mediation might very well arrive at Vienna before the treaty was signed; nay, the treaty might be signed upon this knowledge, by virtue of instructions given with this contingency specified in them. I say this might be the case; and therefore to affirm this fact, in the terms Publicola affirms it, is nothing to the purpose. What Raleigh advanced may still be true.

That

That full powers were given by Spain to carry on the treaty of Vienna four months before this offer of the meditation, is most certainly true: and therefore there is as much reason to be astonished that early measures were not taken to prevent it, as there is that other measures than what we have seen pursued were not taken to prevent the effects of such a treaty. Could it be an absolute secret to our ministers, who ought to be well informed, since they have had such immense sums for secret service, as were never heard of before their time, that Spain was negotiating at Vienna during these four months? Could it be a secret to them that, from the death of the duke of Orleans, and about a year, at least, before this treaty was concluded, the Spanish ministers were full of fears and jealousies about the completing the infanta's marriage with the king of France? If these things, which were not quite unknown to most private persons, who observed the course of public events, and who sought information about them, did not escape the intelligence of our ministers, how could a consideration of the circumstances, which the court of Spain was in at that period, escape their sagacity?

From the time of the accession of the king of Spain to the quadruple alliance, the whole management of the court of Madrid had been left to the duke of Orleans and his cardinal du Bois; and if we were drawn into the treaty made at Madrid in 1721, by this prince and his minister, as I verily believe we were, it is easy to see who

was

was thanked for this by the Spaniards, and how watchful France hath constantly been to seize and improve every occasion of rendering our title to Gibraltar disputable, and of wresting this important place out of our hands. We came then into the congress of Cambray joint mediators with the French, between the emperor and the king of Spain, but not with equal advantage; not with an equal share in the confidence of one of the parties; and with our share in the confidence of the other, perhaps, a little diminished; for it is not unlikely that the private treaty, made at Madrid with the king of Spain, while we were mediators at Cambray between him and the emperor, might give umbrage at least to the latter. I know not whether this step did not even occasion some complaint, though not in form perhaps, from the imperial ministers.

In this state of things, and in this disposition of all parties, what could it be imagined that the Spaniards should turn themselves to, on the foresight of a rupture of all intimacy, and even correspondence with France? Could they resolve to leave themselves without any ally, with so many enemies, and with their interests still unadjusted? Could they resolve to run the risk, in this condition, of falling back into a state of war, when they were about to purchase peace at a price which they thought so dear? Could they resolve to abandon themselves intirely to Great Britain, who had hitherto shown so much partiality to the emperor, still their enemy, and whose principal

intercourse with them had been managed hitherto by France, to whom they expected soon to become enemies? Certainly they could not resolve upon this, even as I have stated the case; much less could they do so, if they had such an inveterate rancour at heart, as Publicola represents. What then could our ministers imagine the Spaniards should do upon a foresight of the infanta's being sent back, and by consequence of breaking with France? I will venture to say, for it is plain and evident, that if they thought any thing on this affair, they must think the very thing which the Spaniards did. The Spaniards began to treat at Vienna, that they might prepare for the worst; and they delayed concluding their treaty, till what they feared happened. Give me leave to add, that it was easy to see that, whenever the ministers of Philip and the Imperialists should come to examine their masters' interests together, they would soon find these interests not so hard to reconcile, nor their want of mediators so great, as they had imagined, while rivalship and pique kept them at a distance; and that there were men of great weight in the emperor's court, whose private interest must render them particularly zealous to promote this union. All this happened; and it affords a pregnant instance of what I said above, that reason of state will determine the conduct of princes, not old stale resentments.

From what hath been thus stated I desire to make some inferences, and to recommend them to Publicola's consideration.

First

First then, It appears more ridiculous than ever to talk of the promise of Gibraltar, and the loss of their fleet, as lying at the hearts of the Spaniards, and breaking out upon this occasion. Neither must it be said absolutely, that our refusing the sole mediation at Cambray threw Spain into the arms of the emperor. In what respect this step might contribute to it will be said presently. But the principal and determining cause of Spain's uniting so closely with the emperour was the sending back the infanta.

Secondly, However sudden the immediate resolution for the departure of this princess from France might be; yet this design had been long in agitation; so long that the suspicion of it had been entertained by the Spaniards, and was even publicly owned by their ministers very many months before they sent their full powers for carrying on a treaty at Vienna.

Thirdly, There was surely, in the whole progress of this affair, notice enough to alarm any reasonable men, and time enough to prepare for the consequences of a breach between France and Spain. During the life of the duke of Orleans, he had, and it could not well be otherwise, the chief credit at Madrid. But it was obvious enough, that, by sending back the infanta, his successor would furnish us with a fair opportunity of attempting at least to get between France and Spain, as France had stood between Spain and us, and of maintaining ourselves in that post. This indeed was an object of the utmost importance, which deserved

more than all our negotiations have cost us, and which it is not impossible might have been accomplished for less. Whenever it shall appear, that we took all the measures in our power, in a proper manner and at a proper time, for this great end, infinite honour will accrue to our ministers without dispute.

Fourthly, If we had been as much prepared as one would think we might in so many months have been, we should have had some great advantages, which, if we were unprepared for these events, and even surprised at them, it was impossible we should reap.

The sole mediation could not indeed have been sooner offered than it was; because it could not be offered till Spain had broke with France, and then it was offered to us. Nay, if it had been offered sooner, I agree that we could not have accepted it sooner, for reasons of policy and even of decency. But if we had been prepared for these events, we might have struck a great stroke, as the generality of the world thought, and continue to think, by accepting the mediation in form, as soon as it was offered. In the case supposed of preparatory measures taken by us, on a foresight of such a conjuncture, it is probable that Spain would not have been extravagant enough to precipitate so bad a bargain as she made for herself in the Vienna treaty. Having no mediator nor even ally, she was under a necessity of granting almost any terms to the emperor, provided she secured the main points which she had in view. But, sure of our

support, and she might have had assurances sufficient for her to depend upon, it is impossible to think she would have carried her concessions farther than she needed to have done. In this case none of those engagements, which were talked of, but which have never yet appeared, so injurious to Britain, could have been taken; and we might have had perhaps the satisfaction of seeing the peace of Europe consummated by the reconciliation of two princes, the adjustment of whose interests had been so long our care, and whose union is, without doubt, in general, and unless some particular circumstances of a very extraordinary nature hinder it, the common advantage of all those, who desire to see a balance of power preserved in the western world. But I go farther. I will suppose that we had not been able to soften Spain; or that we had not attempted it, which perhaps was the case; that Spain looked on us with a jealous, and even a revengeful eye; and in short that the mediation was offered to us, without any design that we should concern ourselves in it, and purely for form sake; yet surely, even in this case, some advantage might have been taken by our immediate acceptance of it. Our conduct at least would have been free from any objection, and Spain and the emperor would have been left without any colour of excuse. Might not such a step have retarded the conclusion of this famous treaty? Might not time have been gained; and would not the least time, in this case, have been of the greatest moment to us?

Fifthly, When the mediation was offered us, we could not know how soon the treaty would be signed. It cannot be pretended that we did. Our refusal of it therefore must have been grounded purely on these two considerations, so often urged in defence of this measure, that the Spaniards were our inveterate enemies, and that we were in alliance with the French. What is meant by being in alliance with the French, and making this a distinction between our relation to them and our relation to the Spaniards, I am at a loss to find. We were surely in alliance with one nation, as well as the other, from the moment the king of Spain acceded to the quadruple alliance, and the matters still unsettled at Cambray were solely relative to him and to the emperour. If it be meant, that we thought the French our friends, and knew that the Spaniards waited only for a pretended occasion to break out into enmity with us, I think this reason will prove the very contrary of what it is advanced to prove. Did we suspect that something contrary to our interest, something dangerous to us, was working up in the negotiation of Vienna; and did we for this very reason decline an opportunity of coming at some knowledge of what was in agitation there? did we, for this very reason, refuse the best means we could have hoped for, of keeping our ancient friendship with the imperial court, and of being in a condition to check the court of Spain? Such arguments as these will not pass; and whoever produces them hath too mean an opinion of the rest of mankind, and too presumptuous an opinion of his own

own sufficiency. On the part of France, no objection could have been made to us, if we had accepted this mediation: for either the points to be mediated upon were pure trifles; such as the titles, and other matters of as little weight, referred to the congress of Cambray; in which case our accepting the sole mediation must have been quite indifferent to the French: or these points were of moment to the general interest; and in this case, the French ought to have desired that we should continue in the mediation, for the same reasons which ought to have determined us to do so. If the friendship and confidence between us and the French was not so strict as it hath been represented, they did not deserve the compliment we made them. If this friendship and confidence were so strict, they might and they would have trusted us with pleasure. Every one knows how concerned and alarmed the French were at the resentment, which the king of Spain showed on this occasion. Their first care was to try all possible means of pacifying him. If we could have been one of these means, their obligations to, and their confidence in us must have increased. We might have treated for them, when they could not treat for themselves. Instead of this, by dint of management, we so disposed affairs, that the French in a short time treated for us with the emperour and the king of Spain, with whom we could not treat for ourselves.

The last inference I shall make, from all that hath been said, is this. As sending back the

infanta was the certain and immediate cause of throwing Spain into the arms of the emperor; so our refusal of the sole mediation may justly be deemed an accessory cause of it. This refusal might give occasion to carry the engagements of these two princes farther than it was for our interest that they should go. At least, our acceptance of it was the sole probable measure, in that instant, of preventing such engagements; for this union of the emperor and the king of Spain is not, in itself, so terrible. Spain might be as well, nay better for us and for all Europe, in the arms of the emperor than of France; and if this union is become formidable to us, we may thank for it our own management, through a long series of business, and through divers revolutions of affairs: our too much neglect of Spain; our too much dependance on France; our being, upon all occasions, indefatigably busy about the interests of other people, and leaving to other people the conduct of our own; of which surely a more strange example cannot be imagined, than that which is before our eyes. We would not attempt, nay we would not consent, to be mediators, when we stood in that character, and could stand in no other, notwithstanding all the reasons for it in that nice conjuncture. Such was our delicacy. But we have admitted and (may I be allowed to say so?) we have courted France to act as mediator, where she is a party; for France is a party to the treaty of Hanover; and the treaty of Hanover, with the treaty of Vienna, give occasion jointly to the congress of Soissons, and all the present negotiations.

That

That France is a party in our quarrel, we have been often told, and that she would act as such we have been often assured. She was to make besieging Gibraltar a Casus Fœderis. She was to march an army into Rousillon. What was she not to do?—But we have seen her act hitherto no part but that of a mediator; a common friend; but unconcerned in the quarrel. No good effect hath yet appeared, even from her offices as mediator. If, by these offices, she hath kept us from acting for ourselves, and made us prefer a precarious dependence to a vigorous war, I am sure the effect of her acting in this character hath been a bad one for Britain.

Nothing can be more plain than that chain of causes and effects, which hath dragged us into our present difficulties; and as these difficulties increased, the obstinacy of Spain must of course increase likewise. If that court had never thought of getting Gibraltar out of our hands, the state we brought ourselves into was sufficient to suggest the design to them. When once Spain had purchased the emperor's alliance, (I may use this expression, the treaty of Vienna will justify it) she might flatter herself that he would adhere to her, even in unreasonable expectations, since he had no more to expect from us, and had so much to receive from her. As soon as we had sagely declined having to do with her, or for her, unless in concert with France, with whom she would have nothing to do at that time, France employed all possible means to be reconciled to her. Intrigues

trigues of every sort, ecclesiastical and secular, were set on foot. They succeeded; and Spain saw she had nothing to apprehend. What she had to hope, I determine not, from this party to the Hanover treaty. The other princes and states, who acceded to this treaty, acceded in such a manner, as it is easy to prove, if Publicola should think fit to deny it, that we could have little to hope, and Spain little to apprehend, from their engagements, in her disputes with us about our immediate interests.

All other powers softened towards each other by degrees; and by degrees we got deeper into the quarrel. Spain, from having no ally, came to have many; some more, some less to be depended on; none to be feared. From having a multitude of disputes, she came to have none, except with us. We, on the other hand, from having none of our interests in dispute, are come to see hardly any others in controversy. From feeling ourselves backed by several allies, we are come, at least in the points of direct relation to us, to have in effect no ally but one; and with that one we own that we are dissatisfied; nay, we own that we are afraid of him. The writer, I am answering, insinuates both; nay, he does it almost in express words. He complains of the indifference of France in support of our interests; and of the danger of engaging in a war, in concert with France. Who would have thought it, Mr. D'Anvers? Here is the London Journal contradicting the Enquiry; and I am able to point out to you many gross in-

stances

stances of his doing the same thing. Here is Publicola accounting for our present difficulties, now they are come upon us, by the very arguments which were urged against the Hanover treaty, and which proved, that the natural consequence of that treaty was just what the event hath shown it to be. Those who wrote against the Enquiry foretold what would happen. Publicola justifies the ministry, by complaining that it hath happened!

I will mention but one instance more of this kind; and that shall be with relation to the Ostend company. "The grand quarrel," says Publicola, "was between us and Spain. The Ostend trade, "about which such a noise hath been made, was "more the concern of our neighbours, both by "treaty and interest, than our own."—Now I will leave the world to decide by whom all this noise about the Ostend trade hath been made. Did not you, Mr. D'Anvers, and several other writers, maintain, that this company was but of little concern to us, in opposition to the whole party on the contrary side, who took all possible pains, both within doors and without, to prove that the Ostend trade was a point of the utmost concern to Britain, and even equal to Gibraltar itself? Nay, the author of the Enquiry, who hath now the mortification to see himself given up, in every material article, by both parties; even by those who set him to work, goes so far, p. 57 of that memorable performance, as to assert that Gibraltar would be of no importance to us, if the Ostend company should be suffered to subsist; and having laboured

laboured that point, with all his strength, for no less than twenty pages together, concludes it thus: "That not only our own East and West India "trade, and that of the Dutch, will be ruined by "the Ostend company, which will be the imme- "diate effect of it, or rather is so already in some "degree, but also that the contagion will spread "to many other branches of the British and "Dutch trade; and convey along with it the "riches, the strength, and the naval power, to the "same Spanish Netherlands.

"But were it so that Holland alone would be "the sufferer by the Ostend trade, which is far "from being the case, yet the ruin of Holland "must carry along with it, in the end, the ruin of "Britain."

Such absurdities as these would provoke merriment in a case of less consequence; but they provoke indignation in a case where the honour and interest of our king and country are so deeply concerned.

Into this state were our foreign affairs brought when his present majesty came to the crown. I mention this the rather, because they, who now think it for their interest to date the rise of all this mischief so much backwarder than it can consistently with truth be dated, may possibly find it for their interest hereafter, if new and almost unavoidable difficulties should come upon us, in consequence of what they have done in a former reign, to date the rise of them as much too forward. Let it then be remembered, that all which hath happened

in

in this reign is no more than a prolongation of the same scene. The great scenes of the world are not to be shifted at our pleasure. They must be continued sometimes, when we are convinced the most that they are weakly framed. Opportunities must be waited for, and we trust they will happen. We are sure they will be improved by the capacity, the vigour, the experience and valour of our august monarch. A seasonable and powerful effort hath often broke through the most complicated evils. A word hath often effected, what the most tedious negotiations, such as we have been accustomed to, could never have brought about.

I have now done with Mr. Publicola for this time; and I hope for good and all. If my letter is grown into a greater length than I designed, this hath been owing principally to an earnest desire of setting these matters (so often and so grossly misrepresented) in a just and clear light. I have advanced no facts but such as are of public notoriety, such as I know to be true, and such as I do verily believe to be so, upon such grounds as reasonable men have always thought sufficient to constitute, in cases of this nature, the highest probability. I have endeavoured to push no consequence, nor to strain any argument farther than I judged it would evidently bear; for whatever Publicola may think, which concerns me little, I assure you, Mr D'Anvers, that I would not have given myself this trouble, small as it is, of answering him for any other reason but this; that,

in

in order to get well out of our present difficulties and dangers, it is necessary to know truly how we came into them; and that he therefore, who contributes to dispel from before the eyes of mankind those mists of errour, which are so industriously raised at this time, does some service to his king and his country.

I am, Sir, &c.

JOHN TROT.

AN

ANSWER

TO THE

DEFENCE

OF THE

ENQUIRY into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.

In a Letter to Caleb D'Anvers, Esq.

AN

ANSWER

TO THE

Defence *of the* Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.

SIR,

AS soon as I heard that the author of the Enquiry* had condescended to take notice of a Letter which you thought fit to publish in your journal of the fourth of January last, I resolved to make my acknowledgments to him for so great an honour, and to desire you to convey them into the world. This duty should have been discharged

* The following was the motto to this Answer to the Defence, &c. "Nor can we conceive a more abject servility "of conduct, than for people, so long famed for commerce "and bravery, to see their darling good, and their pe-"culiar glory, the pledge of their liberty, and life of all their "property, just going to be forcibly and unrighteously torn "from them; and tamely to look on without one struggle "for so great a blessing, or one hearty effort against the in-"vaders of it. What can we become, if we give our consent "to such ruin by our own supine indolence and insensibility, "and suffer ourselves to be stripped of our boasted strength "and ornament at once, but a nation, the most despicable of all "nations under Heaven; exposed to the contempt and in-"sults of the world about us here below, and rendered "utterly unworthy, by our own conduct, of the care of Provi-"dence above us?" Enquiry, p. 86.

discharged immediately, if I had not been diverted from it by avocations of a very different nature; and if I had not observed, on a review of the present dispositions, that there was no reason in force to make a very speedy reply necessary. What I am going to say now will, I think, justify me for what I have said already, in the opinion of mankind; and at least in the secret thoughts even of the author and defender of the Enquiry: and as this effect of the little additional trouble I am about to give myself is the principal, nay, the sole good one which I dare expect, we are in time for that; and by consequence I shall not lose my labour by my delay.

This author hath thrown several matters in my way, to which it is proper I should say something, before I enter into that which is strictly the subject of our present dispute.

He declares upon this occasion, with all possible seriousness, that "he hath not writ, or dictated, "or advanced, or, directly or indirectly, had the "least part in the writing or publishing any paper, "which hath appeared in the world, in any form, "from the time of writing the Enquiry, and from "some time before that, to the twentieth of "January 1728-9." He makes this declaration, "and for that space of time, particularly with a "view to papers printed in the London Journal; "in all which he had been utterly unconcerned "either directly or indirectly."

Far be it from me to question the truth of so solemn a declaration. I give entire credit to it;

and I freely own that he hath reason to complain of me for insinuating, at least, that he had a hand in the London Journals. The little share I have had in the paper war hath not given me many opportunities of knowing the combatants; and the productions on one side gave me little curiosity to inquire after the authors of them. But I found it universally affirmed, and no where contradicted, that this gentleman had a hand in the weekly papers just mentioned. The persons who recommended these papers, countenanced the opinion; and were glad, perhaps, that so considerable a name should give them an authority, which might supply whatever else they wanted. Nay, I found among those who were acquainted with this author, and who profess a particular regard for him, some who were angry at him on this very account; some who were sorry for him; but none who doubted the truth of the fact. What may have given occasion to so general a concurrence, he can best tell. I urge these circumstances only to show, how I was led into an errour. It was indeed errour, not malice. But still I think myself obliged to take this occasion of asking his pardon; and I do it with all possible seriousness, as he made his declaration, and from the bottom of my heart; because I am as much convinced, that he neither abetted, encouraged, nor paid the authors of these papers, as I am that he was not himself the author of them.

It cannot be imputed to me, that I have any thing to answer for, on account of the personal

severities which this author, in a very pathetic manner, complains of. We must acknowledge, and we ought to lament, that our public papers have abounded in scurrility. One would be tempted to imagine, that the Saturnalia were held all the year round in Britain; for those who can do nothing but rail, have had their encouragements to write; and I am persuaded that this gentleman's candour will oblige him to confess, that nothing but a thorough contempt hinders complaints from being made against the writers of his own side, much better grounded and supported by much stronger instances, than he can produce against the writers of the opposite side, in his own, or in any other case. For my part, I should be extremely sorry to have it said of me, with truth, that I had railed at any author, instead of answering, or even in answering his book; and less than any would I be guilty of this crime, for such it is, toward one who defends, with so much uniformity of conduct, the liberty of the press, that corner-stone of public liberty. He who will support what hurts himself, because he thinks it the support of the whole liberty we enjoy, shall meet with nothing from me but that which he deserves from all mankind, the utmost respect, whenever he leaves me the power of showing it, consistently with the regard I owe to truth, and to my own necessary defence.

He will not, I hope, think it inconsistent with this respect for his person, or with that which I have for some of his writings, if I cannot bring

myself

myself up to have the same for his "Enquiry into "the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain;" or for his "Defence of this Enquiry." He appears to have a paternal fondness for the first of these treatises, which amounts even to a partiality; the more surprising, because it is found in one who can boast so numerous and so fair an offspring. I should not have attempted to draw him out of an errour, which he seems to indulge with so great a satisfaction, if he had not made it necessary for me. Since he hath done so, I will offer some observations on the Enquiry itself, before I come to the Defence.

The circumstance upon which he seems to triumph a little, (that the Enquiry was not answered) he will permit me to say is often a very equivocal proof of the merit of a book. The same mouths, it seems, which pronounced the Enquiry to be a mean and despicable performance, "have more than once expressed in "print their earnest desire that some able hand "would answer it." From what mouths he took this, I know not. But surely the testimony of those, who desired some able hand would answer what they judged to be mean and despicable, is an odd testimony for him to quote; since it could proceed from nothing but a design to ridicule him.

Though the Enquiry was not answered in form, yet I believe that several, perhaps all, the points on which his system leaned, were occasionally examined, and sufficiently refuted by you, Mr.

D'Anvers, and by others. If no more was done I take the reason to have been plainly this. The ministerial air of authority and information, assumed in it, made even those, on whom this air did not impose, judge that it was prudent to wait till time and events should open the scene a little more; and as the scene opened, they perceived that the Enquiry was daily answered in the most effectual manner, to their hands; so that the author might have waited all his life, perhaps, for something more of this sort, if he had not thought fit to seize an opportunity of defending it, not more worthy his notice, than several others before given him; and if my respect for him, and my desire to stand fair in his opinion had not determined me to make him a reply.

As to the effect of the Enquiry, which he thinks so considerable, that it "awakened multitudes out "of a dull and languid state into life and vigour; "and that it was not found to procure slumbers "either to those who liked it, or those who "disliked it;" I, who was most certainly one of those who either liked or disliked it, can affirm with the greatest truth, that if it did not procure me slumbers, it did not keep me awake. Some of the facts advanced in it were strange and surprising; but then they were destitute of any proof, except the strong affirmations of the author, and collections of circumstances so extremely trivial, that they became burlesque as soon as they were seriously applied. A bare exposition of any real danger from the pretender would

would have waked multitudes into life and vigour, though the Enquiry had never been written. But I apprehend that so many pages spent on Wharton's rambles, Ripperda's chitchat, hearsays of what one great man writ concerning what another great man said, three Muscovite ships coming to Spain, embarkations which were never made, and armies which were never assembled, could have no other effect than to compose multitudes into perfect tranquillity, and to confirm the opinion of their security on this head. Any surmises of an engagement, on the emperor's part, to assist Spain in the recovery of Gibraltar by force, could provoke no indignation, whatever else it might provoke, nor cause any alarm. We knew Gibraltar to be impregnable to the Spaniards, before Ripperda declared it to be so; and what assistance the emperor could give them toward reducing this place, unless he had in his service some of Mr. Waller's winged troops and Pegasean horse, we were not able to discover. As to the emperor's real engagement in this article toward Spain, and as to the engagements of Spain toward the emperor, on the article of trading to the West-Indies, we soon knew what they were; and with this knowledge our alarm ceased. What was said in the long dissertations, about the Ostend company, caused likewise little or no emotion in us. Our interest was plainly not that of principals, till the Dutch had the address to make us so, by their accession to the treaty of Hanover; and the conduct of our own court, who beheld, with so much indifference, the rise

and progress of this company, had taught us to be indifferent about it. These considerations, and many others which I omit, hindered the Enquiry from having the effect, which this gentleman's paternal fondness makes him believe it had. The part, if I may have leave to say so, was overacted. But still I see no reason that he has to be concerned, because one way or other the end of writing it was answered. The Enquiry was the book of a day, like some little animals on the banks of the river Hypanis, which came to life in the morning, fulfilled all the ends of their creation, and died before night.

There is a point, on which the author and defender of the Enquiry values himself and his book very much; I mean the strict regard to truth, which he assures us he observed in writing. Now, though I am ready to agree that this author has always a great regard to truth, yet I affirm that I could write a book as big as the Enquiry, filled with nothing but demonstrations of his errours in matters of fact. Too much confidence in the informations he received, too much haste in composing, and above all, that fire which is apt to overheat the imagination of polemical writers must have caused these errours. It is impossible to account any other way, how a gentleman of nice honour, remarkable sincerity, and even exemplary piety, instead of making his propositions constantly the result of the evidence he found, upon a thorough examination, true, should, through a whole book, have constantly suited his evidence

to a certain set of propositions; and how facts and dates, as stubborn things as they are in the hands of other men, should grow soft as wax under his touch.

But it is not my design to enter into a disquisition of this sort. It would show ill-nature, which I hope I have not; and it would be now of no use whatever. I must however defend myself, as unwilling as I am to offend him; and therefore since he contradicts what I said, viz. that "he had "been given up in every material article of the "Enquiry;" I think myself obliged to prove it. "How easy are such words as these," says our author, "but how hard to support them?" Now I do assure him that these words, as far as they may be thought harsh or impolitic, will at no time fall easily from my tongue or pen; but he will find that it is easy for me, upon this occasion, to support them. I will confine myself to the four great points of danger, arising from the Vienna treaties, and mentioned already. Let us see whether he has been given up in them or not.

According to the Enquiry, we were in danger of losing not only our East and West-India trade, but many other branches of the British trade, by the privileges supposed to be granted to the emperor's subjects, and from the enjoyment of which privileges we are debarred. Nay, it was very strongly insinuated, that even the ruin of Britain was involved in this point. If this had been the case, and if the treaty of Vienna had thus settled the matter, there would have been occasion for

all

all the outcries which we meet with in the Enquiry, and for still more. But our most knowing merchants gave up this point, as soon as they read and considered the several clauses; and it is notorious that the contracting powers declared, as soon as they heard of the objection, that their meaning was not to give these privileges to the imperial subjects above other nations; and that they would explain the text accordingly, if any ambiguity made it necessary. But in truth there was little or no ambiguity in the matter, except what the representations of it occasioned; for without entering any deeper into it, let us observe, that the answers which this author gives to the objection, which he was forced, from the notoriety of the thing, to make to himself, are evasive and fallacious; for since the same liberty of entering the Spanish ports in the West-Indies, in case of distress by bad weather, or for refreshment, is granted to us by the treaty of 1670, as is granted to the imperial subjects by the treaty of Vienna, does it follow that more is granted to them than to us, because the liberty granted to us hath ceased for many years? If we have not made use of the liberty, the fact affirmed is nothing to the purpose. If we have been denied it, such denial is an infraction of the treaty of 1670, and proves that we have had injustice done us by the practice of the Spaniards; but doth not help to prove, that we have had any done us by their concessions to the emperor, with whom they may keep this article, perhaps, as little as they have done with

with us, and who is not likely to have the same means of obliging them to it, as we have in our power, whenever we please to employ them.

How the eighth article of the treaty of Utrecht came to be quoted, on this occasion, is to me marvellous. That article is made general to all nations; but was particularly directed against the French, who, even at that time, continued to obtain licences to send ships to trade in the South Sea, as they had done all the war. But the treaty of Utrecht confirms the treaty of 1670; and the stipulation, that "no licence, or any permission "at all, shall at any time be given to the French, "or any other nation whatsoever—to sail, traffic, "&c. to the dominions subject to the crown of "Spain in America," cannot surely be construed to deprive us of the right of going into those parts, in the cases allowed by the treaty of 1670. This seems so clear, that I may pronounce the gentleman given up, on this head, by the most knowing merchants, and by every man who can read and understand what he reads.

But I may go farther; for it appears even from the fifth article of the provisional treaty itself, which is said to secure us from the dangerous engagements contained in the treaties of Vienna, with relation to trade, that the king of Spain "never understood to grant, by the said treaty, "any privileges contrary to the treaties confirmed "above; nor to give to his imperial majesty any "greater advantages than those enjoyed by other "nations in their commerce; his imperial majesty

"adopting

" adopting for his subjects the above-mentioned " declaration, made in the name of his catholic " majesty." And it is very observable, that this article seems to be inserted in the treaty, merely upon the surmises of the ministers of France, Great Britain, and Holland, who have pretended, as it is said in the introduction to it, " that, " in the treaty of commerce, concluded at " Vienna on the first of May, 1725—there were " divers clauses, which clashed with articles of " several treaties of commerce, anterior to the " year 1725," &c.

If therefore the natural sense of the Vienna treaty itself, as well as the declaration of their imperial and catholic majesties, as soon as the objection was first started, and their offer to remove any supposed ambiguity in this article of the Vienna treaty, were not sufficient to satisfy us; what farther satisfaction shall we receive by the provisional treaty, in case it should be accepted, which contains only the very same declaration?—But this hath been sufficiently explained already by your correspondent Raleigh.

As to the Ostend trade, he thinks that I myself cannot be against him, unless in the degree of the importance of it. Now this is the very point upon which he must be given up, in this case, if he is given up at all. I never heard that any man was wild enough to affirm, that the trade carried on from Ostend was of no consequence whatever to us. But the question is, whether that trade be of that degree of importance to us, which he repre-

sents

sents. He asks, "who of those I oppose hath "declared against him in this?" I answer, The very person I quoted in the passage he had before his eyes, when he asked this question. He says, in the Enquiry, "that our East and West-India "trade will be ruined by the Ostend company; "that they are so already, in some degree; that "the contagion will spread to other branches; in "short, that this trade will carry riches, strength, "and naval power from us to the Spanish Nether-"lands." What says Publicola? "The Ostend "trade, about which such a noise hath been "made," (he must mean by the enquirer, since the enquirer made more noise about it than all the other writers put together) "was more the "concern of our neighbours, both by treaty and "interest, than our own." I appeal now, in my turn; and I appeal to the enquirer himself. Is not one of these representations directly contrary to the other? Does not Publicola diminish the consequences of the Ostend trade to us, and treat it even lightly? Does not he magnify it, in the strongest terms, and make our all depend upon the obstruction of it? Does not Publicola, an author whom I oppose, give him up?

We are now come to the danger, much insisted upon in the Enquiry*, "of having Gibraltar "wrested out of our hands by force, if it be "possible, unless we will basely yield it up;" and this danger is grounded on a supposed† mutual engagement between the emperor and king of

* Page 57. † Page 34, 35.

Spain

Spain, contained in a secret offensive treaty. The writer of the Enquiry confesses, " that the im-
" perial resident read to some of our ministers
" the words, which he said were the contents of
" the article which his master had entered into,
" relating to Gibraltar; which implied, that his
" master had engaged to use his good offices for
" the restitution of Gibraltar." Now from hence, because this resident read all that related to this point, and did not show the whole treaty to us, any more than we thought ourselves obliged to show to the imperial ministers the treaties of 1721, which we made at Madrid with one of the parties between whom we were at that time mediators, in the congress at Cambray; from hence, I say, the writer I am answering concludes, that the truth of what he imputes to the emperor stands confirmed: but this offensive alliance hath appeared hitherto no where, except in his writings; and the article relating to Gibraltar, in the defensive alliance between the emperor and king of Spain, is surely as contrary as possible to all that he hath advanced. By that article it appears, that the Spaniards affirmed a promise on our part to restore Gibraltar. In consideration of this promise, the emperor declares he will not oppose this restitution, if it be made amicably; that if it be necessary, he will employ his good offices, and even his mediation, if the parties desire it. Till therefore the enquirer can show another article between the contracting powers in the Vienna treaties, about Gibraltar,

this

this must be reputed the sole article of that kind, and by consequence a flat contradiction to all that he hath said on this occasion; so that if his own side do not give him up in this case, both they and he will be given up, I fear, in the opinion of every other man in Europe; to which I shall add, since the observation lies fairly in my way, that every man, who knows any thing of the interest of Europe, knows it as much the interest of the emperor, that Britain should keep Gibraltar, as it is the interest of one of our allies that we should lose the possession of this place; and yet we have been taught by some profound statesmen, to apprehend the emperor's efforts to take it from us, and to rely on the assistance of France to preserve it to us.

I have reserved to the last the greatest of all those dangers, which are represented in the Enquiry; and that is the danger of the pretender.

It is there affirmed*, "that one express article "of the alliance between the emperor and Spain "contained an obligation in favour of the pre-"tender, and a stipulation to make the attempt "for him in England before opening the war in "any other parts." Nay, this author was so well informed of all these proceedings, that he gives us the particular engagements, which the pretender in return took toward the emperor and Spain. All these things are asserted in the strongest manner, as founded on "positive intelligence;

* Page 52.

"on

" on intelligence from more than one person; " on undoubted intelligence; and such as could " be entirely depended on." Now I suspect that the enquirer would think me very impertinent, if I should seem to question the authority of his intelligence; and yet I verily believe, that I have better reasons to do so than he had to depend upon it, when he writ the words I have quoted. But we will wave saying any thing more on a point on which it is proper for neither of us to speak plain. His good opinion of the intelligence communicated to him will not give it the stamp of infallibility; nor will my bad opinion destroy it's credit. The world will therefore judge, or rather has judged, of the validity of what he does not explain, by the force or weakness of the other circumstances which he enlarges upon; and by observing whether the course of events hath justified this boasted intelligence or not. I have just mentioned above the chief of these circumstances; and notwithstanding the great respect I have for this author, nothing shall oblige me to treat them more seriously. I will show him, however, that the course of events hath destroyed all the use he pretended to make of these circumstances, and that it has contradicted, instead of confirming his intelligence. He says*, " that " the vigorous resolutions taken, and the prepa- " rations and dispositions made by Great Britain, " suspended the execution of this design. The " Spaniards found themselves obliged to send

* Page 51.

" part

" part of their ships from Cadiz and St. Andero " to the West-Indies, and the Muscovite ships " returned home."——Very well! The event does not yet justify the intelligence; but that is accounted for. The execution of the design was suspended for the present. The design went on then; and the preparations for an invasion by consequence. It must have been so; for we find in the Enquiry*, that the design thus suspended was afterward prevented by the appearance of a British fleet on the Spanish coast. Now let me desire you, Mr. D'Anvers, to take the trouble of turning to Sir John Jennings' letter, dated August 10, 1726, and made publick here; in which you will find the Spaniards so little prepared to invade us, that when he came on their coast, they seemed to be in the greatest consternation, that all the troops they could assemble did not exceed three thousand men, and that these were in very bad condition.

I ask now, is the intelligence of the enquirer, upon this head, supported by any thing but his own affirmation? Is it not contradicted by the whole course of events? Does there appear the least reason to believe, that he had a sure foundation to build upon, when he made such bold assertions, and of such a nature? The secret offensive treaty, which he talks so much of, has never appeared, nor any footsteps of it; and many people are apt to believe, that it never existed any where but in some people's luxuriant

* Page 97.

fancy. The several treaties made at Vienna in 1725, between the emperor and Spain, have been long publick; and when it was observed, some where or other, that nothing was contained in them like what the enquirer had asserted, the enquirer was given up. He was said to be mistaken. The article in favour of the pretender was said to be in some other treaty; and afterward in no formal treaty. It was not a treaty. It was an engagement. This may be called, by some ill-bred people, shuffling: but sure I am that it must pass for a direct giving up of this author; who will find, perhaps, if he pleases to inquire into the particulars of what passed on this occasion, that the person who gave him thus up, had some share in setting him to work.

After this, it is hardly worth notice, that the author of the "Observations on the Conduct of "Great Britain" has given him up likewise; for the utmost which this writer ventures to say, when he comes to speak of this engagement, asserted by the enquirer to be contained in an article of a treaty, is this; "our apprehensions were that "there might be engagements in favour of the "pretender." Let the enquirer consider again, whether I was in the wrong to advance that he had been given up, even by his own side.

Having justified what I presumed to advance concerning the Enquiry, I come now to the Defence of it.

The gentleman begins this Defence by stating the case, so he calls it, as he did in the Enquiry; and

and then he proceeds to take notice of what hath followed since the date of that book; that is to say, he represents the matter in dispute, just as it suits his purpose; leaving out many things necessary to set the whole in a true light; asserting some things, which have been never proved; and others, which I think never can be proved; making what insinuations, drawing what conclusions he thinks fit; and in a word, begging the question in almost every line. It is hard to conceive for what purpose this is done. The reason given, I am sure, is not a good one; since the principal facts and reasonings upon which the strength of all that can be said must be founded, are so far from seeming to be forgot, that they seem to be the only things remembered, or thought of at this time, and are the common topicks of almost every conversation. There must therefore be some other reason for this method of proceeding; and I can guess but one. This method may perhaps be thought proper to catch unwary readers, and to give a particular bias to their minds, with which they are to read and to judge of all that follows. I could make use of the same art; and, without being at much pains, draw up a state of the case very contrary to that which he hath drawn, and at least as plausible. But I think the proceeding too unfair to copy after it. I have indeed no reason to do so; since, very indifferent to all other considerations, I seek nothing in this dispute but the discovery of the truth: and therefore as I will receive nothing but what is supported by

the evidence of fact, and the force of argument, so I will not presume to attempt imposing any thing, void of both, upon others. Besides, this gentleman undertakes to "consider what I have "advanced, either against any thing, in which he "can be supposed to be concerned; or upon any "subject of debate, (of this debate he means) "which appears to him to be of importance:" so that if I am able to refute all that he objects to me, in the Defence of this Enquiry, I refute all objections of any importance, to what I have said in my former letter to you; and then I imagine that his state of the case will do him no great honour, and his cause little good.

The first point on which I am attacked by the defender of the Enquiry is, on the turn, so he calls it, which I have given to the very beginning of this whole scene. He means the Vienna alliance.

Let us see therefore whether it is he or I, for one of us may perhaps, have done so, who hath endeavoured, in treating this subject, to turn every thing to the service of some other cause than that of truth.

In the Enquiry, he represented the Vienna alliance, as to the manner, and as to the matter of it, to be one of the most astonishing phænomena which ever appeared in the political world. What surprise to see two princes, rivals almost from their infancy, "two powers, that could hardly be "kept within the bounds of common decency "toward one another, privately running into one "another's arms," as he expresses himself? What

a surprise

a surprise to see the emperor abandon the mediation of Great Britain and France; to the first of whom he and his family owed so many obligations; and to the last of whom, in conjunction with the first, he owed the acquisition of Sicily, and the other advantages of the quadruple alliance? What a surprise to see Spain abandon this mediation, just in the moment, as my adversary has extremely well observed, when the interests of the duke of Parma were in agitation; interests which Spain had extremely at heart; and in the supporting which she had reason to think herself sure of success against the emperor: because the mediators had taken secret engagements with her to favour these interests by one of the treaties made at Madrid in 1721? What a surprise to see Spain do this, and in doing it not only forego the advantages which the mediators had procured, and were to procure for her, in many respects; particularly, in that favourite point, the succession of Don Carlos; but make so bad a bargain for herself at Vienna, that the emperor, according to this author, and indeed I think according to the truth, "gained "every thing, and particularly the guaranty of "his own succession?"

All this, it must be confessed, appeared wonderful, and excited a strong curiosity to know what were the springs of so great, and, according to these representations, so sudden a revolution of counsels and interests. But here we were dropped. The enquirer spent much time, and

took much pains to show what did not occasion it; but I have not observed, that he pretended to show what did; unless he meant, that we should take, for causes of it, those terrible designs which he imputes to the emperor and the king of Spain. Our ministers, who seem to have foreseen so little that France and Spain might break, and that the negotiations then on foot might be thrown into confusion, or take some new course, by this rupture, grew it seems prodigiously alert and sagacious afterward. They did not foresee what happened; but they discovered strange mysteries of iniquity concealed under this transaction, when it had happened; and these mysteries we find pompously unfolded in the Enquiry, with all the improvements and embellishments which the author's luxuriant fancy could bestow upon them. Now supposing these discoveries to have been real, the things so discovered can be looked upon no otherwise than as circumstances of the general measure; the measure, which the emperor and Spain took, of treating by themselves and for themselves; and therefore they wanted to be accounted for as much as the measure itself: but upon this head, I say, the enquirer gave us no satisfaction. Far from explaining to us what might induce Spain to take such a resolution, at that particular point of time, rather than at any other, he did not afford us the least hint to guess, why she should take it at all; and yet so strange an effect must have had some very considerable cause; too considerable certainly to be absolutely a secret, and even beyond the reach of conjecture.

This

This remarkable defect was, I believe, felt by every person who read the Enquiry; and therefore in the progress of the dispute, the writers of the same side thought it incumbent upon them to assign some cause, which might appear proportionable to such extraordinary effects; and which, at the same time, might not be inconsistent with what their great master, the enquirer, had advanced. The task was not easy; and indeed they have succeeded accordingly. Some laid the cause of all in that inveterate rancour, which they supposed the court of Spain to have conceived against us, on two accounts; the promise made by lord Stanhope about Gibraltar, and the defeat of the Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean. When this was exploded, and I think it was so as soon as examined, they had recourse to another system; a very strange one indeed: for it declares that the emperor, France, and Great Britain, the three contracting powers with Spain in the quadruple alliance, acted the most perfidious part imaginable in that whole proceeding; such a part as Ferdinand the catholick, or Lewis the eleventh, would have startled at. The succession of Don Carlos was, it seems *, a point, which all the powers of Europe strenuously opposed; which the emperor, who had already obtained his desires in the affair of Sicily, could not be for; to which the French were averse; which Great Britain had reason to oppose and prevent; and which it was plain that the Spaniards could never carry in a congress, where every party was an enemy to their

* British Journal, Jan. 4.

intentions. Surely nothing so extravagant, nothing so insolent as this was ever yet advanced! If you, Mr. D'Anvers, had presumed even to insinuate any thing like it, I believe you would have been prosecuted with all the severity possible; and I am sure you would have been given up by all your friends. Neither can I conceive how the enquirer, who is so zealous an assertor of our honour in the observation of treaties, could pass by such an imputation as this, without darting his thunder at the impious head who devised the slander; unless he thinks it an irremissible sin to account for any thing in contradiction to himself; and a venial fault to accuse Great Britain and France, as well as the emperor, of something worse than a violation of treaties; even of making them with a design to break them; and of obliging a prince, by long negotiations, and by a war, to accept conditions, which they never intended should be made good to him.

Among others, I presumed, at last, to account for this great event upon principles which I believed to be true, notwithstanding all that I read in the Enquiry; and which I still believe to be true, notwithstanding all that is said against them, in the Defence of the Enquiry.

The defender begins with quoting two or three passages, which relate to the sending back the infanta, and the point of the sole mediation, out of my letter to you; and then, without disproving the facts, or so much as mentioning the argument grounded upon them, he pretends that the whole

is hypothetical; and thinks it would be a full and sufficient reply to me, to "frame a scheme on the "other side, and to oppose supposition to sup- "position, and one arbitrary interpretation of ap- "pearances to another." After which he proceeds to frame such a scheme, partly on facts, which he would have us believe true, and partly, as he says himself, from his own invention; and this he thinks proper to oppose, in a ludicrous manner, to the account I have given.

Now if it shall appear, on examination, that I have built upon undeniable facts, and have reasoned justly, instead of building on suppositions, and giving arbitrary interpretations to appearances, this author's smartness will turn upon himself; and, instead of showing, that I deserved no answer, he will only have shown, that he was unable to give me a good one.

Let us enter into this examination.

I affirmed, and I do still affirm, that from the death of the duke of Orleans, the Spanish ministers were full of fears and jealousies about the completing the infanta's marriage with the king of France. Neither do I find any thing urged in the Defence of the Enquiry, to destroy the credibility of this fact. Indeed, if it was proper to descend into particulars of so delicate a nature, it would not be at all difficult to demonstrate, from a consideration of the change which was made in the French ministry, and of the difference of personal situations, interests, and views, that although there never could have been room

for

for such fears and jealousies as these, while the duke of Orleans had lived, yet there was great room for entertaining them, under the administration of his successor. But this is not all. These fears and jealousies increased and strengthened daily, in the minds of the Spanish ministers; and if this author pleases to inquire, I believe he will find, or else his prompters deal very unfairly by him, that the delay and excuses of the court of France, about performing the ceremony of the fiançailles, which Spain expected should have been performed soon after the time at which the duke of Orleans died, confirmed, in the highest degree, the suspicions already taken. The ceremony of the fiançailles would have secured the marriage. What other effect then could excuses and delays in this affair produce, but that which I have mentioned?

The Enquiry says*, "that the resolution of "the court of France, relating to the infanta, did "not come, no not in suspicion, to Madrid, till "March 8, N. S. 1724-5." If he means the particular resolution of sending her back at such a determinate time, that is nothing to the purpose, how much soever the affirmation might impose, when it was made use of at first, and before this matter had been sufficiently canvassed. But if the resolution of sending the infanta back, at some time or other; in plain terms, the resolution of not completing her marriage with the king of France be meant: then, I say, that I might very

* Page 15.

justly

justly have set this assertion down in the list of those which are made in the book without a strict regard to truth: for it is undeniably true, that the Spanish ministers in foreign courts entertained this suspicion above a year before that time. It is equally true, that several months before that time they spoke of this measure, as a thing they expected; and I add, that several private persons, at least, wrote from Madrid in the same style, to their correspondents in other countries. Of all this I am as sure, as I am sure I now hold a pen in my hand; or that a pamphlet, called "A Defence of the Enquiry," is now lying before me; and therefore neither the authority of the Enquiry, nor any better authority can persuade me, that the suspicion of a design to send the infanta back from France, did not come to Madrid till March 1724-5; because it would be absurd to believe, that the ministers of that court were less informed or less jealous about an affair of this importance, than private persons; or that the repeated advices, which must have come from the Spanish ministers abroad, made no impression upon those at home.

This fact is, I think, pretty well established; and the others I am to mention will occasion no dispute. They are these. The Spaniards * first took the resolution of throwing off the mediation, and of treating at Vienna in November 1724; and Ripperda's full powers were signed, according to the Enquiry, on the 22d of that month;

* Enquiry, page 15.

that

that is, about a year after the death of the duke of Orleans. Soon after this, the negotiation was begun; but the treaties, in which it terminated, were not signed till the last of April and the first of May 1725.

These, I presume, are facts, and not suppositions. Let it now be considered how I argue upon them, and whether my reasoning be nothing more than an arbitrary interpretation of appearances, as the author of the Defence hath rashly pronounced, but not ventured to attempt to prove. The sum of my argument is this. Since the Spaniards expected that the infanta would be, a little sooner or a little later, sent back from France, they expected to find themselves, a little sooner, or a little later, obliged in honour to show a due resentment of this affront, to send back the princesses of the house of Bourbon from Spain, and to break off that correspondence which had subsisted between the two courts, from Spain's accession to the quadruple alliance, and which had been so intimate, during the life of the duke of Orleans. They could not foresee how long this rupture might last, because they could not foresee how soon a change would be made in the French ministry, and satisfaction be given them for this affront; but they could not fail to foresee, that if this event should happen during the congress of Cambray, something worse than the affront would follow, and they must remain in the most abandoned condition imaginable; broke with one mediator; not sure of the other; the

emperor

emperor in possession of Sicily; and the reciprocal condition, in favour of Don Carlos, not effectually secured to them. These things are so intimately and necessarily tied together, that I can as little discover how it is possible to allow the first fact which regards the suspicions and expectations of the Spaniards, and deny the consequences which follow, as I can see how it is possible to contradict, with the least appearance of reason, a fact so publickly known, supported by so many circumstances, and justified by so many consequences as the first is. The probable arguments employed in the Defence, and which, it may be pretended, will serve to prove that though the fact were true, and the suspicion I have insisted on was entertained by the court of Madrid, yet that it did not produce the effects of throwing Spain into the engagement she took at Vienna, will be considered presently.

Thus far then, as we have a deduction of facts, not of suppositions; so we have a thread of consequential arguments, not a rhapsody of arbitrary interpretations of appearances. The case is fairly stated, and no imaginary scheme is offered to be imposed for truth. The probability, which results from this state, is confirmed, and I think turned into certainty by the event. By the state abovementioned, it was probable that Spain would take measures, in time, against the distress to which she must foresee that she stood exposed. Accordingly, the Spaniards began to treat at Vienna before the infanta was sent from France, which is

a fact

a fact allowed on all hands, that they might prepare for the worst; and when I add, that they delayed concluding their treaty, or that the conclusion of their treaty was delayed till what they feared happened, what do I affirm more than what my adversary allows? He had said, at first, that the "treaty of peace was signed at Vienna, before "what Spain feared from France was known "there." He has corrected that assertion, and has said, "that as the treaty of peace was agreed "to at Vienna before what Spain feared from "France was known at Vienna to have hap-"pened; so it was signed before the refusal of "Britain could be known there;" that is, the refusal of the sole mediation. The first point then is yielded to me. The Spaniards did not actually sign at Vienna, till the news came thither, of the infanta's being actually sent from France; though they had settled and agreed their terms with the imperialists, on the knowledge that she would be sent away. On the second point, all that I urged, as fact or argument, stands in the same force it did before; for I desire this author may not be indulged in a liberty I shall never take with him nor any one else, the liberty of carrying my affirmations, by strained constructions, farther than the plain and natural import of the terms I employ.

In opposition to Publicola, I showed that the manner in which he affirmed the treaty of Vienna to have been signed before the refusal of the mediation was known there, did not refute Raleigh,

on

on account of some possible circumstances there mentioned. Now this author has been forced to leave the proof, drawn from those possible circumstances, just as he found it. "There is no "proof," says he, "but the bare possibility here "insisted on." I say no more. The argument is as strong against him, as against Publicola; for even after the advantages taken over Publicola, for not expressing himself clearly, this author has, for reasons easy to be guessed, expressed himself in a manner liable to the same objection. "The "peace was signed," he says, "before the refusal "of Britain could be known." What! before it could be known by certain and direct intelligence, or before it could be known in form, after the tedious round which this resolution was to take? That is not explained; and yet that was the single point on which any thing could be said to the purpose. In short, we pursued with great steadiness our wise maxims of neglecting Spain, and of adhering closely to France; insomuch that those who wished us no good were perhaps heard, when they insinuated that, far from contributing to ward off a blow so much apprehended by Spain, we privately abetted France, in her design of breaking the match, and imagined by that measure, to establish an irreconcilable quarrel between the two courts. The Spaniards, as well as the imperialists, had reason to believe, from our whole conduct, that we should not accept the sole mediation, which had been offered to us; and was it then strange that the former, neglected by us,

us, provoked by France, should press the signing this treaty, without waiting long for our answer; or that the emperor, who got so much by the bargain, should consent to it?

Having been thus led to the affair of the sole mediation, which I had hitherto omitted to speak of, in order to avoid confusion, I shall consider it here, as far as this author has made it necessary for me. In my letter to you, Mr. D'Anvers, I dwelt a good deal upon it. I placed it in every light, and debated all the merits of the cause, as well as I was able. Now, if what I urged was absurd and nothing to the purpose, this author should have shown, in general, that it did not deserve a more particular answer. If what I urged was clear and strong, as some people imagine it was, this author, who declares himself, in every point, of a contrary opinion, should have had the goodness to examine and refute my arguments. How it happens I know not, but this great master of polemical writing hath, in every instance, upon this occasion, avoided to enter into the argument. He hath dwelt on the outside of things, and hath generally cavilled at circumstances.

I have just now given a strong instance of this; and I lay hold of the opportunity to tell this gentleman, that I am no apologist for Spain, though he endeavours to fix that character upon me by an innuendo, so very fine, that I was for some time at a loss to find out his meaning. I neither sounded to arms against the Spaniards, two years ago;

ago; nor am, at present, an advocate for bearing their delays and their insults. I neither aggravated, two years ago, the depredations and hostilities committed in the West Indies by the Spaniards; "and those violences, by which the whole com-"merce of Jamaica hath been well nigh destroy-"ed, and the trade of that island reduced to a "miserable condition*;" nor do I now soften in their favour, and call these outrages and losses by the gentle name of "inconveniencies attending "a state of uncertainty†."

But to return. Having given an instance of this author's cavilling at circumstances not material in the dispute, I shall now give some instances of his affirming over again, by way of answer, what had been refuted before; and when I have done this, I shall have taken notice of all that he says upon the subject of the sole mediation.

First then, he says, that the knowledge of the negotiations going on at Vienna was a just reason to decline this offer, which he supposes to have been a mere piece of mockery. But he does not so much as pretend to say a word, in answer to what I insisted upon, as an advantage in accepting this mediation, even supposing it offered to us without any design that we should concern ourselves in it. He does not pretend so much as to controvert what I urged, to prove that the worse opinion we had of the designs carried on at Vienna, the more reason there was to catch at this offer of the mediation.

* Enquiry, page 60. † Defence, page 13.

Secondly, he insists, that we could not accept this mediation, with a due regard to our alliance with France; and he supposes, that this reason will be thought just by "all those who do not "think the breach of faith, and the violation of "treaties, matters of no concern." Here again is another charitable innuendo. But let it pass. It would be easy to strengthen all that was said on this subject, in my Letter to you, by showing the difference between such a stipulation as this of a joint mediation, and the covenants which princes and states enter into with one another, about their mutual interests. But there is no need of it, since this author, who thinks fit to insist on this point, hath not thought fit to answer any one of the arguments urged by me, to prove that France could not have complained of us, if we had accepted this mediation; and yet there were some dilemmas laid down which seemed to deserve a solution.

Lastly, he pretends, that I affirmed, against the most publick facts, and the plainest appearances, what I said to show that our acceptance of the mediation must have been agreeable to France; and yet what I said was founded on publick facts, and the plainest appearances; which he has not touched, because he durst not deny them. It is really very strange, that so considerable an author should continue to write, when he can neither find out new arguments, nor answer the objections made to old ones.

Having now dispatched the point of the sole mediation,

mediation, it remains that I say something to those probable arguments, if they deserve that name, which I have civilly given them, by which this gentleman pretends to destroy what is, I think, established on the solid foundation of fact and reason, concerning the measure taken in France after the death of the late duke of Orleans, to break the match with the infanta, and the consequence of that measure, the throwing Spain into the hands of the emperor.

Now the first of these arguments is, that the court of Spain did not mention this affront from France, as any inducement to the transaction at Vienna; and that any such mention would have been inconsistent with other declarations made to Mr. Stanhope at Madrid. Very well. It is then an established rule, that we are not to believe a court has motives for their conduct, which motives they do not own, although we have the strongest reasons imaginable to believe such motives true. Another rule, which this author would do well to establish at the same time, and which is founded on as much reason as the former, is this, that we are to believe all the motives which a court thinks fit to give out, to account for their conduct, although we have the plainest proofs imaginable that these motives are false. Such logick as this was never introduced into politicks, I believe, before; and I am persuaded that you, Mr. D'Anvers, will excuse me, if I spend no time in answering it. Let me desire you however, before I leave this argument, to turn

to the thirteenth and fourteenth pages of the Enquiry, where you will find that the enquirer says, the imperial ministers at Cambray, at London, and Paris, talked the very language, which the defender of the Enquiry says the Spaniards were always ashamed to make use of *. Nay, the enquirer adds, that " upon the first publick news of the " Vienna treaty at Madrid, the discourses of " many were taught to run that way, and to dwell " upon that same popular topick."

The second of these arguments is this. If the news of sending back the infanta from France, and of Great Britain's refusing the sole mediation, had both come to Madrid before Ripperda was sent from thence; even this " could not have " really been, and would not have been pre- " tended to have been the motive of what was " afterward done at Vienna." And why, pray? Because when the news of our refusing the sole mediation did come, the court of Spain acknowledged it to be a reasonable proceeding. This, you see, is built on the principles laid down in the last article, and deserves no farther notice. But on the news coming to Madrid, that the infanta was sent home, he confesses that " the " court of Spain might, by such circumstances, " be induced to try what honourable terms the " emperor would come to." This concession goes farther than he is aware of; for I desire to know if it is reasonable to believe, that Spain would have treated with the emperor when the

* Page 19.

case

case had happened, why it is unreasonable to believe that Spain did begin to treat with him on almost a certain prospect that the case would happen; which is the great point we have been contending about? Ay, but Spain would not have treated with the emperor to hurt Holland and Britain, because Spain had been hurt by France; nor would the emperor have entered into a treaty to hurt them, who had no part in the affront to Spain and never injured the emperor. Again; much less would the king of Spain send a minister to Vienna to enter into and finish treaties, which should hurt other nations, upon a suspicion that France would hereafter affront him. I could make several reflections on some of the expressions in this place; and on the turn, which the author takes, of putting some very odd arguments into my mouth; and, what is still more, into the mouths of the emperor and the king of Spain. But I forbear; and content myself with saying two things, which will effectually blunt the point of all the wit employed in this paragraph, and fully answer the whole of what is said farther upon this subject, in the Defence of the Enquiry.

First then; as far as I am from being, or pretending to be, a master in politicks, which degree this writer seems to have taken long ago, I never imagined that the affront, considered merely as an affront, precipitated Spain into all the engagements she took with the emperor; though, by the way, he mistakes very much, if he thinks, as he says, that he may deny new fresh resentments to

determine the conduct of princes, exactly upon the same grounds, as I have denied that old stale resentments have this effect. What I imagined, what I said, and what I proved was, that this affront, considered as a necessary breach with France, at least for a time, would throw Spain into such circumstances of distress, as she was to prevent by all possible means; and that therefore reason of state determined in this case; though no doubt the affront, at the same time, provoked the Spaniards. Thus I am consistent with myself; and the author might have spared himself the trouble of writing this elaborate paragraph, if he had adverted to my sense, instead of playing with my words.

Secondly; as to the emperor, our author is guilty of begging the question; for the emperor will insist, as he has insisted, that his engagements were not engagements to injure any body; that he entered into no offensive alliance; and that, when he exacted from Spain the guaranty of the Ostend trade, and of his succession, he exacted the guaranty of nothing but of that, which he judges he has an independent right to establish and secure. As to Spain, it will be likewise said, that when his catholick majesty treated with the emperor, he never meant to hurt other nations, but to secure his own interests; that if his guaranty of the Ostend trade hurts the Dutch or us, he is sorry for it; but could no more avoid that engagement, than he could several others extremely disadvantageous to himself, and into which

he

he was however obliged to enter, because he was obliged to purchase the emperor's alliance at any rate: that therefore we must not blame him, who opposed the establishment of the Ostend company while he could do it, without any support from us; who never gave his guaranty to it, till he was forced to do so, by the necessity of his affairs; into which necessity he was falling for above a year together, without seeing the hand of Britain once stretched forth to hinder it. Such answers as these would certainly be given; and, in the mouths of the imperialists and the Spaniards, they would be just.

If, after all that has been said, this gentleman is unable, upon my notions, to account for the king of Spain's resolute flying from the mediatorship of France, I am sure it is not my fault. A few sacrifices did indeed help to pacify Spain, and to reconcile her to France; and a few sacrifices might, for aught I know, have reconciled our quarrels; or, which is better, have prevented them. But as no one can foresee now when such sacrifices will be made here; so neither could Spain, at the time when she sent to Vienna, foresee when such sacrifices would be made in France.

Upon the whole matter, and to conclude this tedious article; if the way in which I have endeavoured to account for the resolution taken by Spain to abandon the mediation of Cambray, and to treat at Vienna, be not right, I should be glad to know what the right way is. No other, which this gentleman, or any reasonable man will venture

to support, has been yet pointed out. But I apprehend the account I have given to be a just one; because it is built on fact and reason; because the event hath, in every respect, confirmed it; and because it shows not only why Spain broke with France, and applied to the emperor; but why Spain entered into these new measures, after the death of the duke of Orleans, which it cannot be pretended she ever thought of doing, while that prince was alive. If now this account be a just one, many melancholy but useful truths result from it.

But I need not point out these things. The world will discover them, without any help of mine, and will judge how well the Enquiry hath been vindicated, by the author and defender of it upon this head.

The next point, upon which my reasonings and imputations are to be tried at his tribunal, is that of Gibraltar; and here he sets out by accusing me, not in terms indeed, but in a manner almost as plain, of lying, of direct, premeditated lying. I will keep my temper, though a field large enough is opened to me, and though the provocation is not a little aggravated by the solemn air with which this accusation is brought, by the pretences to patience, and meekness, and candour, and by all the appeals to God with which my accuser hath, in several parts of this treatise, endeavoured to captivate the good opinion of mankind, and to establish his own reputation, that he might make sure of ruining that of others. He calls to

my

my mind the character of Mopsus in Tasso's Aminta.

——di quel Mopso
Ch' a ne la lingua melate parole,
E ne le labra un' amichevol ghigno,
- - - - - - - - e il rasoio
Tien sotto il manto.

I will have the decency not to translate the verses into English.

It is not necesary that I should say much about the jealousies which this author seems to complain arose at one time, lest Gibraltar would be given up or artfully betrayed into the Spaniards hands; nor about the vigorous defence of it, which was made afterward. Thus much however I will say, that when Sir John Jennings was called home, with all the troops embarked on board his squadron, just before the siege, and even from the neighbourhood of Gibraltar; when the Spaniards were suffered, under Sir Charles Wager's eyes, to transport by sea many things necessary for the attack of the place; and when it was known that the town wanted almost every thing necessary for the defence of it, people stood agaze, and not without reason. The cries of the nation precipitated at last the supplies, and the vigour of the garrison made a glorious use of them.

I come now to the accusation brought against me by this writer. I said in my letter to you, that the Spaniards ground their present claim to the restitution of Gibraltar, on a " private article in " a treaty

" a treaty made with them in 1721, stipulating " the contents of a letter to be written by the " late king, and on the letter written in pursuance " of this article." This is the fact. The accusation is, that there is no such article in the treaty; and many words are employed to cut off all pretences of excuse, and to pin the lie upon me. Now I desire it may be observed, in the first place, how very exact and knowing a critick this gentleman is; who, after pronouncing with so much emphasis, that " he hath read the treaty " himself, and finds no one article belonging to it " which hath the least relation to this subject," proceeds to mention the treaty, and quotes a wrong one. No man would have imagined, that such a stipulation could have been supposed to be in the defensive alliance between Great Britain, France, and Spain, of the thirteenth of June, 1721, who had known that there was a distinct private treaty, of the same date, between Great Britain and Spain. But this, it seems, was a secret to my accuser; though the treaty had appeared printed in the fourth volume of Rousset's collection, when he committed this mistake. It was of this treaty I meant to speak; and the reason why I expressed myself in that manner was this. I have had some years by me an extract of this very treaty, which was long kept a great secret, and for the keeping of which secret, there is an express provision in the sixth article of it. When the treaty became publick, I found that my extract of the several articles was exact; and therefore

fore I gave the more credit to the separate article mentioned in the same extract, as belonging to this treaty, and stipulating the contents of a letter to be written by the late king. The letter I never saw; but the account I have had of it by those who have read it, agrees with my extract. All this induced me to think, that there was such a separate and more private article, belonging to this private treaty; nor was I at all surprised to see the treaty come abroad without this article; knowing full well that treaties often appear, when the secret articles belonging to them do not.—This is a true state of the case; and will, I believe, sufficiently justify me for what I writ. But I have not yet done with my accuser. Let it be, that no such private article, as I was led to suppose, does exist, or was ever executed. Will he venture to say that no such article was drawn up, as he expresses himself, about the treaty of pacification? Will he venture to deny, that if our ministers were afraid to sign such an article, and therefore did not sign it, the reason on which the Spaniards were induced to recede from this point was, that something equivalent should be done; and that this something was his late majesty's letter to the king of Spain? I appeal, in my turn, to the lowest observer, as well as the highest, who hath gone about to deceive mankind, this author or I; this author who conceals from the world what he knows, or might know, with all the means of information which he has in his power, and what sets the matter in quite another light

than

than he hath represented it: or I, who, having not the same means of information, fell into an undesigned mistake; which does not alter the state of the case in favour of my argument, since, if the Spaniards accepted this letter, which was writ, in lieu of the article which was not signed, their pretensions, and nothing but their pretensions are under consideration here, will be still the same.

As to the letter itself, what I affirm about it is, that the Spaniards pretend it is a positive engagement to restore Gibraltar to them. That this should be allowed them, I am as far from agreeing as this author can possibly be; but that the letter is sufficient to keep up their pretensions, I affirm: and that in fact they do keep up their pretensions on this foundation is notorious. Was this gentleman to dispute the point with the Spaniards, he might comment as much, and distinguish as subtily as he pleased on the terms of the letter: the others would insist, that it was given them as an engagement; that if they had not received it as such, they would not have departed from the article; and I doubt they would be apt to insinuate, that we could not have found a more proper casuist than himself to distinguish us out of our obligations, among their own schoolmen, or among all the sons of Loyola.

To speak seriously; it were to be wished extremely, that the Spaniards had not had this colour for persisting in their demand of Gibraltar, or that it had been by an express and clear stipulation

taken

taken from them; since it is certain, that the right and possession of Gibraltar is nothing less than ascertained to Great Britain by the preliminaries, as they stand; "and consequently, "that all claim of Spain to it again is not extin-"guished."

I contradict him in his own words, though none of the properest; and I will prove, in what I am going to say, either that he does not at all understand the matter he talks so magisterially about, or that he attempts, in this instance, to deceive the world, by giving wrong interpretations to some things, and by concealing others.

If then, although the letter of the late king hath given the Spaniards a pretence to claim Gibraltar, this claim is effectually barred, and even extinguished by the first general words of the second article of the preliminaries; how comes it to pass that Gibraltar was not specifically mentioned, in order to prevent any future chicane? It will be said, I know, that as the king of Spain's accession to the quadruple aliance vacated any promise which my lord Stanhope might have made; so the king of Spain, by consenting to these preliminaries, has vacated any engagement of this kind, which the letter may be supposed to contain; and I, perhaps, shall be quoted again as "one, who must necessarily see the force of this "argument." But this author must not judge of my eye-sight by his own; for I see a manifest difference between the two cases. My lord Stanhope's promise is said to have been conditional; all

allow

allow that it was verbal; and I think it is allowed likewise, that the late king never confirmed it. The simple accession of the king of Spain to the quadruple alliance might therefore be thought very justly sufficient to put the matter, at that time, out of all dispute, for the reasons given by me, and quoted by this author. But when the preliminaries were to be settled, the king of Spain's claim to the restitution of Gibraltar rested on an engagement, or what he took for an engagement, entered into by the late king, and under his majesty's own hand. Beside, this engagement, or promise, whether valid or not valid, had been insisted upon as valid, in a formal treaty, and had been made the foundation of the second article in the defensive alliance between the emperor and the king of Spain, which relates to Gibraltar. It required therefore something more to put an end to a claim founded in this manner, than to a claim founded on any promise that my lord Stanhope could make. These considerations could never escape the penetration of that most able minister, who negotiated the preliminaries; and therefore I conclude, first, that the Spaniards would not consent that Gibraltar should be mentioned specifically in the second article; and, in the next place, that they could refuse to consent to it on no reason whatever, but this one, that their pretensions to Gibraltar would be kept alive, if it was not mentioned specifically, notwithstanding the general words so much insisted upon by this writer. He has not therefore answered my demand; nor

shown

shown " in the preliminaries an article, which is " indeed as express and effectual a confirmation " of our right to Gibraltar, as if the word Gi- " braltar had been put into it." But he goes on, and observes, " that the latter part of this second " article greatly strengthens the former; because " it is there stipulated, that if any thing shall have " been altered with respect to rights and posses- " sions, or not have been put in execution, the " alteration made, or the thing not executed, is " to be discussed in the congress, and decided " according to the tenour of the said treaties and " conventions;" that is, in his sense, according to the tenour of the treaty of Utrecht, and of the quadruple alliance; for he mentions no other, except that of Baden, which hath nothing to do here. Now, says he, " nothing, either as to the " right of Great Britain to Gibraltar, or to the " possession of it, hath been at all altered; nor " hath there been any nonexecution, &c." From whence he infers, that our right to Gibraltar is not included in this description of points left to be discussed in the congress. But how could he avoid seeing that he assumes for granted the very thing disputed? No alteration hath been made in " our right to Gibraltar, says he; therefore " this right cannot be discussed." An alteration hath been made in this right, say the Spaniards, by a private engagement taken with us in 1721; therefore this alteration is to be discussed at the congress. Who doth not see, that whether this right shall be found to have been altered, and what

what the alteration imports, are by this preliminary to be discussed and decided at the congress?

I think, I have now shown what I undertook, and what this gentleman challenges me to show; that is, I have shown those general words in the preliminaries, upon which the Spaniards may found a pretence for reviving their demand of Gibraltar; or, to speak more properly, since they have never ceased to make it, for continuing this demand. But I have undertaken something more; and therefore will proceed to show what this gentleman was ignorant of, or what he concealed very unfairly, because it is decisive against him.

I think he could hardly be ignorant, that the second article of the preliminaries not only recalls the treaties of Utrecht and Baden, and the quadruple alliance, as he quotes the article, but likewise all treaties and conventions which preceded the year 1725; which latter words he does not quote. Perhaps, he judged them unnecessary. If he did so, he was much mistaken; for by the fifth article of the treaty of 1721, between Great Britain and Spain, it is declared, "that all the "pretensions of both sides, touching affairs not "exposed in the present treaty, and which "pretensions are not comprehended in the "second article of it," shall be treated of in the future congress; which was at that time the congress at Cambray. Now let it be observed, that the affair of Gibraltar is not one of the affairs

exposed in this treaty. Let it be observed also, that the pretension of the Spaniards to Gibraltar, is not one of the pretensions comprehended in the second article of it; and let any man deny, if he can, that, in the intention of Spain, these words were relative to the pretension, which she acquired by the private engagement taken in the letter so often quoted. If the letter gave her a right, as she insists, it gave her a pretension certainly to claim that right, and this pretension is carefully preserved by the treaty of 1721. I do not say among other pretensions; for I think I may venture to say, that all other pretensions are specified in the treaty: even that relating to the free exercise of the Roman catholick religion in Minorca: and therefore these words seem to have been singly applied to the pretensions of Spain on Gibraltar. Will not the Spaniards now insist, upon these foundations, that they enjoyed in 1721, a right demand the restitution of Gibraltar, by virtue of conventions then made; and that the second article of the preliminaries preserves intire, to all the contracting parties, whatever rights, as well as possessions, they had by virtue of any treaty or conventions, antecedent to the year 1725; and that therefore the first general words of the second preliminary preserve to them the right of demanding the restitution of Gibraltar, as a right acquired by conventions made before the year 1725; while the last general words of the same preliminary article preserve this right as an altera-

tion made in the treaty of Utrecht, and in the quadruple alliance?

How little weight soever the defender of the Enquiry may allow to these observations, which would I doubt have some in a congress, yet he must allow that they ought not to have escaped him, or to have been concealed by him; since they do certainly affect the merits of the cause on which he has so positively pronounced judgment, without any regard to them. But I am almost ready to ask your pardon, Mr. D'Anvers, for saying so much on this point, when there is another more clear, and more decisive still behind. Is it possible our author should never have heard of a certain publick instrument, containing a declaration explanatory of the preliminaries made by the French minister at the Pardo, on the fourth of March 1728, and accepted and confirmed by himself, and by the Imperial, British, Spanish, and Dutch ministers on the sixth of the same month? If this instrument hath ever fallen into his hands, and it is in every body's else, did he never read these words in it, " that all pretensions, on all " sides, shall be produced, debated, and decided " in the same congress?" The disputes about contrabands, and other complaints made by the Spaniards concerning the ship Prince Frederick, and the disputes about the restitution of prizes, which articles are taken notice of in the introduction to this instrument, are, by particular clauses in it, referred to the discussion and decision of the congress. To what purpose then were

were these general words inserted? To what purpose was it stipulated, that all pretensions whatsoever (among which the pretension of the Spaniards to the restitution of Gibraltar must necessarily be included; since, whether ill or well founded, it is still a pretension on their side) shall likewise be referred to the congress; and that his "Britannick majesty shall be obliged to stand to "what shall be decided upon the whole?" But I forbear to press this matter any farther upon the gentleman; since it would be, in some sort, like stabbing him on the ground.

I proceed to the article of blocking up the galleons; which is the last upon which I am attacked in the Defence of the Enquiry. And here I must observe again, that he is very far from entering into a refutation of the arguments advanced by me to prove, that seizing the galleons was a measure liable to no objection, and in every respect preferable to that of blocking them up. He observes, indeed, upon Mr. Hosier's letter, that the treasure had been taken from on board the galleons, when our squadron arrived before Porto Bello. Now, without making any reflections on the intelligence brought from on shore to the admiral, and taking it for granted, that all this treasure was in time removed out of his reach; it will still be true, that this circumstance proves nothing in defence of the measure taken to block up the galleons, and not to seize them; since whether they would have the riches on board them or not, when Mr. Hosier should arrive, could not be

known when his instructions were drawn. If all these riches had been actually at Porto Bello, when he came thither, he would have had, in effect, nothing more to say to the Spaniards, than what the orders they had received ten days before from old Spain imported; which was, that they should secure the money in the country.

The single point, insisted upon to justify this measure, and which the writer pronounces to be sufficient, is, that the contrary measure, that of seizing the galleons in port, with all their treasure on board, if it had been practicable, would "have "put Europe into a flame, by putting all the pro-"prietors of those riches, whether French, Dutch "or Spanish, into the greatest uneasiness." At the same time he allows, that taking these ships, if they "had attempted, by force or stealth, to come "out, had been reasonable." Sure I am it is enough to say in reply to this, that as to the uneasiness which such a seizure might have given the Spanish proprietors, it deserved no consideration; that the French and Dutch proprietors would have believed, or ought to have believed, their effects as secure in our hands, as in the hands of Spain; especially in a point of time, when they were, by treaty at least, engaged on our side in opposition to Spain; and lastly, that the distinction between seizing the galleons at sea, or blocking them up in port, as if one was, and the other was not a hostility, is very manifestly a distinction without a difference; to prove which, I dare appeal to every man in Britain, whether he would not esteem the hostility as great,

great, and the insult greater, if a Spanish squadron should block up Portsmouth, than if it should cruise in the channel, and take our ships at sea. The gentleman cuts the dispute short, by referring us to the observations on the conduct of Great Britain; and I shall readily join issue with him, by referring, on my side, to the Craftsman Extraordinary, in which these observations are fully answered, and treated as they deserved to be.

Having mentioned the galleons, our author could not avoid taking some notice of a question I asked, in answering Publicola, and which he allows to be very material. His answers to it deserve a short reflection or two. "Since the "galleons are coming home, hath Spain re- "nounced those designs, which our fleet was sent "to the West Indies to prevent?" Thus he states the question; and his answer is, "Truly I "cannot tell; nor can any one in the world, who "is not in the secrets of the court of Spain." A little afterward he asks the same question; "Has the king of Spain renounced his projects?" that is, those designs which our fleet was sent to the West Indies to prevent? His answer is, "Yes, "undoubtedly, as far as articles ratified by him "can bind; and as far as any contracting powers "can be bound by treaty to one another." Let us see what is urged between the first and the second asking of the same question, to produce such a wide difference in the answers. The king of Spain hath ratified the preliminaries, in consequence of which the siege of Gibraltar is raised.

Orders are sent to restore the South-sea ship; and he has promised that the effects of the galleons shall be delivered. He hath therefore renounced his projects by treaty; but whether he hath renounced them in his heart; "whether he "will go on to act an open and honest part," that is more than our author can tell. It is more likewise than any one will desire, that he or those, for whom he is an apologist, should pretend to tell, or be answerable for. But let us see what they are answerable for; what has been really done by treaty; what we have obtained to make us some amends for the rotting of our ships; for the loss of so many thousand lives, and for the depredations and hostilities which this author sounded so high formerly; and which were carried on with redoubled vigour, during the pacific blockade of the galleons.—The effects of the galleons are to be delivered. I congratulate the Dutch and the French upon it; but especially the latter, who have such immense wealth on board them. Our share is I fear a small one; too small to bear any proportion to the expense we have been at, or the losses we have sustained. —Orders are sent to restore the South-sea ship; but the claims of the Spaniards, either on that ship or on any account, are preserved to them, and referred to a congress, by whose decision we must abide; and nothing is stipulated, which may secure to our merchants a just recompense for the numberless seizures and captures of their effects and ships.—The siege of Gibraltar is raised; but

the

the right to the possession of that place hath not been effectually put beyond dispute. The obstinacy and the chicane of the Spaniards have prevailed so far, that they preserve, even by the preliminaries, a pretence for bringing this right to be decided in the congress; and I shall be glad to hear what ally we have there, on whose good offices we can depend for securing to us the right of possessing, and the possession of this important place.—Upon the whole I am extremely sorry to find, that I was so much in the right, when I advanced, that no man could say, with truth, that the main things in dispute between us and Spain were yielded to us before the return of the galleons; unless he reckoned our keeping Gibraltar, and I might have added the procuring satisfaction to our merchants, not among the main things in dispute, but among those of less importance.—I say very sincerely, that I had much rather have been refuted.

It appears, I think, from what hath been said, that the author and defender of the Enquiry has not only been given up by his own side, but even by himself, in several particulars; and several other points, which were insisted upon in the Enquiry, and have been disputed in other writings, are either not mentioned at all in the Defence, or in such a slight manner as plainly shows the author's consciousness that he cannot support them, though he is very unwilling to give them intirely up: so that the author gave a very partial title to his last production, which can be justly

called, at best, a Defence only of some points in the Enquiry, and is, more properly speaking, a "Recantation of it, with a few particular ex-"ceptions."

But now, Mr. D'Anvers, what shall I say to you in excuse for so many and such long letters? The best thing I can say, is to assure you, and I do it very solemnly, that I will trouble you with no more of them. The gentleman to whom I have now replied, may inquire and defend, as much as he pleases, without any farther molestation from me. When I began to write on this subject, I meant nothing less than the silly ambition of having the last word in a dispute. I saw, like every other man, the publick distress. I thought I discerned the true and original cause of it. The affectation, which I observed to turn us off from this scent, fortified me in my opinions, and determined me to examine what was alleged against them. I have done so; and if, in doing it, I have contributed in any degree to open the eyes of my countrymen, on their true and on their mistaken interests, I have obtained the sole end which I have proposed to myself. I love and I hate; I esteem and I despise; but in a case of this moment, I should abhor myself, if any regard to persons, any consideration, except that of truth, guided my hand in writing.

I began by asking pardon of this author for an injustice, which I have done him through errour, not malice; and I shall conclude with assuring him, that upon whatever principle he may have

treated

treated me, as I think I did not deserve, I lay down my resentment with my pen, and remain in christian charity with him.

I return to the business of my low profession in life; and if I was worthy to advise him, I would advise him to return to that of his high calling; to feed the flock committed to his charge. That I may the more effectually persuade him to take a resolution so much for his own honour, and for the advantage of the church, I will exhort him to it, in the words of the apostolical constitutions, with some very little variation, in order to render the passage more applicable.

Sit autem episcopus turpis lucri non quæsitor, præsertim de Gentilibus; malitque detrimentum capere, quam inferre. Non sit avarus; non maledicus, non falsus testis, non iracundus, non contentiosus, non negotiis, litibusque secularibus implicitus; non pro alio sponsor, aut in causis pecuniariis advocatus. Non ambitiosus, non duplicis sententiæ, non bilinguis; calumniæ & maledicentiæ non cupidus auditor; non hypocrita, fallaciis vanis non utens.

" Let a bishop then not
" be fond of making his
" court for gain, and espe-
" cially to the Gentiles. Let
" him rather receive than do
" an injury. Let him not be
" given to evil speaking, nor
" to bear false witness. Let
" him not be wrathful nor
" contentious. Let him not
" be engaged in the business
" and disputes of the world.
" Let him not be ready to
" answer for others. Let
" him not be the advocate
" of private interest in pub-
" lick causes. Let him not
" be ambitious, nor dou-
" ble-minded, nor double-
" tongued. Let him use nei-
" ther simulation nor dis-
" simulation

utens. Quia hæc omnia Deo sunt inimica, dæmonibus grata.

Constit. Apostolic. lib. ii, cap. 6.

" simulation in his conduct;
" nor vain and fallacious
" sophisms in his discourse.
" For all these things are
" hateful to God, and pleas-
" ing to the devil."

I am,

Mr. D'Anvers, &c.

JOHN TROT.

REMARKS

ON THE

HISTORY

OF

ENGLAND.

WRITTEN IN

1730.

LETTER I.*

SIR,

SINCE the busy scene of the year is over at home, and we may perhaps wait several months before the successful negotiations of France furnish us with new hopes of a general pacification, and give you occasion to carry your speculations forward, it may be proper enough for you to cast your eyes backward, to reflect on your own conduct, and to call yourself to account before your own tribunal.

I am so much persuaded of the integrity of your intentions, that I do not in the least suspect you will think my advice impertinent; and therefore I shall attempt to lead your thoughts on this subject by giving you an acount of some parts of a conversation, at which I happened to be present very lately.

Several of your papers, and several of those which have been written against you, lay before a company which often meets, rather to live than to drink together; according to that distinction which Tully makes to the advantage of his own nation over the Greeks. They dispute without

* As the dedication and preface, that stood at the head of these remarks, were written by another and a very inferior hand, they are therefore omitted here.

strife,

strife, and examine as dispassionately the events and the characters of the present age, as they reason about those which are found in history. When I came in, a gentleman was saying, that your victories had been cheaply bought; and that he had not seen one champion, able to break a lance, enter the lists against you. Upon which some were ready to observe the inconsistencies of human nature, and how hard it often proves to hire men to avow and defend even that which they are hired to act. Others were willing to hope, that corruption had not spread very wide, nor taken root very deep among us. All agreed, that if your papers could be suspected to be written in opposition to the present ministers, the feeble and low opposition you have met with would deserve to be looked upon as a very melancholy symptom for them; since it would denote, that their cause was deemed universally bad; or that their persons were grown universally odious among men of sense, ingenuity, and knowledge. It would denote their guilt, or their misfortune; perhaps both.

Here one of the company interposed, by observing very prudently, "that any thing so void of "probability, as not to fall even under suspicion, "was unworthy of farther consideration. But, "said he, whatever particular views Mr. D'Anvers "may have had, one general effect, which I can- "not approve, has followed from his writings. "We must remember, that, when he began to pub- "lish his weekly lucubrations, universal quiet "prevailed, if not universal satisfaction; for in

" what place, or at what time was the last ever
" found? Few people inquired; fewer grum-
" bled; none clamoured; all acquiesced. Now
" the humour of the nation is altered. Every
" man inquires with eagerness, and examines with
" freedom. All orders of men are more intent
" than I ever observed them to be on the course
" of publick affairs, and deliver their judgments
" with less reserve upon the most important.
" From this alteration, for which the Craftsman is
" chiefly answerable, no good consequence can,
" I think, proceed; and it is visible that several
" inconveniencies may."

To this many of us could by no means assent. We apprehended that in a country, circumstanced like ours, and under a government constituted like ours, the people had a right to be informed, and to reason about publick affairs; that when wise and honest measures are pursued, and the nation reaps the advantage of them, the exercise of this right will always be agreeable to the men in power; that, indeed, if weak and wicked measures are pursued, the men in power might find the exercise of this right disagreeable, inconvenient, and sometimes dangerous to them; but that, even in this case, there would be no pretence for attempting to deprive the people of this right, or for discouraging the exercise of it: and that to forbid men to complain, when they suffer, would be an instance of tyranny but one degree below that which the triumvirs gave, during the slaughter and terrour of the proscriptions, when by edict they

they commanded all men to be merry upon pain of death.

The person from whom we differed brought us back to the particular case of your writings, Mr. D'Anvers. He endeavoured to support what he had said against them in this manner:

"There was no good reason for raising this "spirit, which I dislike, in the nation, when the "Craftsman began to write, or there was such a "reason. If there was none, why has he given "so much alarm? If there was one, how has it "come to pass, that so great an alarm has pro- "duced so little effect? Will you say that he had "very good reason to rouse this spirit, but that "it has hitherto had no opportunity of exerting "itself? Or, will you say that his reasons were "good and the opportunity fair, but that the "minds of men, which have been convinced by "the former, have not yet been determined to "improve the latter? I observe on all these alter- "natives, that if there was no good and even "pressing reason to raise such a spirit in the "nation as I dislike, (because I expect no na- "tional benefit, and I fear much inconveniency "from it) Mr. D'Anvers has acted a very wicked "part, and is little better than a sower of sedi- "tion.—If there was such a reason, but no such "opportunity, he has acted a very weak part, "and is but a shallow politician.—If there was "such a reason and such an opportunity, but no "disposition in the minds of men to follow their "conviction, you may excuse your favourite

" author, perhaps, by alleging that the minds of " men are in the power of God alone; but you " will represent our national condition to be more " desperate than I ever thought it, or am yet " willing to believe it.—Upon this supposition I " affirm, that Mr. D'Anvers is not to be excused, " if he continues to write; for if he cannot raise " this disposition by persuasion, what does he aim " at farther? I hope that he and you, who defend " him, admire as much as I profess to do that " divine saying of Plato: 'We may endeavour to " persuade our fellow citizens; but it is not law- " ful to force them even to that which is best " for them.'"

While all this passed, I took notice that an ancient venerable gentleman showed more emotion, and greater impatience than I remembered to have seen him ever express before. As soon as the other had concluded, he broke silence in the following manner:

" You have endeavoured to prove, sir, that the " Craftsman should not have begun to write; or " at least that he is inexcusable for continuing. " Now I not only differ from you, but I differ " from you upon the very foundation on which " you have established that whole argument.

" The face of things was, I agree, as calm as you " represent it to have been, when my honest con- " temporary Caleb took up his pen. They were " halcyon days truly. We were not only quiet, " but we seemed implicit, and dull uniformity of " eternal assent prevailed in every place. I agree

" that, since that time, things are very much al-
" tered. A ferment, or spirit, call it which you
" please, is raised; but, I bless God, it is not the
" blind and furious spirit of party. It is a spirit,
" which springs from information and conviction,
" that has diffused itself not only to all orders of
" men, as you observed, but to men of all denomi-
" nations. Even they who act against it, encou-
" rage it. You cannot call it toryism, when such
" numbers of independent whigs avow it. To
" call it whiggism would be improper likewise,
" when so many tories concur in it. He, who
" should call it jacobitism, would be too absurd
" to deserve an answer. What is it then? It is,
" I think, a revival of the true old English spirit,
" which prevailed in the days of our fathers, and
" which must always be national, since it has no
" direction but to the national interest; 'est jam
" una vox omnium;' and I hope we shall never
" have occasion to add, 'magis odio firmata quam
" præsidio.'"

" This spirit the Craftsman has contributed to
" raise; and I affirm, in my turn, that, supposing
" him to have no other reason for raising and sup-
" porting it, than a general observation of the
" contrary temper into which the nation had fal-
" len, he deserves the acknowledgments of every
" honest man in Britain, for the part he has acted.
" The dispute between us is thus reduced to one
" single proposition; and if I prove this, all your
" reasoning, sir, falls of course to the ground."

The other assented; the state of the dispute was

fixed;

fixed; and the old gentleman proceeded in his argument to this effect:

" Give me leave to borrow, upon this occasion, " an image which my lord Bacon employs, in one " of his essays, upon another. A people, who " will maintain their liberties, must pray for the " blessing of Judah to avoid the fate of Issachar, " the greatest curse which can befal them. Far " from jogging on silently and tamely, like the ass " between two burdens, such a people must pre- " serve some of the fierceness of the lion, and " even make their roar to be heard like his, " whenever they are injured, or so much as " threatened.

" I do not mean to recommend your seditious, " rebellious spirit, which will create a perpetual " scene of tumult and disorder, and expose every " state to frequent and dangerous convulsions. " Neither would I be thought to approve even that " popular peevishness of temper, which sometimes " prevails, so as to discompose the harmony of " the several orders of government. But this I " assert, that liberty cannot be long secure, in " any country, unless a perpetual jealousy watches " over it, and a constant determined resolution " protects it in the whole body of the nation. " The principle must be permanent and equal. " The exercise of it ought to be proportioned to " the occasions. The hundred eyes of Argus " were not always kept open; but they were never " all closed. The whole body of a nation may be " as jealous of their liberties, as a private man of

" his honour. They may be, at all times, animated
" by a generous resolution of defending these
" liberties at any risk; as he may, at all times,
" feel in his heart the courage of venturing his
" life to maintain his honour. But as there is no
" necessary consequence from this private cha-
" racter to that of a quarrelsome bully; so neither
" is there any necessary consequence from the
" publick character I have recommended to that
" of a factious, rebellious people.

" Liberty is a tender plant, which will not flou-
" rish unless the genius of the soil be proper for
" it; nor will any soil continue to be so long,
" which is not cultivated with incessant care.
" Variæ illudunt pestes; mischiefs of various
" kinds abound; and there is no season, in the
" revolution of the great political year of govern-
" ment, when we can say, with truth, that liberty
" is intirely free from immediate or remote
" danger.

" In every kind of government some powers
" must be lodged in particular men, or particular
" bodies of men, for the good order and preser-
" vation of the whole community. The lines
" which circumscribe these powers are the bounds
" of separation between the prerogatives of the
" prince, or other magistrate, and the privileges
" of the people. Every step, which the prince,
" or magistrate, makes beyond these bounds, is
" an encroachment on liberty, and every attempt
" toward making such a step is a danger to
" liberty.

" Thus

" Thus we see how great a trust is reposed in " those to whom such powers are committed; " and if we look into the heart of man, we shall " soon discover how great, though unavoidable a " temptation is laid in their way. The love of " power is natural; it is insatiable; almost con- " stantly whetted; and never cloyed by possession. " If therefore all men will endeavour to increase " their power, or at least to prolong and secure " the enjoyment of it, according to the uncertain " measure of their own passions, and not accord- " ing to the stated proportion of reason and of " law; and if neither one or the other of these " can be attempted without a danger to liberty; " it follows undeniably that, in the nature of " things, the notion of a perpetual danger to " liberty is inseparable from the very notion " of government.

" That these principles are true, will appear " evident from practice and experience, as well as " from speculation. All forms of government sup- " pose them to be so; and in such as are not abso- " lute monarchies we find the utmost precautions, " which their several institutions admit, taken " against this evil; from hence that rotation of " employments in commonwealths; the annual " or other more frequent elections of magistrates; " and all those checks and controls, which the " wisdom of legislators, prompted by experience, " has invented.

" In perfect democracies these precautions have " been taken in the highest degree; and yet even

" there they have not been always effectual. They " were carried so far in the Athenian form of " government, that this people seemed more in " danger of falling into anarchy than tyranny; and " yet one of their magistrates found means to " become their tyrant, and to transmit this power " to his successors.

" In mixed governments, the danger must still " be greater. Such a one we may justly reckon " that of Rome, as well during the regal as repub- " lican state; and surely no history can be more " fruitful in examples of the danger to which liber- " ty stands exposed from the natural, and there- " fore constant desire of amplifying and maintain- " ing power, than the Roman history is, from the " last of the kings to the first of the emperors.

" A monarchy, limited like ours, may be placed, " for aught I know, as it has often been repre- " sented, just in the middle point; from whence " a deviation leads on one hand to tyranny, and " on the other to anarchy; but sure I am that if " we are situate just in the middle point, the " least deviation is the more cautionally to be " guarded against. Liberty would be safer, per- " haps, if we inclined a little more than we do to " the popular side.

" It may be said, and I would anticipate the " objection, that if we are thus placed, our care " ought to be exerted equally against deviations " on either side; and that I am the more in the " wrong to appear so apprehensive of those on one " side, and so little apprehensive of those on the " other;

" other; because even our own history might
" have shown us, that deviations to the popular
" side have cost us at least as dear as ever those
" to the other side can be pretended to have done.
" But let it be considered;

" First, that as far as these national calamities,
" hinted at in the objection, have been the unavoid-
" able consequences of methods necessary to se-
" cure or retrieve liberty, it is infamous to repine
" at them, whatever they have cost.

" Secondly, that the cases compared together,
" and supposed in this objection to be equal, are
" not so. I may safely appeal to every impartial
" reader of our history, whether any truth he col-
" lected from it ever struck him more strongly
" than this; that when the disputes between the
" king and the people have been carried to such
" extremes, as to draw national calamities after
" them, it has not been owing primarily to the
" obstinacy and weak management of the court,
" and is therefore unjustly charged on the just
" spirit of liberty. In truth, a spirit of liberty
" will never destroy a free constitution; a spirit
" of faction may. But I appeal again, whether
" those of our princes, who have had sense and
" virtue enough to encourage the one, have had
" any thing to fear from the other.

" Now if experience shows, as I am persuaded
" it does, that the prerogative and power of a
" prince will never be in any real danger when
" he invades, neither openly nor insidiously,
" the liberties of his people; the same experience

" will show, that the liberties of a people may be " in very real danger, when, far from invading the " prerogative and power of the prince, they submit " to one, and are even so good as to increase the " other. The reason of this difference is plain. " A spirit of faction alone will be always too " weak to cope with the legal power and autho- " rity of the crown; and the spirit of liberty, in " the whole body of the people, which contradis- " tinguishes this case from the other, may be rais- " ed by the fear of losing; but cannot be so raised " by the hopes of acquiring. The fear is common " to all; the hope can only be particular to a few. " The fear therefore may become a general prin- " ciple of union; the hope cannot.

" But if a national spirit cannot be any other " than a defensive, and therefore, unprovoked, a " harmless, inoffensive spirit; that of a prince " cannot, without due coercion, be kept within " the same bounds; for here the tables are " turned; and the hope of acquiring, which can " never be a common principle among the multi- " tude, to unite and carry them into action, be- " comes an almost irresistible motive to the " prince; who, by yielding to it, indulges the most " powerful passions of the soul; who finds many " to share the difficulties and dangers of the en- " terprise with him; and who shares the prize " with none.

" Generally and abstractedly speaking, there- " fore, as publick liberty is more exposed under " mixed governments, than under perfect demo-

" cracies; so is it more exposed under limited
" monarchies than under any other form of mixed
" government.

" What increases the danger to liberty in this
" case is, that the opportunity of invading it,
" which lies open to a sovereign prince, suits
" almost any character. The powers intrusted to
" other magistrates, as in a commonwealth, are
" subject to immediate controls, the exercise of
" them is subject to future revisions, and is limit-
" ed to a short time; so that if such magistrates
" invade liberty, with any prospect of success, it
" can only happen, when they are able to compen-
" sate for the disadvantages of their political cir-
" cumstances, by the greatness of their personal
" qualifications, by superior understanding and
" superior courage, by a great, if not a good cha-
" racter, and by the appearance of virtue at least.
" Few men therefore are fit for such an under-
" taking.

" But the sovereign prince, who rules in a li-
" mited monarchy, has an opportunity open to him
" for life; and such an opportunity as requires no
" extraordinary personal qualifications. He may
" possess every vice or weakness, which is opposed
" to the virtues, or appearances of virtue, requisite
" in the other case, and yet may destroy the liberty
" of the bravest people upon Earth. The pre-
" tences for concealing his designs, and the helps
" for carrying them on, which his situation affords
" above that of any magistrate in a common-
" wealth, will abundantly compensate for the dis-

" advantages

" advantages arising from his personal character,
" and will secure his success, if the people are
" brought, by artifice or accident, to grow remiss
" in watching over their liberties. Every man is
" therefore fit for such an undertaking. If these
" general reflections evince, that liberty must
" always be in some degree of danger under every
" government; and that this danger must increase
" in proportion as the chief powers of the state are
" intrusted in fewer hands and for longer terms;
" then liberty is always in some degree of danger;
" and that not the least, even under our excellent
" constitution; then the necessity of keeping this
" jealous spirit, the true guardian of publick
" liberty, always alive and active in this nation,
" is manifest; then the observation of our being
" fallen into the contrary temper is alone a suffi-
" cient reason to justify Mr. D'Anvers for joining
" his endeavours to awaken us from our political
" lethargy; then, sir, my proposition is proved,
" and your reasoning falls to the ground."

This discourse furnished matter of much reflection to the company. Some objections were made; some doubts were proposed; and some explanations asked for. I shall not trouble you with all these particulars, but shall conclude my letter by relating to you in what manner the old gentleman replied, and by his reply wound up the conversation of the evening.

" I believe, gentlemen, said he, that we do not
" differ so much as some of you seem to imagine:
" for, first, though I desire the vessel of the com-
" monwealth

" monwealth may sail safely, yet I desire it may
" sail smoothly too; and though I must think, till I
" hear better reasons to the contrary, that publick
" liberty cannot be so easily attacked, and may
" be more easily defended, in a perfect demo-
" cracy, or in a mixed republick, than in a limited
" monarchy; yet will it not follow necessarily
" from hence, as has been supposed, that I prefer
" the two first to the last of these forms of govern-
" ment. On either side there are compensations;
" and if liberty may be better defended in the
" former, yet still it may be defended, and do-
" mestick quiet is perhaps better preserved in the
" latter.

" Secondly, if I agree with the gentlemen who
" have insisted so much on the little reason which
" there was in the late reign, or is in the present,
" to apprehend any encroachments from the crown
" on the British liberties; these gentlemen must,
" I think, agree with me likewise, that this will not
" alter the case; subvert what I have endeavoured
" to establish; or derive any blame on those who
" have endeavoured to revive that publick spirit
" of watchfulness over all national interests, which
" is the proper and true guardian of liberty, in an
" age when that publick spirit has more than be-
" gun to sink and die away. I hope there will be
" always men found to preach this doctrine in
" season and out of season, as the apostles preached
" the Gospel; because if this spirit is not kept at all
" times in vigour, it may fail us at some particular
" time when we shall want to exert it most. In

" great

" great and immediate danger, the most sluggish " sentinel is alert; but surely they who, in times " of apparent security, excite us to be upon our " guard, do as real service as they who animate us " to our defence when we are actually attacked; " and the first is, in my opinion, that kind of ser- " vice of which we stand the most in need. I " confess freely, that I should not apprehend so " much danger to liberty in times of suspicion, if " I saw that neither power could subdue, nor " artifice divert, nor pusillanimity oblige men to " abandon this spirit; as I should apprehend in " times of apparent security, if I observed it to be " lost. In a word, no laws, no orders of govern- " ment can effectually secure liberty any longer " than this spirit prevails, and gives them vigour; " and therefore you might argue as reasonably for " repealing any law, or abolishing any custom, the " most advantageous to liberty, and which you " cannot be sure of restoring at your pleasure, " because you feel no immediate want of it; as " you have argued for letting this spirit die away, " which you cannot be sure of reviving at your " pleasure, because you perceive no immediate " occasion for the exercise of it.

" I hope that I have said enough to give me a " right to conclude in this manner; and if I was to " descend into particular applications of the ge- " neral truths which I have advanced, I think that " no doubt whatever could remain in any of your " minds, upon this subject."—After this, our company broke up. If the same subject is re-

sumed

sumed when they meet again, or any other, which I judge proper to be communicated to you, it is highly probable that you will hear again from

Your admirer,

Friend and Servant, &c.

LETTER II.

SIR,

THE same company hath met, and the same subject hath been resumed; so that I think myself under an obligation of writing to you again.

The person, who gave occasion to all that was said in your defence the other day, seemed very desirous, that the conversation should be pursued at our last meeting; and therefore as soon as we sate down, he addressed himself thus to the old gentleman who had fought your battle.

"Sir," said he, "I own myself a good deal re-
"conciled to the Craftsman, by the discourse you
"held, when we were last together. That some
"inconveniencies must follow from keeping this
"spirit of jealousy and watchfulness always alive,
"seems to me very evident; but I begin to think
"that this evil may be necessary, in order to se-
"cure us against greater. Every system of human
"invention must be liable to some objections;
"and it would be chimerical in us to expect a
"form of government liable to none. Even theo-
"cracy was attended by some real inconvenien-
"cies, according to the Jewish histories; and
"neither the divine presence in the tabernacle,
"nor

" nor the ambulant oracle, which the priest car-
" ried about with him, could preserve intire purity
" in religion, or good order in the state. We must
" be content therefore to bear the disorder I ap-
" prehend from that ferment, which a perpetual
" jealousy of the governors in the governed will
" keep up, rather than abandon that spirit, the
" life of which is the life of liberty. When the
" jealousy happens to be ill placed, we may hope
" it will not rise to any great and dangerous
" height. When it happens to be well grounded,
" it may have the good effect of destroying a
" wicked minister, of checking a bad, or of re-
" claiming a misguided prince.

" You see, sir, that my conversion is pretty far
" advanced; and if you will please to descend into
" particular applications of the general doctrines
" you delivered, as you gave us reason to hope
" that you would, it is very probable that the few
" doubts I have still may be removed."

The rest of the company seconded this request. The good old gentleman yielded to our common desires, and spoke to the following effect:

" The general truth I am to prove by particular
" examples is this: that liberty cannot be pre-
" served long by any people, who do not preserve
" that watchful and jealous spirit of liberty, on
" the necessity of which I have insisted. If you
" are once convinced of this truth, you will know
" what opinion to entertain of those who endea-
" vour to extinguish this spirit, and of those who
" do all they can to keep it alive.

" There

" There are two other general truths relative to " this, which I shall establish likewise by particu- " lar examples, as I go along.

" One is this: that the spirit of liberty, far from " inspiring that rashness and undistinguishing fury " which are peculiar to the spirit of faction, is " slow to act even against the worst princes, and " exerts itself in favour of the best with more " effect than any other spirit whatever.

" The second is this: that how slowly soever " the spirit of liberty may act in suspicious times " and against encroaching governors; yet if it be " kept alive, it will act effectually sooner or later, " though under the greatest disadvantages, and " against the most powerful opposition; in a word, " in the most desperate cases.

" The first of these truths will recommend this " spirit to every good prince and honest minister. " The other will encourage every man who is a " friend to liberty, never to abandon the cause " through despondency of success, as long as he " sees this spirit prevail, or even subsist.

" Having fixed these principal points of view, " let us proceed: and though I would not advise " you to admit the works of Machiavel into your " canon of political writings; yet since in them, " as in other apocryphal books, many excellent " things are interpersed, let us begin by im- " proving a hint taken from the discourses of " the Italian secretary on the first decade of " Livy.

" He

" He observes that, of all governments, those " are the best, which by the natural effect of their " original constitutions are frequently renewed or " drawn back, as he explains his meaning, to their " first principles; and that no government can be " of a long duration, where this does not happen " from time to time, either from the cause just " mentioned, or from some accidental cause.

" The reason is obvious. There must be some " good in the first principles of every government, " or it could not subsist at all; much less could " it make any progress. But this good degene- " rates, according to the natural course of things; " and governments, like other mixed bodies, tend " to dissolution by the changes which are wrought " in the several parts, and by the unaptness and " disproportion, which result from hence through- " out the whole composition.

" The most effectual, and indeed the sole " method of maintaining their health and prolong- " ing their life, must therefore be to bring them " back as near and as frequently as possible " to those principles, on which their prosperity, " strength, and duration were originally founded.

" This change, or renewal of the state, hath " been sometimes wrought by external causes, as " it happened at Rome, upon the invasion of the " Gauls. The Romans had departed from their " ancient observances. The ceremonies of religion " and the laws of justice were neglected by them. " An enemy, whom they despised and provoked, " conquered them. The impressions made by this

" dreadful calamity brought them back to their " first institutions, and to their primitive spirit. " They sprung up from this second original, as " Livy calls it, with new vigour, and rose to greater " fame, power, and dignity than ever.

" But not to dwell on such examples, as point " out to us rather the punishment of vice, than the " means of reformation, let us observe that this " change, or renewal of the state, is oftener and " better wrought by internal causes.

" Many excellent institutions were contrived in " framing the Roman government, which served " to maintain in force the first principles of that " political system. Such were the regulations " about elections; the laws against bribery; and " many other written laws, or confirmed customs. " Such again was the constitution of the senate, " in whom the majesty of the commonwealth " resided, and whose authority controlled the " licentiousness of the people. Such was the " erection of that sacred, tribunitial power, whose " prerogatives served to check the usurpations " of the magistrates, and who could arrest with " one word even the proceedings of the senate. " Such was the office of the censors, whose inqui- " sitions and lustrations corrected abuses, reformed " manners, and purged the senate itself of corrupt " and unworthy members.

" These laws, these customs, these different " orders, controlling one another, and promoting " the general good of the commonwealth, had " great effect during some centuries. But this

" effect could never have followed them at all,
" if the spirit of liberty, which had enacted these
" laws, established these customs, and formed
" these orders, had not continued. The very best
" laws are a dead letter, nay often a grievance,
" unless they are strenuously and honestly ex-
" ecuted. They never can be so executed, unless
" the spirit of them possess those to whom the
" execution of them is committed; and it would
" be ridiculous to expect to find this spirit in the
" magistrates, and the several orders of the state,
" unless it appeared in the body of the people, out
" of whom these magistrates are chosen, and
" these orders composed.

" The examples which Machiavel cites to show,
" that the virtue of particular men among the
" Romans did frequently draw that government
" back to it's original principles, are so many
" proofs that the duration of liberty depends on
" keeping the spirit of it alive and warm. Such
" examples were frequent in Rome, while this
" spirit flourished. As it decayed, these examples
" became more rare, and failed at last entirely.
" The old laws and customs were, for the most
" part, still in being. The forms of electing ma-
" gistrates, and of promulgating laws, were in
" the main observed. There was still a senate.
" There were still censors and tribunes. But the
" spirit of liberty being stifled by that of faction and
" cabal, and the several orders of the government
" being tainted by the general corruption, these
" good laws and customs remained without force,

" or were suspended, or were abrogated, or were " perverted to serve the purposes of private am- " bition and avarice.

" The time-serving flatterers of princes and " ministers have no point, among all the nauseous " drudgery imposed on them, which they are " obliged more to labour than that of representing " all the effects of a spirit of liberty as so many " effects of a spirit of faction. Examples might " be found, even without searching long or looking " far after them, when this hath been done against " the publick sense of a whole nation, and some- " times in favour of a cabal, neither numerous " nor considerable enough to be called a party. " But still it will remain eternally true, that the " spirit of liberty and the spirit of faction are not " only different, but repugnant and incompatible: " so that the life of either is the death of the " other.

" We must not imagine that the freedom of the " Romans was lost, because one party fought for " the maintenance of liberty; another for the " establishment of tyranny; and that the latter " prevailed. No. The spirit of liberty was dead, " and the spirit of faction had taken it's place on " both sides. As long as the former prevailed, a " Roman sacrificed his own, and therefore no " doubt every other personal, interest to the in- " terest of the commonwealth. When the latter " succeeded, the interest of the commonwealth " was considered no otherwise than in subordina- " tion to that particular interest, which each person

" had

" had espoused. The principal men, instead of
" making their grandeur and glory consist, as they
" formerly had done, in that which the grandeur
" and glory of the commonwealth reflected on
" them, considered themselves now as individuals,
" not as citizens, and each would shine with his
" own light. To this purpose alone they employed
" the commands they had of armies, the govern-
" ments of provinces, and the influence they ac-
" quired over the tribes at Rome, and over the
" allies and subjects of the republick. Upon
" principles of the same kind, inferiour persons
" attached themselves to these; and that zeal and
" industry, nay that courage and magnanimity,
" which had been exerted formerly in the service
" of the commonwealth, were exerted by the spirit
" of faction, for Marius, or Sylla; for Cæsar, or
" Pompey.

" It is plain, that the liberty of Rome would not
" have been irretrievably lost, though Cæsar had
" finished the civil war with absolute success, and
" was settled in power, if the spirit of liberty had
" not been then lost in the whole body of the
" people; if the Romans had not been as ripe
" for slavery, as the Cappadocians were fond of
" it; for I think the Cappadocians were the
" people who desired, that a prince might be set
" over them, and refused to be a free people.

" I cannot believe that those, who murdered
" Cæsar, took such puerile measures as Cicero,
" who was not let into the secret, pretended that
" they had taken, when he saw the consequences

" of their action. But in this they erred. They " killed their benefactor: at least, he was such " to the greatest part of them; and renewed the " civil war, in order to restore liberty to a people, " who had lost the spirit of liberty, and who would " not take it when it was offered to them. Even " in the senate, Octavius had a party; Antony " had a party; but the commonwealth had none. " In short, the freest people upon Earth, by " suffering the spirit of liberty to decay, and that " of faction to grow up, became slaves to such a " succession of monsters, continued with very " few exceptions from the reign of Augustus to " the destruction of the empire, as God never " sent in his wrath to execute vengeance on any " other nation.

" Thus I have endeavoured to illustrate and " confirm the first general proposition laid down, " by a summary application of it to the Roman " story. I have not explained by what degrees, " and by what means one of these spirits gradually " decayed, and the other grew up. The subject " is fine, and the task would be pleasant; but it " is unnecessary to our present purpose. We " see enough at this time, if we see, that, in the " greatest revolution of the greatest government " of the world, losing the spirit of liberty was the " cause, and losing liberty was the effect.

" If now we bring these considerations home, " we shall find not only the first general proposi- " tion, but the others relative to it, illustrated " and confirmed through the whole course of our

" annals

" annals. I shall make a deduction of some of " these particulars. To deduce them all would " exceed my strength and your patience."

Here one of our company interrupted the old gentleman's discourse, by saying, that, since we were come to a kind of pause, he desired leave to make an observation, which he thought pertinent and material, on what had been said, before we went into any new matter.—" The " difference and opposition between a spirit of " liberty and a spirit of faction," continued he, " hath been justly stated. A spirit of liberty " will be always and wholly concerned about " national interests, and very indifferent about " personal and private interests. On the con- " trary, a spirit of faction will be always and " wholly concerned about these, and very indif- " ferent about the others. When they appear " therefore in their proper characters, they are " distinguished as easily as light and darkness; " and the danger I apprehend is over.

" But faction puts on the mask of liberty; " and under this false appearance, disputes her " being even with liberty herself. Now here, " methinks, a great many dangers arise; the " danger of mistaking when it is so hard to " distinguish; the danger of being bubbles and " tools of faction, while we fancy ourselves " assertors of publick liberty; the danger of con- " tinuing under this delusion, till it is too late " to prevent such mischiefs, as we never intended " to bring on our country. The spirit of faction

" may take, and I doubt not hath often taken
" possession of numbers, who meant to entertain
" no other spirit than that of liberty; for numbers
" have not the discernment of spirits. This
" possession may continue, and in fact, I believe
" it hath continued very often, till faction hath
" accomplished, or secured the accomplishment
" of her ends. I made this observation, which
" results naturally from what hath been said, and
" insist upon it, because if faction could not
" lie latent, under the most specious and popular
" pretences imaginable, there would be no great
" need of putting us on our guard against it;
" and because if it can lie thus latent and con-
" cealed, we may be exposed to the dangers
" I have mentioned, which side soever of the
" question we take in political disputes. At
" this time, to speak as I think, the case is so
" clear on one side, that no man who adheres
" to it hath the least pretence left him to say,
" that he pursues the publick interest, or is
" directed in his conduct by the generous, dis-
" interested spirit of liberty.

" I could support my assertion by many proofs,
" if it was necessary in this company. One
" I will mention for it's singularity; and it is
" this.

" We have seen and heard, in a nation hitherto
" free, such maxims avowed and pleaded for, as
" are inconsistent with all the notions of liberty.
" Corruption hath been defended, nay recom-
" mended, as a proper, a necessary, and therefore

" a reasonable

" a reasonable expedient of government; than " which there is not, perhaps, any one proposi- " tion more repugnant to the common sense " of mankind, and to universal experience. Both " of these demonstrate corruption to be the last " deadly symptom of agonizing liberty. Both of " them declare, that a people abandoned to it " are abandoned to a reprobate sense, and are " lost to all hopes of political salvation.

" The dependence of the legislative on the " executive power hath been contended for by " the same persons, under the same direction; " and yet nothing surely can be more evident " than this; that in a constitution like ours, the " safety of the whole depends on the balance " of the parts, and the balance of the parts on " their mutual independency on one another: " agreeably to which Thuanus makes Ferdinand " say, in answer to the Castilians, who pressed him " to take away the independency of the states of " Arragon; 'Æquilibrio potentiæ regni regisque ' salutem publicam contineri; & si contingeret ' aliquando alterum alteri præponderare, procul- ' dubio alterius aut utriusque ruinam ex eo secu- ' turam; that the publick safety depends on the ' equal balance of the power of the king, and of ' the power of the kingdom; and that if ever it ' should happen, that one outweighed the other, ' the ruin of one, or of both, must undoubtedly ' follow.'

" On one side then the mask is pulled off. The " weak may be seduced to concur; the strongest

" may

" may be forced to submit; but no man can be
" any longer deceived.

" On the other, it must be acknowledged, that
" the appearances are extremely fair. True notions
" of liberty and good government are professed
" and pursued. Our grievances are complained
" of; our dangers are foretold; not only those
" which all men feel or see, but those which are
" more remote from observation. In short, the
" spirit of liberty, such as it hath been described,
" seems to breathe from this quarter, and to diffuse
" it's influences over the nation.

" As I am a lover of my country and of liberty,
" I have rejoiced in this. I rejoice in it still; and
" yet I confess freely, that I took some umbrage
" at a paper, which came out not long ago. The
" design and tendency of it seemed to me to favour
" the cause of a faction; and of a faction, how-
" ever contemptible in it's present state, always
" to be guarded against. The paper I mean is
" Fog's Journal of the sixth of June; where you
" have seen a ridiculous speech, supposed to be
" made by general Monk, and translated, as the
" author says, from Leti's history of Oliver Crom-
" well.

" If this wretched production had appeared in
" Mist's Journal, I should have felt neither surprise
" nor concern. That writer never wore so much
" as the mask of liberty; and showed his game so
" plainly, that, whatever he got by faction, faction
" could get nothing by him. But Fog, who writes
" incomparably better, hath appeared to write
" with

" with a much better design. Those who are the
" warmest in the national interest, without regard
" to persons, and independently of all factions,
" have made this judgment of him; and therefore
" I was surprised and concerned to find, that he
" exposed himself even once or in any degree to
" the same reproach, that was frequently and justly
" made to his predecessor."

The gentleman's observation gave occasion to much discourse. Our old sage desired it might be remembered, that he had not undertaken the defence of every weekly writer, though he had undertaken yours, Mr. D'Anvers. " The paper con-
" tinued he, which hath been so much mentioned,
" is a very silly paper, to whatever purpose it was
" designed.

" If it was designed to inspire a horrour of
" those miseries, from which the restoration de-
" livered the nation, it was a very superfluous
" work at this time, when there is no real or pre-
" tended difference of opinion upon that head
" among us. Those who do not go to church
" upon the twenty-ninth of May, nor on any
" other day, will agree with those who do, in
" this point, upon better authority than that
" of Leti, and for better reasons than those,
" which are contained in the foolish declamation
" attributed to Monk.

" If it was designed to make us commemorate
" the restoration of the two brothers, Charles
" and James, as a national blessing in itself,
" and independently of the other consideration,

" the

" the project was equally ridiculous. The flattery " bestowed upon these princes, while they were " in exile, might pass, and many things concurred " to make it pass. But to talk in the same style " to mankind at this time, when they have both " sat on our throne, when so many of us remem- " ber both what they did, and what they would " have done, is contemptible to the last degree.

" If it was designed for more modern appli- " cation, and to raise a spirit among us in favour " of the pretender, the project was too foolish, " to have been hatched at home. It must have " been imported from abroad. What jacobite " can be sanguine enough to hope, that his cause " should revive, when he beholds the heroical " king and queen, who fill our throne, auspicious " parents of a numerous progeny of young heroes " and heroines, rising up to emulate their vir- " tues, and to gladden, like them, the British " nation.

" This single consideration might be sufficient, " to damp the hopes of any jacobite, who lives " at home, and is a witness of all this glory. " But however I shall mention another, which " ought to have it's weight likewise, and which " will have more perhaps among some people. " The spirit of jacobitism is not only gone; " but it will appear to be gone in such a man- " ner as to leave no room to apprehend it's " return; if we reflect that it hath died away, " while all that could be done to keep it alive " was doing by those who professed it, and

" by

" by those who valued and recommended them-
" selves on their opposition to all the effects
" of it; if we consider the numbers of people
" who have abandoned this interest, notwithstand-
" ing the utmost provocations to the contrary.

" In short I persuade myself, that, if the
" pretender had no rival in the throne, instead
" of having there one so formidable as our most
" august monarch, yet his way to the throne
" would not be more open to him. The whole
" bulk of the people hath been brought by the
" revolution, and by the present settlement of
" the crown, to entertain principles which very
" few of us defended in my younger days. The
" safety and welfare of the nation are now
" the first and principal objects of regard. The
" regard to persons and to families hath been
" reduced to the second place; and it holds
" even but that under the direction of the former.
" Can any man believe, that a people brave
" enough to dispose of their crown for the
" greatest national advantage, even when the
" throne was full, will ever dispose of it, as
" long as the spirit of liberty remains among
" them, for the greatest national mischief, if
" the throne should be empty?

" There is but one design more, which I can
" conceive to have given occasion to this silly
" paper; but one quarter more, from which
" it could possibly come: and these guesses,
" perhaps, will not appear the least probable.
" Might it not be designed to instil a jealousy

" of

" of jacobitism, and to prejudice mankind against " all writings, which those who are offended " at them cannot answer?—Might it not be " designed to furnish the spruce, pert orator, " who strewed some of his flowers in the Daily " Courant of the eleventh of June, with a hint " which he hath most happily and modestly " improved? ' Fog,' says he, 'avows jacobitism; ' the Craftsman concurs in the same design; ' nay, every jacobite in England sinks his master's ' divine right in the popular topicks of debts, ' taxes, and corruption.' So that jacobitism " may now be imputed, upon this authority, " to ninety-nine in a hundred of the whole " nation; for ninety-nine in a hundred do " complain of debts, taxes, and corruption. I " am sure there is arrogance and impertinence " both in such an insinuation too gross to be " denied; whereas the Craftsman may destroy " the whole proof brought against him of arro- " gance, by answering three silly questions in " the negative.

" If this was the design, I will be bold, for bold " it may justly seem, to say, that this expedient " is at least as bungling and likely to prove as " ineffectual, as any that have been produced by " the same great genius who contrived it; for if " we were inclined to believe, that the Craftsman, " Fog, or any other person, carries on the mea- " sures of faction under the mask of liberty; " should we believe it on the credit of those who " oppose them, and who are notoriously in-

" fluenced

" fluenced to write, though under specious pre-
" tences of promoting loyalty to the king and an
" acquiescence in his majesty's measures, yet in
" reality for no other service than that of a small
" number of men; nay, strictly speaking, of a
" single man? With what face can such writers
" impute faction to any one living or dead?

" Let them be assured, that we can examine
" and judge for ourselves; and that neither the
" Craftsman nor Fog would be able, if they went
" about it, to impose upon us, any more than
" they themselves have been able to do.

" The pretty author, I just now mentioned,
" begins his essay with airs of wit, and ends it
" with airs of wisdom. What pity is it, that he
" should succeed in neither? In his first paragraph
" he represents the Craftsman, with curious im-
" propriety, as a magician, who conjures up
" spirits; as a dog, who barks at a distance; as
" a little insect, who nibbles at a character; and
" my friend Caleb was all these things, it seems,
" at the same instant. After this specimen of
" writing, we may expect to see him compared,
" in some other production of the same author, to
" a bird, and made to fly different ways and in
" different places at once.

" But let us leave the wit and come to the
" wisdom; which will bring us back to our
" subject.

" In the last paragraph of this elaborate
" piece, the author sets the example of my lord
" Falkland and others before our eyes; who

" strengthened,

" strengthened, as he says, the republican party " so long, that when they found out their designs " and forsook them, it was to late to prevent " them. After this, he calls most charitably on " several well-meaning persons, to take warning; " for some, whom he allows to be such, he thinks " in danger of being drawn in to favour the pur- " poses of those, whom he calls opposers of our " government.

" Behold this little Gamaliel in cathedra! Ob- " serve the scholars he places at his feet for in- " struction! 'Risum teneatis amici?' Can the " gravest of you forbear laughter?

" When we come to apply the general propo- " sitions laid down still more particularly to the " English than we have done to the Roman " history, I shall show you perhaps, that this " author, like most other fine men, treasures up " in his memory the observations he meets with " in history instead of making his own upon the " examination and comparison of the facts and " characters he finds there; and that the example " he hath chosen will come out against the very " purpose he hath applied it to. In the mean " time let us observe, that the alarm, which hath " been taken by some of this company, and I sup- " pose by others, at the publication of that stupid " paper in Fog's Journal, shows how little reason " there is to apprehend, that those who are " actuated by the spirit of liberty, and pursue the " national interest, should be imposed upon by " the spirit of any faction.

" The

" The spirit of liberty is a jealous spirit; and " faction is equally the object of it's jealousy, " whether the views of faction be directed in " favour of the crown, or against it. I make this " distinction here, though I shall have occasion " to speak more fully upon it hereafter, because " I perceive that we are apt to confine our idea " of faction to such men and such measures, as " are in opposition to the men in power, and to " the measures they take; whereas in truth a " number of men in power, who exercise it solely " for their own private advantage and security, " and who treat the nation as their farm, or " rather as a country under contribution to them, " let them shelter themselves under what autho- " rity they please, are as much a faction, as any " number of men, who under popular pretences " endeavour to ruin, or at least to disturb the " government, that they may raise themselves.

" If the spirit of liberty were extinguished, as " it is discouraged, the spirit of some faction or " other would no doubt prevail; but this would " not succeed under the mask of liberty. There " would be in such a case no need of wearing " this disguise. Men would avow faction. They " would choose that which suited their interest " best; and indeed it would be of no great " moment which they chose.

" But if the spirit of liberty, which begins to " revive in this country, becomes prevalent, there " will remain nothing to fear from any faction " whatever whether masked, or unmasked. While

" it is masked, and the instruments or members
" of it pursue the national interest, though they
" intend another, the bad principle is however so
" far productive of good, and the cause of virtue
" is so far promoted by vice itself. When it
" comes to be unmasked, and the instruments or
" members of it are hurried by indiscretion, or
" forced by the course of events, as they must be,
" to show their game, faction is that moment dis-
" armed. The distinction marked, the separa-
" tion follows of course; and those who espouse
" the cause of the nation will find themselves
" doubly strengthened by the assistance which
" faction gave them at one time, and by the op-
" position she makes to them at another. In
" short, gentlemen, the spirit of jacobitism may
" crawl about and skulk in corners. The spirit
" of the other faction may roll in gilded spires,
" and with erected crests in every publick place,
" and hiss, and threaten, and cast it's venom
" around; but the spirit of liberty, like the divine
" rod of Aaron, will devour all the serpents of
" the magicians.

" I see therefore no cause to fear, that we may
" be drawn in to serve the purposes of faction,
" while we pursue the cause of liberty; and if
" we suffered ourselves to be drawn off from this
" pursuit by the jealousy, which one faction en-
" deavours to give us of another, we should be
" arrant bubbles indeed. Fog is not to be de-
" fended for publishing a paper liable every way
" to blame, and capable of no excuse; but if he
" hath

" hath hurt anybody by it, he hath hurt himself;
" and the weight which is laid upon it by those on
" one side, who perhaps writ it, is as ridiculous
" as the project of those, who thought to advance
" the jacobite cause by it, if it came from that
" side."

Here the old gentleman broke off, and though he was pressed to resume the discourse he had begun, when this interruption happened, he desired to be excused, because it was late, and promised to comply with our request upon some other occasion. If he keeps his word, as I am persuaded he will, you shall hear again from,

SIR, Yours, &c.

LETTER III.

SIR,

OUR old gentleman having kept his word with the company, I designed to have kept mine with you; but some business calling me into the country, I send you a few minutes of the conversations which have passed, in hopes that the subject will not be left imperfect for as long a time as my affairs may oblige me to be absent. Throw these minutes into what form and make what use of them you please. They are designed to serve an honest cause; the cause of truth and of liberty. You have espoused it; and I hope will pursue it.

You are able to do this with success, even in opposition to the most plausible writers; and how much more against the cursory Observator, who appeared in the Daily Courant, and the London Journalist?

I do not suppose you will think it worth your while, to set seriously about answering them: but it may be worth while now and then to show them how little they deserve to be answered.

They complain heavily of the prolixity and dulness of the letters which you have published. Might they not be taught, what they have already taught the world, that an essay of two or three columns

columns may be longer than an essay of five or six? Let them not carp at my words, since they cannot mistake my meaning.

Might they not be convinced, that they are the least competent judges in the whole nation of the dulness of others, for this plain reason; that it is not in the case of dulness, as it is in that of wit and learning; in which he is the best judge of these qualities in others, who possesses them himself in the most eminent degree?

But there is a judge, before whom all productions of this sort are tried, and by whose sentence alone they must stand or fall. This judge is the publick; and I am apt to think, that these authors may be informed of the sentence pronounced by the publick on your papers, Mr. D'Anvers, and on their own, if they will take the trouble to inquire of Messieurs Roberts, Peele, and Francklin.

I am even inclined to believe, that they have inquired; and that, despairing of success before this tribunal, they have appealed to another, where those whom the publick rejects are pretty sure of being received.

Sure I am that they cannot hope to succeed any where else, while they found their merit on Billingsgate, false quotations, gross misrepresentations, and an eternal begging of the question.

That they are guilty of all these may be soon proved. I will point out some instances; as many as the haste I am in allows me time to mention.

The Cursory Observator accuses you and me (for these writers are pleased to suppose us to be the same person who corresponds with himself) of quoting falsely and applying foolishly in every case, while he quotes falsely himself, and ridicules the application of what it is manifest he never read. His whole charge is built on a lie and a blunder.

Machiavel is made, according to him, in one of my letters, to suppose "that the first destruc-"tion of Rome by the Gauls (and I never "heard of a second) was a judgment from "Heaven on the people for their having departed "from their ancient observances and religious "ceremonies."—With this he makes himself wonderfully merry; and having heard that Machiavel did not pass for a very strong believer, he ridicules the imputation of such a supposition to that great politician.

But let this scribbler learn to read, before he blots any more paper. Let him learn to speak of what is or is not in books, after he hath looked into those books, and not from his idle imagination of what an author would or would not have said, agreeably to the character of the author, which his ignorance hath taken upon trust.

My old gentleman never said, that Machiavel supposed the destruction of Rome by the Gauls was a judgment from Heaven; but he reckoned, among other particulars in which the Romans had begun to degenerate, and to which they were

were brought back by this great misfortune, that of neglecting the ceremonies of religion and the laws of justice. Now Machiavel does say this in express and strong terms, as this writer would have known, if he had consulted the first chapter of the third book of his discourses on Livy.

But I will tell him something more. This very Machiavel* hath written a whole chapter concerning the religion of the Romans; in which he mentions, that Rome was more obliged to Numa than to Romulus; in which he shows, that her grandeur and felicity were owing to her religion; nay he asserts in general, that as religion raises commonwealths, so the contempt of it must ruin them. "Good Gods! is this talking like Machi-"avel?"—Why truly it is thus that Machiavel talks; and in talking thus he shows more learning and sense than the Observator is master of.

Cast your eye, Mr. D'Anvers, on the next paragraph; in which this able person undertakes to prove from reason, as well as history, a matter of fact. The fact is this: that the destruction of Rome by the Gauls was owing to the opposition set on foot to the measures and person of the great and much injured Camillus.

It was a great mistake, it seems, to mention this incident in the Roman history, in one of my letters. The Observator shall find, that it was a greater blunder in him to dwell upon it.

He knows as little of Livy as he does of

* L. 1, c. 11.

Machiavel, or I believe of any other good author. Let him turn to the Roman historian. He will find that Livy, in the transition which he makes from the prosecution of Camillus to the invasion of the Gauls, says, "that, if there be any thing "certain in human affairs, Rome could not "have been taken, if that citizen had remained "in it." But does he attribute the invasion of the Gauls to this man's banishment? No. He attributes it to the conduct of three rash and foolish brothers, who were sent ambassadors to the Gauls, and who, by breaking the law of nations, justly provoked this people. He attributes it to the force of a faction, which prevailed to screen these criminals, and exposed the state to ruin, rather than give them up to justice.

Thus the fact stands in history. Let the Observator now consider whether it would be very difficult, to make certain applications of it, which he would not like. I doubt these applications would appear much more apposite, than that which is said to be intended in his paper, of the character of the great and much injured Camillus.

He succeeds, you see, but ill when he meddles with facts; and I do not find that he pretends much to reason. The rest of his paper contains little more than fool, knave, libeller, incendiary, &c. I shall therefore take notice of but one thing more; and that is, the advantage he would make of a mistake in printing.

He must have perceived, or he can perceive nothing, that it was a mistake in printing. If the

meaning of my letter had been, that the Craftsman might destroy the whole proof of arrogance brought against him, by answering in the negative all the questions asked in the paragraph referred to, it should have been said "five silly "questions;" for they are five, not four; but the truth is, that no regard was had to the two introductory questions; and that the three main questions, which follow, were alone meant. A writer must be reduced very low by his cause, or be very low in his character, who catches at such an impertinent opportunity of being what he imagines smart.

I should say a word or two to the profound Mr. Osborne, who hath been pleased to let us know, that he prefers the absolute monarchy of Augustus to the free state of the Roman commonwealth. He prefers likewise, I suppose, at least his discourse leads one to think so, the violence, the treachery, and the bloody massacres, on which this absolute monarchy was founded, to the civil disorders, which were occasioned by establishing and maintaining an equal commonwealth. I should desire him to compare the reigns of a Caligula, a Nero, a Domitian, an Heliogabalus, which had never happened, if the usurpation of Augustus had never happened, with the glorious fourth and fifth centuries of the republick of Rome; but I have not, at present, time for this. I hope you, Mr. D'Anvers, will give him some salutary correction at your leisure, and make him ashamed of having prophaned the language of a

free

free people in so prostitute a manner, and to such slavish purposes! Advise him to learn better notions of government from Mr. Gordon's excellent discourses, prefixed to his translation of Tacitus; in which he will find his favourite Augustus set in a true light, and proved to be an infamous tyrant, though somewhat more artful than his successors. He must certainly acknowledge the obligation; since you cannot be suspected of doing it on any account, but that of a charitable disposition toward him. If he was capable of imposing on the dullest Quidnunc in any coffee-house, or of seducing the most raw boy that ever eloped from school, you might be suspected of some farther and deeper design; but when you write against so harmless a creature, your efforts must pass, and ought to pass, for the pure effects of the most disinterested, the most refined charity.

Let me only ask the favour of you to touch three points, among others, whenever you condescend to meddle with squire Osborne. One is to assure him in my name, and if you please in your own, that a good minister ought not to be abused; nay more, that he who abuses him is a rogue, a rascal, and an impudent (I had almost said, for I conform to his dialect, a traitorous) fellow; and might have justified myself by the authority of a writer on Mr. Osborne's side, who talked of allegiance to ministers: but let this important author know, at the same time, that we defy him to make the least use of these concessions against

any

any one sentence, any one word in any Craftsman that hath been published.

There are two other things, of which I desire you likewise to take notice. One is scandalously impudent; the other infamously unfair.

When his patron is commended by any honest man in Britain, it is done most certainly with a sneer. The "great man" is an expression, which hath undoubtedly occasioned more sneers than this nation had seen in a century before; but it is saucy and impudent in Mr. Osborne, to suppose that one, who speaks to the king and royal family with all the respect that is due to them, means a sneer.

The other thing, which I desire you to take notice of, is the malicious and mean comment made on an expression in my last letter to you, where I called his present majesty a formidable rival of the pretender. Mr. Osborne is pleased, out of the abundance of his loyalty, to resent this as an insult on the king. Now though in strictness of fact and propriety of language, his majesty neither is a rival to anybody, nor can have a rival, being our rightful and lawful king, by the consent of his people in parliament, the only good title to the crown of these realms; yet in pretension there is a rivalry; and I may defy Mr. Osborne to give any other reason for keeping up so large an army in times of peace.

You will observe, Mr. D'Anvers, that the only design of this letter is to make some short observations

vations on two silly papers, which have been published against my former letters to you. You are now desired to apply the old gentleman's general positions to the English history, from the minutes which I have sent you, and which I believe will be as agreeable to the publick, as it was to the company in which he delivered it.

I am, SIR,

Your friend and reader, &c.

LETTER IV.

FEW nations have gone through more revolutions, few governments have appeared more unsteady, or fluctuated more between prerogative and privilege, than this of Great Britain.

If we are freemen, it is because the spirit of liberty has been never yet quite extinguished among us.

We have been surprised, betrayed, forced, more than once, into situations little better than that of downright slavery. But these usurpations have not become settlements. They have disordered the frame, but not destroyed the principles of a free government Like cloudy mornings, they have soon passed over, and the sun of liberty has broke out again with double force, and double lustre.

It must be a pleasure to reflect on that uniformity of spirit which created, and has constantly preserved or retrieved, the original freedom of the British and Saxon constitutions.

I feel a secret pride in thinking, that I was born a Briton; when I consider that the Romans, those masters of the world, maintained their liberty little more than seven centuries; and that Britain, which was a free nation above seventeen hundred years ago, is so at this hour.

However

However savage our British ancestors may be represented by the Romans, whom the luxury of Greece, and the effeminacy of Asia had already corrupted, they certainly were a people of spirit and of sense; who knew the ends of government, and obliged their governours to pursue those ends.

Cæsar himself acknowledges, that they fought boldly for their liberties, when he invaded them; and there is good reason to believe, from his manner of writing, and abrupt way of leaving this island, that they gave him a warmer reception, than he is willing to own.

But to speak of them after an author, in whose time they were better known than they were by Cæsar, or even by Tacitus; Dion Cassius, when he is about to relate the expedition of Severus into Britain, says, " that they held a great part of " the government in their own power."

Their long resistance again the Saxons shows their love of civil liberty.

Their long resistance against the usurpations of the church of Rome, begun by Gregory, that flatterer of Phocas and Brunehault, under pretence of converting the Saxons, shows their love of ecclesiastical liberty.

Though the Saxons submitted to the yoke of Rome in matters of religion, they were far from giving up the freedom of their Gothic institutions of government.

The Saxon heretoges, that is, publick generals, were chosen only to conduct them in war, not to rule over them in war and in peace.

These

These heretoges, among the German colonies, who settled in the countries they conquered, and founded new governments, became kings, and had trappings enough to set off their majesty, and to enforce their authority; but the supreme power centred in the micklemote, or wittenagemote, composed of the king, the lords, and the Saxon freemen, that original sketch of a British parliament.

Here all important affairs were treated. The conduct of their kings was examined in it, and controlled by it.

The rights of the people in those days must have been carried to a very great height; since they went hand in hand with those of the church; and since a positive law declared, that, if the king did not defend both, he should lose even the name of king. "Nec nomen regis in eo constabit, verum "nomen regis perdit."

The principles of the Saxon commonwealth were therefore very democratical; and these principles prevailed through all subsequent changes.

The Danes conquered the crown, but they wore it little; and the liberties of the Saxon freemen they never conquered; nor wrought any alteration in the constitution of the government.

Thus much it was thought necessary to premise concerning the original constitution of our government. We now come to that period of history, from whence we propose to deduce our following remarks.

WILLIAM,

WILLIAM, the Norman, is come down to us in history under the character of a conqueror; and though it may be disputed whether he was strictly so any more than several other princes, who have supported their titles by their swords, yet we may confess, that he imposed many new laws and customs; that he made very great alterations in the whole model of government; and that he, as well as his two sons, ruled, upon many occasions, like absolute, not limitted monarchs.

Yet neither he nor they could destroy the old constitution; because neither he nor they could extinguish the old spirit of liberty.

On the contrary, the Normans and other strangers, who settled here, were soon seized with it themselves, instead of inspiring a spirit of slavery into the Saxons.

They were originally of Celtick *, or Gothick extraction, call it which you please, as well as the people they subdued. They came out of the same northern hive; and therefore they naturally resumed the spirit of their ancestors, when they came into a country where it prevailed.

* We have thought fit to explain the expression of this place, though we know the word Celtick, as well as Scythian, hath been used in the same large and general sense, which is made use of here: and we could show, if such a trifle deserved it, that by the Celtæ antiquity did not always understand the people inhabiting a part of Gaul, notwithstanding the quotations out of Polybius, Diodorus, &c., which have been urged, by way of cavil, against us.

Stephen,

Stephen, the fourth king of this race, owed his crown to the goodwill of the nation; and he owed this goodwill to the concessions he made in favour of liberty.

John came to the crown after the death of his father Henry the second, and his brother Richard the first, by the election of the people. His electors, indeed, found themselves deceived in their expectations; for he governed in the most extravagant manner. But they soon made him feel whose creature he was. The contests between the laity and an ambitious usurping clergy ran very high at this time. John had made his advantage of these divisions. But the spirit of liberty prevailed, and that of faction vanished before it. Men grew ashamed of being the tools of private ambition, when publick safety was at stake. Those of the high church and those of the low church united in one common cause. The king blustered and drew out his army; but it was a British army. No wonder therefore, if the king submitted, and Magna Charta was signed.

It was signed again by his son and successor, Henry the third, in full parliament, and with the greatest solemnity. The people however abated nothing of their jealous, watchful spirit; and it was well for liberty they did not. The long reign of this prince was one continual struggle between him and them. The issue of this struggle was favourable to the latter. By exerting their strength, they increased it under Henry the third. They

lost no ground under Edward the first, and they gained a great deal under Edward the second.

Thus was the present constitution of our government forming itself for about two centuries and a half; a rough building raised out of the demolitions which the Normans had made, and upon the solid foundations laid by the Saxons. The whole fabrick was cemented by the blood of our fathers; for the British liberties are not the grants of princes. They are original rights, conditions of original contracts, coequal with prerogative, and coæval with our government. As such, in the days we speak of, they were claimed; as such they were asserted by force of arms; as such they were acknowledged; and as such they were constantly maintained afterward by that pertinacious spirit, which no difficulties nor dangers could discourage, nor any authority abate; not even that of the pope, as impudently as it was exercised, and as foolishly as it was revered in those superstitious ages.

Had this spirit relaxed in the course of so many years, our government must have settled in an absolute monarchy, or tyrannical aristocracy.

The Norman kings, of imperious tempers, assumed great power. The barons did the same. The people groaned under the oppression of both. This union was unnatural and could not last. The barons, enjoying a sort of feudatory sovereignty, were often partners and sometimes rivals

rivals of the kings. They had opposite interests, and they soon clashed.

Thus was the opportunity created of reestablishing a more equal free government, than that which had prevailed after the Norman invasion.

The kings, the barons, and the clergy, not less ambitious or avaricious than either of the others, had powerful means of promoting their usurpations. The commonalty had little or no share in the legislature; made no figure in the government; and it is hard to conceive how they could act, as the others might, and certainly did, by particular concerts, to the advancement of their particular interests.

All these disadvantages were supplied by that spirit of liberty, which diffused itself through the whole mass. Numbers were on the side of the commons. In all disputes therefore it was necessary to apply to them. They made the proper use of such conjunctures. Whoever lost, they were sure to be gainers; for so they deemed themselves, when they suffered all the hardships of war, and even laid down their lives in the quarrel, if they left liberty more improved and better secured to their posterity.

By concessions to the commons, our kings maintained and extended their prerogatives over the barons. By espousing the national interest, the barons continued able to cope with the crown, till they broke among themselves. Nay, even the church, notwithstanding that ancient and close alliance between secular and ecclesiastical ty-

ranny, was forced, on some few occasions, to be a friend to the liberties of the people.

The king, the barons, and the clergy were all, in reality, enemies to publick liberty. Their parties were so many factions in the nation; yet they all helped, in their turns, to establish liberty.

So true it is, that every thing, even the vices of mankind, and the misfortunes of a country, will turn to the advantage of liberty, where the spirit of it is maintained in vigour; as every thing, even the good qualities of mankind, and the prosperity of a country, may operate a contrary effect, where this spirit is suffered to decline.

As losing the spirit of liberty lost the liberties of Rome, even while the laws and constitutions, made for the preservation of them, remained entire; so we see that our ancestors, by keeping this spirit alive and warm, regained all the advantages of a free government, though a foreign invasion had destroyed them, in great measure, and had imposed a very tyrannical yoke on the nation.

LETTER V.

WE are now come to the reign of Edward the third. We must desire our readers to stop here, and at the reign of his successor, a little; since no reigns can furnish us with more memorable and pertinent examples, to show how the spirit of liberty exerts itself in favour of good princes; how slow it is to act even against the worst; and yet how effectually it is able to act even in the most desperate cases.

Old Froissart says*, that the English had an opinion, grounded on observations made from the days of good king Arthur, that between two valiant and able princes in this nation there always intervenes a king "moins suffisant "de sens & de prouesse; of less sense and "courage." I shall not warrant the exact truth of this observation. The proportion, I fear, is much greater on the worst side in all kingdoms. But certainly Edward the third, whose story gave occasion to Froissart to broach this anecdote, stands between his father Edward the second, and his grandson Richard the second, a bright instance of this truth, that "great and

* Vol. i, c. 2.

" good princes are favourers of liberty, and " find their account in promoting the spirit of " it; while the weakest and the worst princes " chiefly affect absolute power, and often meet " with the fate they deserve for such attempts."

The former know that they have nothing to apprehend from this spirit; and they wisely prefer the generous efforts of goodwill and affection, to the reluctant compliances of such as obey by force.

The latter, conscious that they are unable to lead, endeavour to drive their people. Unworthy to be kings, they struggle to be tyrants.

Few were the blemishes which may be thought to tarnish the lustre of this reign of Edward the third. Few and short were the struggles between him and his people; for as he was fierce and terrible to his enemies, he was amiable and indulgent to his subjects. He not only observed the laws, but he made the sense of the nation, in some measure, a law to him. On this principle, in which to a considering mind there will appear as much wisdom as goodness, he removed a son, nay a favourite mistress from court.

Henry the fourth, if I mistake not, did something of the same kind; and which of their successors, after such examples, could presume to think it below his dignity to consult the inclinations of his people, and make them the rule of his conduct?

Under this great prince, the constitution of our

our parliaments, and the whole frame of our government, became reduced into a better form. A spirit of liberty breathes in the laws of this glorious king; and the power and duty of parliaments are set forth, in some of them, with such terms as would never have been passed by a prince who had put the least pedantry, or the least foppery, into his notions of kingship.

The spirit of liberty was not idle in this reign, though it had little or no occasion of exercise against the crown. The usurpations of the church were many and grievous. They had been long murmured against; but a false respect for religion had hitherto maintained them. This delusion began now to be removed. Wickliffe arose to dispel this magick charm; to undraw the veil of this pretended sanctuary; and to expose the horrors and trifles, which lurked behind it, to publick view, indignation, and contempt. The axe was now first aimed at the root of popery; and prelates were taught the first lessons of moderation. Parliaments sat and proceeded on business, even on ecclesiastical business, without the intervention of mitres. There was, I believe, one parliament held, to which few or none of the prelates were summoned; in order, perhaps, to teach them how little their concurrence was essential to give due weight to the counsels, or full authority to the acts of parliament.

As this prince loved, instead of hating, as he encouraged, instead of discountenancing, the spirit of liberty in his people; so he was strengthened

ened and supported by it in such a manner, and in such circumstances, as cannot be paralleled.

The nation had been miserably harassed by civil wars and oppressions of various kinds, when he came to the crown. The burden of personal service, and the taxes raised to defend the dominions which his predecessors held on the continent, had exhausted all degrees of people. This mischief was so much resented by them, that foreign interest and foreign counsels may be justly reckoned among the principal causes of all the disputes, and even wars, between them and their former kings.

In this situation, and in this temper of mind was the nation, when Edward the third, by laying claim to the crown, and undertaking the conquest of France, opened to his subjects the terrible prospect of being worse than ever oppressed by the same grievances; and yet his nobility and commonalty seconded him in all these enterprises, with fewer complaints than could have been expected. These men, so apt to complain of grievances, and so little patient under them, carried him triumphantly through all his wars abroad, though they struggled with want, pestilence, and famine at home.

What principle produced this wonderful change? Did higher notions of prerogative prevail? Had the doctrines of a slavish submission at once possessed our ancestors? By no means. It was not the power, it was not the authority of the king, which forced; but it was the character of

the

the man, which invited to these compliances. The spirit of liberty exerted itself in favour of the patron of liberty.

A corrupt parliament, a degenerate nobility, a servile commonalty, will sacrifice any thing to any prince; to a Richard the second, or an Edward the third, equally and indiscriminately. But a free, a generous, a virtuous people, such as we may boast our ancestors were in those days, will sacrifice every thing, except liberty, to a prince like Edward the third; and liberty is a sacrifice, which a prince like him will never require at their hands. To him who would require it, they would sacrifice nothing. Such a people may be well governed with ease; and it ought to be hard to govern them ill. They will do more for a prince whom they love and esteem, than he has a right to expect from them. If they do less for a prince whom they despise or hate, they are surely very excusable.

In order to render this example still stronger and more useful, it may be proper to point out, beside his general character, some of those particulars in the conduct of Edward the third, which probably induced his people to sacrifice their estates, and their lives too, so cheerfully in a cause, to which, under other princes, they have been so averse.

In the first place, as his father Edward the second lost his crown and his life, in the most miserable manner, by suffering himself to be governed by his ministers, and protecting them from the resentments

resentments of the people; so his son very early exerted his own authority, and freed himself from the guardianship, or rather subjection, of the queen and Mortimer, who had long oppressed the nation, and dishonoured the young king by their scandalous conduct.

The next reason seems to have been this: Though he was magnificent in his court, yet he limited, with great care, the exactions of his purveyors, kept a severe hand over them, and suffered no more to be levied on his people, than what the necessary expense of his houshold required. He saved for his people, not for himself.

Thirdly, The taxes laid in his time were laid for visible and important services, wherein the honour at least of the nation was concerned; which every man knew and approved.

Fourthly, The expenses were lessened by that double economy, which is so rarely found, or even understood. I mean not only that inferiour economy, which consists in the management of the receipts and issues of the publick revenue; but that superiour economy, which consists in contriving the great schemes of negotiation and action. When the talents for this economy are wanting in those who govern, the publick pays for their want of genius; and the prince's or minister's errours are so many additional taxes on the people. When these talents are not wanting, the very reverse happens. The genius of the prince, or minister,

nister, comes in aid of the publick charge. Much is saved; and art and management supply it all.

Edward the third began his war against France in conjunction with German allies. He saw no better expedient at that time. But as soon as fortune and intrigue had procured it for him, he took another, shorter, cheaper, and more effectual method. He supported the earl of Monfort, competitor with Charles of Blois, for the duchy of Brittany. "Avecques les Allemans, & les Bra-" bançons," says Froissart, "il n'avoit riens fait, " sors despendre grossement; & l'avoit mené & " demené les siegneurs de l'empire, qui avoient " prints son or & son argent, ainsy qu'ills avoient " voulu, & riens fait. Si descendit à la requeste " du comte joyeusement, &c." That is, "with " the Germans and the Brabançons, all he had " been able to do was to spend great sums of " money. The princes of the empire, who had " taken as much as they would of his gold and " his silver, and had done nothing for it, were " accustomed to amuse him, and to tire him out. " He condescended therefore to the request of " the earl very joyfully."

Fifthly, It was not owing to his success, that the people had a good opinion of his enterprises, and promised themselves a happy issue, how difficult, or dangerous soever these enterprises might appear. Their confidence was placed, and very justly, in those qualities, and that tenour of conduct, which they observed in their king, and to which his prodigious success was owing. No man contrived,

contrived, prepared, resolved with more phlegm, or acted with greater fire; the reverse of his successor, who resolved rashly, and executed irresolutely. He waited sometimes for opportunities, but he always improved them when they happened; and those accidents which govern or dictate the measures, and perpetually shift the fluctuating schemes of weak governments, were bent by this great prince to serve the wisest and most steady purposes.

Sixthly, If he drained away some of the national wealth by taxes, he restored it very amply again, by the great care he took of extending and improving trade; by which he opened new mines of treasure; and, for a few temporary contributions, enriched his people to future generations. A prince, who adds to the national stock, has a right to share the advantage he procures, and may demand supplies from his people without blushing. But a prince who lives a rentcharge on the nation he governs, who sits on his throne, like a monstrous drone in the middle of a hive, draining all the combs of their honey, and neither making nor assisting the industrious bees to make any; such a prince, I say, ought to blush at every grant he receives from a people, who never received any benefit from him. The duke of Gloucester told Richard the second, on his restoring Brest to the duke of Brittany, that he should have taken a town by his own valour and conduct, before he resigned what his ancestors had left him. Much to the same purpose might an oppressed people justly

justly answer a craving prince. When you have increased the riches and advanced the prosperity of the nation, you will have some right to make these demands upon us; but till then we shall think that you have none.

LETTER VI*.

THE glorious scene of government, which displayed itself in the reign of Edward the third, was strangely altered on the succession of Richard the second; a violent, haughty, obstinate, and weak prince; whose reign, as one of our historians observes, "affords but little "matter that may shine in history; and cannot "boast of any one great and distinguished cap- "tain; any one memorable battle, or important "siege; but prorogations of truces, abstinences, "sufferances, patiences, tolerances were the "language and amusement of the times; and "treaties were all the while kept on foot for "a perpetual peace; treaties, says he, hitherto "fruitless, illusory, and impracticable."

It must be confessed, that the reins of government hung pretty loose in the hands of Edward the third, toward the latter end of his reign; from whence proceeded the growth of those factions, which disturbed the beginning of his grandson's reign. Some part of this was owing, very probably, to the abuse of Wickliffe's doctrines; more to the cruel treatment which the

* Mr. Francklin was taken up for printing this paper and the preceding one, on the reign of Edward the third; but no farther prosecution hath been yet commenced against him on that account.

inferiour

inferiour part of the commonalty received. The lords grew tyrants, and the commons rebels. But these commotions were soon suppressed by the united force of the rest of the nation; much sooner, and with consequences less fatal, than in other countries, where rebellion and popular insurrections seem to have been the epidemical distempers of that age.

If the spirit of faction was soon quelled among the commons, it prevailed openly, scandalously, and dangerously in the court. Something of it might be discerned, perhaps, among the lords, who opposed the court; even in the duke of Gloucester, the favourite of the people; in the duke of Lancaster, a wise prince, and who acted long the moderating part; in Arundel and others. Nothing of it was to be observed in the general proceedings of parliament, and in the national conduct.

The justness of the character given before of Richard the second discovered itself very early in his actions. He had a brutality and a good opinion of himself; one of which might have betrayed him into a discovery of what it was his interest to conceal, if the other had not made him capable of doing it even on reflection. Hence came those famous and foolish sayings of this prince, which history has preserved, and which gave his people timely warning what they had to expect from him. Of his commons he said, "that slaves they were, and slaves they "should be." Upon an address from parliament

to

to remove his chancellor and treasurer, his answer was, "that he would not remove, at "their request, the meanest scullion out of his "kitchen."

However, he found men, as all princes may easily do, who flattered him in his vices and follies; such men, for instance, as Nevil, Vere, Poole, Tressilian, and others; who, to fasten him to themselves, made the nation odious to him; as they made him odious to the nation by their rapine, their insolence, and by a weak administration; which exposed the kingdom to be invaded by the Scots, and threatened and insulted by the French.

During all this time, parliaments met frequently, and gave necessary supplies; some grievances they redressed; but bore the maleadministration of the court faction till the tenth year of this king; when they prosecuted the favourites with great justice; with temper, and yet with vigour. They spared nothing to provide for the defence of the kingdom by sea and land; and having put the administration, for a time, into the hands of persons chosen by themselves, gave the king such a warning, as might have taught him to abandon a faction, and to throw himself on his people: but it proved in vain. His favourite ministers persuaded him, that they suffered for his sake; that the aim of their enemies was to dethrone him by disgracing them; and while all the troubles of his reign were due to his support of them, they made him believe, that they suffered

for executing his orders, and maintaining his authority.—Nay, they represented to him, that, by accusing the counsellors, a man plainly shows, that he believes the sovereign incapable of governing; and that the readiest way to discredit a prince, is persuading his subjects, that he makes use of ill ministers.—These arguments and artifices, ridiculous as they seem, succeeded, and had their effect for some time longer.

The deluded king entered into a closer conjunction than ever with his ministers. He took their iniquities on himself; made their cause his own; was privy to their plots of poisoning their enemies; of packing juries; of corrupting the judges to give opinions against law; and to all that dirty work, which they wanted, not he. Nay, by his encouragement they raised troops; and a battle was fought in their quarrel; but they were defeated, and the fourteenth parliament, called the wonder-working parliament, having punished the judges and ministers with proper severity, endeavoured to reconcile the king and his people. They gave him great subsidies, and renewed their homage and fealty to him.

Even all this still proved in vain. No experience was sufficient to reclaim Richard the second. He governed tyrannically at home, and took a wife, and bought a peace from France. It is remarkable, that the peace cost him four hundred thousand pounds, much more than he got by his wife. His favourite ministers had before this time endeavoured to persuade him to give up Calais,

and purchase the friendship of France, to assist him against the lords and others, who opposed him. This is not the last, nor least instance of conducting foreign affairs purely with regard to the interest of ministers, and without any to the honour and interest of the nation.

The factions among the great men were of double advantage to the king for a time.

First, the body of the people, who showed themselves sufficiently animated with a spirit of liberty, grew cool in espousing the quarrels of the lords, after they thought liberty secured by the proceedings of parliament, in the tenth year of this king; and though many particular actions of violence, of treachery, and of cruelty, were committed by Richard the second, they bore all with the greatest patience for several years.

In the next place, these factions among the great men enabled the king to divide them, to play one against the other; and to build up his tyranny on the ruins of both. His uncle, the duke of Gloucester, was basely betrayed, and barbarously murdered by him. He procured a packed parliament, consisting of men imposed on the shires and towns by the king's authority, wholly managed by court favourites, and which bent all it's endeavours to destroy the liberties and privileges of the people. With the help of such a parliament, he wreaked vengeance on those who had opposed him; got his authority exalted above all law, and exercised a most cruel tyranny.

The people still bore, and it is probable that the

the king, and others as well as he, imagined that they would be obliged to bear on, since the whole legislature united in their oppression. But in this he was deceived. When the parliament took the part of the people, the people followed the motions of parliament. When they had no hopes from parliament, they followed the first standard which was set up against the king. The same spirit of liberty, which had been so slow to act under so many provocations, acted with the greatest vigour, when it was least expected. The king, at the head of an army in Ireland, the duke of York at the head of another in England, and the earl of Salisbury at the head of a third, could do the king no service. The armies would not fight for the king against their country. The whole nation abandoned him, or acted against him. Some of his ministers were hanged; particularly those who had been the great instruments of taxing and oppressing the people. He was, at length, forced to resign, and to subscribe an instrument with his own hand, by which he confessed himself unworthy to govern the kingdom any longer. This instrument of resignation was not only unanimously approved of in parliament, but articles of accusation were ordered to be drawn up against him, to justify their resolution of deposing him. These articles were thirty-five in number, setting forth the particulars of his misgovernment: two of which are to this effect:

" That he had put the administration of the " publick affairs in the hands of unexperienced

" and ill-designing persons, to the great damage " of the people, who were loaded with excessive " taxes.

" That in his negotiations with foreign princes, " he had made use of so many equivocations and " sophistries, that none would take his word any " more."

It is very observable, that these extremities fell upon Richard the second, at a time when every thing seemed to contribute to his support, in the exercise of that arbitrary power which he had assumed. Those whom he had most reason to fear were removed either by violent death, or banishment; and others were secured in his interest by places, or favours at court. The great offices of the crown, and the magistracy of the whole kingdom, were put into such hands as were fit for his designs; beside which, he had a parliament entirely at his devotion; but all these advantageous circumstances served only to prove, that a prince can have no real security against the just resentments of an injured and exasperated nation; for, as Rapin observes upon the sad catastrophe of this reign, and that of Edward the second; " in such governments as that of Eng- " land, all endeavours used by the king to make " himself absolute are but so many steps toward " his own downfal."

It is farther observed by another eminent writer upon this reign, which he justly calls a reign of favourites, " that the king in his distress saw him- " self forsaken by those, whom he should have

" forsaken

" forsaken before; the very men, who had so
" much flattered him with their excessive love
" and loyalty; and like those mean insects,
" which live with a little warmth, but shrink at
" any change of weather, they, who had contri-
" buted to all his errours in his prosperity, trans-
" planted their zeal into the new sunshine, as
" soon as his successor demanded the crown."

LETTER VII.

FROM the reigns of Edward the third, and Richard the second, we shall hasten downward, as fast as some necessary observations will permit. Those of the princes of York and Lancaster form a period of more than eighty years, which passed in foreign and civil wars, in frequent revolutions of government, and in all those disorders, which usually accompany and follow such revolutions.

The party of Richard the second, even after the death of that unhappy prince, broke out into open rebellion against Henry the fourth: but their efforts were vain. He held the crown fast, which the parliament had given him; and the chief of his opposers perished in their attempts. Happy had it been if they alone had suffered; but here we must observe a necessary and cruel consequence of faction. As it oppresseth the whole community, if it succeeds; so it often draws oppression, not on itself alone, but on the whole community, when it fails. The attempts to dethrone Henry the fourth justified him, no doubt, in supporting himself by a military force. They excused him likewise very probably in the minds of many, for governing with a severe hand; for doing several illegal and tyrannical actions; for invading the privileges of parliament, at least in the point of elections: and for obtaining by these

these means frequent and heavy taxes on the people: for as all this might appear the harder, because it happened in the reign of a king who had no title to his crown but the goodwill of the people, and the free gift of parliament; so it might appear, on the other hand, the less grievous, because some part of it was rendered necessary by the opposition, which a faction made to a parliamentary establishment; and because the rest of it was represented, perhaps, under that umbrage, to be so likewise, by the court logick of that age.

A people may be persuaded to bear patiently a great deal of oppression, as long as they can be persuaded, that they bear it only to defend their own choice, and to maintain their own acts; but if they discover this to be nothing more than a pretence, by which such powers are kept up as are unnecessary to their security, and dangerous to their liberty; by which the wealth of the whole nation is drained into the coffers of a few; and by which, in one word, they become exposed to ruin by the very means which they took to avoid it; it cannot be expected, that they will be patient very long.

It deserves particular notice, that although Henry the fourth was willing to show his clemency, at the beginning of his reign, by inflicting a very slight punishment on the wicked and hated ministers of the late king; yet it being alleged in their excuse, that Richard had compelled them to act, the parliament took occasion from thence to pass an act, by which it was declared, that, for

the future, compulsion should be no legal excuse to justify actions contrary to law. The reasonableness and expediency of this act are very manifest; for it is the indispensible duty of a good minister, to dissuade his majesty from all illegal measures; or, if he cannot prevail, to quit his service, rather than suffer himself to be made the instrument of them: and if the commands of the prince were to be allowed a sufficient justification, the prerogative of doing no wrong would be extended to ministers, and nobody would be left accountable for maleadministration.

In the short but triumphant reign of Henry the fifth, the spirit of faction was awed; and the spirit of liberty had no occasion of exerting itself, at least with struggle and in any signal manner, under a prince just, moderate, and pious, according to the religion of those times.

The reign of his son was the reign of faction; and it discloses a horrid scene of iniquity, folly, madness. The scandalous management of publick affairs, which brought infinite loss and dishonour to the nation, gave real occasion, as well as pretence, to commotions and insurrections. The contemptible character of the man who sat on the throne revived the hopes of the faction of York. The faction of Lancaster took the alarm. Most of the great and active men were attached to one side or to the other, by obligation, by resentment, by hopes, or by fears. The national interest was sunk, to the shame of the nation, in the particular interest of two families.

In

In the civil wars, which happened a century and a half, or two centuries before this time, the point in dispute was how the people should be governed. In these we are speaking of, the point in dispute was who should govern. The first was worth contending for, and deserved all the blood which was shed in the quarrel. But this cannot be said of the last, which ought always to be looked upon with great indifference; except in cases, where it has so immediate and necessary a relation to the first, that securing the first depends, in a great measure, on settling the last. Such cases have happened; and particular instances may be easily found; but the contrary cases, where men have fought for governors, without regard to government, are easy to be found likewise; and that was plainly the case of the two factions of York and Lancaster.

The parliaments in those days seemed to be in another temper; very little concerned who was king, and very much to preserve the constitution. In the many revolutions which happened, each side would have the parliament for them. Whatever titles they set up, they were glad to hold the crown by the grant, or by the confirmation of parliament. The parliament wisely complied, whoever prevailed. The chance of war determined who should be king; at one time Henry the sixth, at another Edward the fourth, and the parliament accordingly placed them on the throne, and settled their government.

There

There is another observation, which ought to be made, before we leave this period of time. The reigns of Richard the second, and Henry the fourth, had shown the dangerous consequences of that influence, which the crown had obtained in the elections of members of parliament. The watchful spirit of liberty was soon alarmed, and prevailed to make such regulations about elections, and about the qualifications of the electors and the elected, as seemed at that time sufficient to prevent this influence for the future. These regulations appear in several laws, made during the reigns of the three Lancastrian princes; and our elections proceed, in a great measure, upon them to this very day. These regulations have required, and must, in the nature of things, require to be altered, as the course of accidents, or the change of national circumstances, shall suggest reasons for so doing. But then such alterations have been, and ought always to be contrived so as to adapt them better, and to enforce them more strongly; because the principle, on which they are founded, can never vary, and is so essential to the preservation of liberty, that if it be lost, and if a practice in opposition to it should ever prevail, the balance of our government would be that moment lost, and the British constitution left at the mercy of any ambitious prince, or wicked minister.

For this reason, Mr. Rapin observes very justly, "that there are but two ways of depriving the "English of their liberties; either by laying "aside

" aside parliaments, or bribing them." And in another place he says, " that the English free-" dom will be at an end, whenever the court in-" vades the free election of parliaments."

It is necessary to insist upon this observation a little; because it hath been ridiculed, though dully, and great pains have been taken to explode the doctrine contained in it, which was laid down in these words: " In a constitution like ours, " the safety of the whole depends on the balance " of the parts; and the balance of the parts on " their mutual independency on each other." These words, it seems, even with those of Thuanus to explain them, convey no idea to the London Journalist; but this will be found, as I apprehend, to be his fault, or his defect, not Oldcastle's. A man born without the sense of hearing, or stopping his ears, and determined at any rate not to hear, may be deaf to the voice of Stentor himself.

I shall not enter into any altercations with the London Journalist, nor go out of the road to have the honour of such company. But when I meet him in my way, I shall encounter him frankly, without the least fear of being crushed by the weight of his arguments; or, which is more, by the power of his patron.

To say, like this author, that the " carrying on " of business and maintaining government by " powers absolutely distinct, and absolutely in-" dependent, is a meer Utopian scheme," must proceed from ignorance or folly. Have not powers, absolutely

absolutely distinct and independent, been joined by federal unions? Are no such examples to be found, even at this day? Has not this been brought about by the very reason given to prove that it can never happen; because men agree when they see reason for agreement; and they see reason for agreement, when they see their interest in agreeing? Osborne could not be in earnest, when he let such stuff fall from his pen. He meant to elude the argument, and to perplex his readers, or he meant nothing. But this shall not pass. The matter is too important. He shall be talked to as he desires, without a metaphor; and what has been advanced shall be applied to our government.

A king of Great Britain is that supreme magistrate, who has a negative voice in the legislature. He is entrusted with the executive power; and several other powers and privileges, which we call prerogatives, are annexed to this trust. The two houses of parliament have their rights and privileges: some of which are common to both, others particular to each. They prepare, they pass bills, or they refuse to pass such as are sent to them. They address, represent, advise, remonstrate. The supreme judicature resides in the lords. The commons are the grand inquest of the nation, and to them it belongs likewise to judge of national expenses, and to give supplies accordingly.

If the legislative as well as the executive power was wholly in the king, as in some countries, he would

would be absolute; if in the lords, our government would be an aristocracy; if in the commons, a democracy. It is this division of power, these distinct privileges attributed to the king, to the lords, and to the commons, which constitute a limited monarchy.

Again: as they constitute a limited monarchy, so the wisdom of our government has provided, as far as human wisdom can provide, for the preservation of it, by this division of power, and by these distinct privileges. If any one part of the three, which compose our government, should at any time usurp more power than the law gives, or make an ill use of a legal power, the other two parts may, by uniting their strength, reduce this power into it's proper bounds, or correct the abuse of it; nay, if at any time two of these parts should concur in usurping, or abusing power, the weight of the third may at least retard the mischief, and give time and chance for preventing it.

This is that balance which has been so much talked of, and this is the use of it. Both are plain to common sense, and to experience; as will appear farther in the course of these remarks, where we shall have occasion to show how often the proper use of this balance has saved our constitution; and to what misfortunes we have been exposed by the neglect, or improper use of it.

Since this division of power, and these distinct privileges, constitute and maintain our govern-

ment,

ment, it follows that the confusion of them tends to destroy it. This proposition is therefore true; that, in a constitution like ours, the safety of the whole depends on the balance of the parts. Let us see whether it be true, that the balance of the parts consists in their mutual independency.

To speak again without any metaphor, the power, which the several parts of our government have of controlling and checking one another, may be called a dependency on one another, and may be argued for by those who want to throw darkness around them, as the dependency opposed to the independency, mentioned in the proposition. But the fallacy is gross. We have shown that this power of control in each, which results from the division of power among all the parts of our government, is necessary to the preservation of it: and thus a sort of constitutional dependency, if I may have leave to express myself in that manner, is created among them; but this mutual dependency cannot be opposed to the independency pleaded for. On the contrary, this mutual dependency cannot subsist without such an independency; for whenever this independency is lost, the mutual dependency is that moment changed into a particular, constant dependency of one part on two; or, which is still more unreasonable, of two parts on one. The constitutional dependency, as I have called it for distinction's sake, consists in this; that the proceedings of each part of the government, when they come forth into action and affect the whole,

are liable to be examined and controlled by the other parts. The independency pleaded for consists in this; that the resolutions of each part, which direct these proceedings, be taken independently and without any influence, direct or indirect, on the others. Without the first, each part would be at liberty to attempt destroying the balance, by usurping or abusing power; but without the last, there can be no balance at all. I will illustrate this, by supposing a prince, who claims and exercises a right of levying money without consent of parliament. He could not be opposed effectually, if the two houses of parliament had not a right to oppose him; to call his ministers to account; and to make him feel, that, far from being absolute, he was under this constitutional dependency; but he would not be opposed at all, if the two houses of parliament were under his influence, and incapable of directing their proceedings independently of him. One would be ashamed to insist thus much on a point so very clear, if some men were not so hardened to all sense of shame, as to maintain the contrary; and that there are men capable of doing this, is one of those melancholy symptoms which characterise the present age. I could almost appeal to the cool thoughts, and the private reflections of some of these writers, whether any thing can be more scandalous than the task they have undertaken. To skreen their patrons, they endeavour to distinguish us out of our greatest national advantages; as was observed in the case of Dunkirk.

Dunkirk. To reconcile the minds of men to such measures as their patrons may want, and as no honest man will take, they endeavour to demolish the very corner stones, on which the whole fabrick of liberty rests. Their iniquity, it must be confessed, is very systematical. When they write for corruption, they write for the means. When they write for the dependency of the parliament on the court, they write for the end. Well might Oldcastle say of these writers, their patrons and abettors, " that the mask was " pulled off on one side." Let me conjure them, in the name of modesty, to call themselves whigs no longer. It is time they should lay that appellation aside, since it will not be hard to prove, from the general tenour of their writings, that the maxims they advance, the doctrines they inculcate, and the conduct they recommend, lead to the destruction of civil liberty, as much as the political lessons of Sibthorpe, Manwaring, or archbishop Laud himself. They and their followers declared themselves directly against liberty. To plead for it was almost blasphemy; and to assert it little less than the sin against the Holy Ghost, according to the doctrines taught by those divines. Such absurdities made few converts in those days; and the preachers of them would meet with the utmost contempt in these. But the writers, of whom we now complain, affect to maintain the cause of liberty, while they betray it. They assert the principles of liberty in general, and sometimes reason upon them well enough; but when

when they apply them to particular cases, they prevaricate, evade, and exert all their poor endeavours to turn the cannon of liberty against herself. The others had fænum in cornu. They put mankind on their guard against them, and were the true promoters of all the mischief and confusion which followed, when the nation run into the utmost extremes, in opposition to them. These men insinuate themselves as friends to liberty. They are looked upon as such by some few persons, who mean well to liberty even at this time; and yet they are almost wholly employed in promoting that which is destructive of liberty, and inconsistent with it, corruption and dependency. Laud and the others endeavoured openly to lop the branches and cut down the tree; but these men are privately poisoning the root of liberty. The power of the court, and the authority of the lawyers, could not make the levying ship-money pass for law, nor prevail on the nation to bear it. But if it were possible to suppose a house of commons as dependent as these lawyers, (and they would be as dependent, if the doctrines which we oppose prevailed among them) the nation might then be loaded with taxes, oppressed with debts, and reduced to the greatest misery by law. Our liberties, as well as our estates, might be taken from us. We might be legally undone. These are possible consequences of such doctrines. If they are not probable, we owe no thanks to the weekly preachers of them. The nature of our present settlement, which is built on the foun-

dation of liberty, the interest and honour of the prince now on the throne, as well as of all his illustrious posterity, are our security against these dangers; but still I say, we owe no thanks to the writers on the side of the ministry.

I have dwelt pretty much upon this point, to show what is the real design of these remarks; and I will venture to add, that those persons, who oppose such doctrines as we have been opposing, will appear at last to be the truest friends to his majesty king George, and the protestant succession; which can subsist only upon those principles, upon which it was originally established.

LETTER VIII.

IF the reign of Henry the sixth was a reign of faction, those of the house of York were so likewise.—The popularity, bravery, cruelty, rashness, uxoriousness, incontinence of Edward the fourth; in short, his good and his bad qualities worked the different effects of supporting, exasperating, and increasing factions. The characters of Henry the sixth's queen and of the earl of Warwick, to mention no more of the principal actors on that bloody stage, conspired to maintain and aggravate this national calamity.

In these long-continued struggles the whole nation became involved, and the factions of York and Lancaster growing every day more animated and better disciplined, we are not to wonder, that they fought usque ad internecionem; at least, till the field of battle, the scaffold, and some theatres of clandestine murders had left no man on one side alive, who was in a condition to oppose or give jealousy to the other. But that which may very justly raise our wonder is, that Edward the fourth, having secured to himself and his family the possession of the throne, by the murder of Henry the sixth, and his son, and by the total defeat of the whole Lancastrian party, should suffer two new factions to be nursed up, which divided his own party, occasioned the murder

of his sons, and, by establishing the short-lived tyranny of his brother, brought the earl of Richmond to the throne, and sunk for ever the house of York in that of Lancaster.

Edward the fourth's queen was the original cause of all this mischief, and a principal sufferer herself in the course of it. She was resolved to govern at any rate; and Rapin observes, "that "as her being queen gave her no manner of title "to meddle with the affairs of the publick, she "knew how to manage that matter another way; "namely, by the influence she had over the king. "Though Edward often proved false to her, she "bore it very patiently, and never showed her "uneasiness at it. Edward, charmed to find "himself at liberty to pursue his inclinations, "without danger of continual reproaches, repaid "her moderation with the most obliging and con- "descending behaviour; of which she knew how "to make a good use." She maintained this ascendant over her husband to the last, and for a little complaisance, which cost her nothing in present, she purchased a degree of power in the state, which cost her dear in consequence, by alienating the affections of the people from her husband during his life, and ruining his family afterward, as I have hinted before.

"Her aim was," according to Rapin, "to secure "her power during the king's life, and in case "she survived him, to make sure of the govern- "ment of the kingdom, in the name of the prince "her son, when he should come to be on the

" throne; but by a fatality, not unusual to the " best laid projects, this very thing proved the " occasion of her own, and her family's ruin."

I cannot think, as Rapin seems to do, that her project deserved to be ranked among those which are the best laid. It appears to be the narrow project of a woman, who had cunning, insinuation, and the spirit of intrigue, with much pride and ambition; but wanted that extensive knowledge, and that superior genius, such as Catherine of Medicis, and our queen Elizabeth possessed, which is necessary to conduct so great a design as her passion prompted her to undertake. For what was her project? Was it to acquire an interest in the nation, by deserving well of it?—Nothing less. It was singly this; to form a faction at court, by raising her relations and immediate dependents, which should be wholly her own, and into whose hands she might throw all the power and profit; which the king had to bestow. She had the good luck to compass this design, and triumphed, no doubt very wisely, in her great success. Surrounded by her creatures, she looked no farther than that circle, and either took no notice of the temper of the nation, or judged of it by the temper of the court. But the rise of this faction immediately formed another, and established the distinction of ancient and new nobility. The former had the true natural strength, which great estates in land and established credit in the nation gave them. The latter had no strength of their own, none but that adventitious strength,

which arose from employments and favour at court. They brought nothing to court, which could make the court amends for the envy and discontent which their elevation created. To supply this, two things were done; which served, perhaps, to fortify the queen in her delusion, and thereby made the ruin of her ambitious projects the surer. All those who were not in the good graces of her faction, were disgraced at court, and in effect banished from it. Nay they were persecuted by the power of it; as the duke of Clarence, the king's own brother, was even to death. The names of the parties of York and Lancaster might subsist, and be made use of on proper occasions; but in reality, the being for or against the party of the queen was the sole distinction which prevailed; and even the friends of the house of York, whom the queen did not affect, were debarred from having the king's ear, excepting only three of his old and most faithful servants, who maintained themselves against her and her faction. I mean Stafford duke of Buckingham, Hastings, and Stanley.

Another method which this queen took to strengthen herself and her faction, was by raking up money by illegal and oppressive means; particularly by setting prosecutions on foot against the rich men of the kingdom, several of whom were arraigned of high treason, and encouraging the judges to get them found guilty at any rate. Habington observes in his history of this king, "that "as their wealth was the principal evidence "against

" against them, though their persons were acquit-
" ted, their estates were found guilty."

The same historian observes farther, " that
" the memory of these carriages hithertofore, in a
" business that concerned the life of a man re-
" puted innocent, drew the world into much fear,
" that he would now decline to rigour. Neither
" was the king totally excused, although this cruel
" avarice was laid to the queen, who having a
" numerous issue and kindred, by favour raised
" up to the highest titles, was almost necessitated,
" for supportance of their honours, to rack the
" kingdom."

Edward seemed sensible, before his death, of the mischievous consequences which this conduct, and the clashing of two factions might produce. He endeavoured to prevent them, by " recon-
" ciling the two parties; a poor expedient!" as Rapin justly observes, " which could not easily
" produce the effect he expected."

The duke of Gloucester, who concealed his design till his brother's death, took advantage of these factions. He made his court publickly to the queen, and held a private correspondence with the opposite party. Nay he found means, by fomenting it, to raise a third for himself.

I have dwelt the longer in this place, on the strange turns and cruel effects of faction; because I believe no example can be produced out of any history, which sets them in a stronger light: and because this period of time affording but small matter to recommend the spirit of liberty, which

had little to do in the transactions of it, I imagine that pointing out the fatal consequences of the contrary spirit, which then prevailed, may answer the same end; as exposing of vice is frequently the strongest recommendation of virtue.

But we must not imagine, notwithstanding all the contrary appearances in this period, that the spirit of liberty was absolutely extinguished. Though that flame was lost, for the most part, in the constant glare of faction, yet it was still alive; and by living, preserved the constitution of our government during the whole course of these civil wars.

If we look closely into these scenes of confusion, we may discover many particular instances of the operations of this spirit. Such were the difficulties and delays opposed to the grant of tonnage and poundage, for nine years together; and the many restrictions added to this grant, when it was at last obtained by Edward the fourth. Other instances to the same purpose might be quoted; but we choose to insist on a more general observation, already mentioned by us, which runs through the whole period, and is so strongly vouched by history as to admit of no cavil.

The observation we are going to make contains a memorable exception to this proposition, which is but too generally true, that the spirit of liberty and the spirit of faction are incompatible, and cannot long subsist together. The virtue of our ancestors made this exception; and if it hath been remembered to their shame, that they sunk

the

the national interest in the particular interest of two families; it ought to be remembered to their honour, that they did so in this single point only, who should reign, and in no other. We took notice, in a former paper, that upon every revolution, each side engaged the parliament for them, and that whoever prevailed, the parliament wisely complied. This conduct, which lasted from Richard the second down to Richard the third, preserved our liberties; but it could not have been pursued, nor could our liberties by consequence have been preserved, if the spirit of liberty had not been latent in the hearts of those very men, who seem to breathe nothing but faction. How could it have happened, that the sole title of conquest was ever established in so many revolutions brought about by the sword, if the actors in them had not been strongly affected with a love and reverence for the free constitution of our government? The princes of York and Lancaster themselves were willing, nay desirous to have a parliamentary confirmation of their titles, real or pretended. But how came they to be so desirous of it? How came they to think it necessary? The case is plain. The temper of their parties and of their armies begot this necessity. The spirit of liberty prevailed enough in the whole body of the nation, out of which these parties and armies were composed, to preserve the principles of publick freedom, though not enough to preserve the publick peace.—Each side contended to have a king of their own party; but neither side would

have

have a tyrant.—They sacrificed their lives to faction; but would not give up their liberties.—The victorious armies led their kings to the foot of the throne; but carried them no farther.

The author of the Short History of standing Armies observes, that, "in all the wars of York "and Lancaster, whatever party prevailed, we do "not find they ever attempted to keep up a stand-"ing army. Such was the virtue of those times," says he, "that they would rather run the hazard "of forfeiting their heads and estates to the rage "of the opposite party, than certainly enslave "their country, though they themselves were to "be the tyrants."—This remark is just, as far as it goes; and it goes as far as that author wanted to carry it; but it is not so full, nor carried so far, as history will warrant. That the princes, who obtained the crown by their armies, did not attempt to govern by their armies afterward, is most true, and may reflect some honour on those princes, and on the heads of their parties. But there is something more than this remarkable in the conduct of those times; for even in the heat of victory, in the raptures of a successful revolution, and before the armies could be disbanded, we see these princes obliged to ascend the steps of the throne in such a manner, and under such conditions, as the parliament thought fit to prescribe, and as were not always agreeable to them. This, I am sure, reflects great honour on the parliaments, who were actors in the last scenes of all these revolutions; and on the armies, who

contented

contented themselves to become spectators in such conjunctures.—We will take the first example which presents itself in these wars.

The duke of Lancaster was at the head of an army of sixty thousand men, when he came to the crown. The proclamation, which he published the very day he was crowned, showed how very unwilling he was to seem to hold his crown purely by right of election. He would gladly have set up that of conquest; or a title derived from Richard the second's resignation; or a title by blood; or any title but the true one. Notwithstanding this, he was obliged, when nothing could have obliged him but the sense of his own party and army, to submit to as formal an election as ever was made. The two houses took no notice of the blind claim of right which he entered. They chose him to be king, upon the question put to them, after having given their negative to the duke of York, to his sons, and to others, who were severally proposed in the same manner to them. They seem industriously to have contrived and pursued, on this occasion, a method of proceeding as opposite as possible to the views and inclination of this prince, whose army attended him, and whose rival was his prisoner.

Again; to take another example from the latter end of these wars. The battle of Northampton being won, and Henry the sixth taken, the duke of York hastens out of Ireland to put himself at the head of his party and his army. The parliament meets. The duke asserts his undoubted right by descent

descent to the crown, which he demands as due to him, without any interposition of parliament. He shows the utmost, and even an indecent impatience, to take possession of it. He is supported by his own party. He is opposed by others. But the matter is by all submitted to the debate and decision of parliament. The debate itself must have been grievous enough to a prince so fond of a crown, and so much warmed with the notion of his hereditary right. But the decision of this affair must have wounded him to the quick. So little regard was paid to his right, that he was forced to content himself with leaving the crown on the head of Henry the sixth, during that prince's life, and not to have the prospect of succeeding to it, till after that prince's decease; which, by the way, was a point of the less value to him, because he was older than Henry the sixth, and could not hope to be the better for it, according to the course of nature. He submitted to all these mortifications; and a very judicious historian attributes his submission to his moderation; but I believe those who fully consider his former conduct, and his passionate behaviour at this time, will hardly subscribe to such a judgment. His submission, like that of Henry the fourth, in the case before cited, was a submission, which the temper of his party rendered necessary. They would not force the resolutions of the two houses: and why the two houses would go no farther in his favour, at that juncture, might easily be accounted for, if this

were

were a proper place for that disquisition.—After the battle of Wakefield, where the duke of York was killed, and that of St. Alban's, where the earl of Warwick was beaten, the faction of York were determined, by the dangers they had run, and by the losses they had sustained, to balance no longer, but to set the crown on the head of the earl of March; and yet they proceeded no otherwise than under the authority of parliament, which had ratified the agreement made between the late duke of York and Henry the sixth. By one article of this agreement it was stipulated, that if king Henry broke it in any point, the crown and royal dignity should immediately devolve on the duke of York, if alive; or, in failure of him, on his next heir. The earl of Warwick therefore, in a kind of military assembly, (for a part of the army, at least, was there,) proceeded to the election of Edward the fourth; but he proceeded on this foundation. The great efforts made to break this agreement, and to defeat the effect of it, by king Henry's queen, and the Lancastrian party, were interpreted, and not without colour, as so many infractions of it. By consequence, Edward the fourth had an immediate right to the crown, by virtue of the act of parliament, made in confirmation of this convention, which act and convention were produced by Warwick, who caused them to be publickly read. The proceeding of this assembly, which hath a tumultuous air in history, was therefore in reality a proclamation of a king, made by authority

authority of parliament, and not of an election of a king, without that authority.

Let us conclude, that if the spirit of faction hath, on some occasions, prevailed over the spirit of liberty, so far as to defeat and even pervert the designs of the latter; the spirit of liberty hath likewise revived, in it's turn, on other occasions, and prevented the consummation of that misery, which faction would naturally and of course have produced. Let us conclude that all standing armies, for whatsoever purpose instituted, or in whatsoever habit clothed, may be easily made the instruments of faction; because a body of men separated, in many respects, from the rest of the nation, constrained to different customs, and in some measure subjected to different laws, may be easily persuaded, that they have a different interest. Let us conclude that these casuists in red are the most dangerous in this respect, that having swords by their sides, they are able at once to cut those gordian knots, which others must untie by degrees. But let us conclude, at the same time, that if a spirit of liberty be kept up in a free nation, it will be kept up in the army of that nation; and that when it is thus kept up, though the spirit of faction may do great hurt, it cannot complete the publick ruin. We see the truth of this observation exemplified near three centuries ago; and let us remember with gratitude, that the same truth was again confirmed to us no longer ago than two and forty years.

LETTER IX.

ONE of the historians of Britanny, if I remember right, and I think it is Argentre, says the people of that duchy grew so much tired with the disputes between Charles of Blois and the Monforts, that the two parties agreed, just before a battle, to make an end of the quarrel at once, by taking off that prince, against whom the fortune of the day should declare itself.—Our ancestors were very far from following this example; but they seized the opportunity which was presented to them, after Richard the third had usurped the throne, and murdered his nephews, of abolishing tyranny, and extinguishing faction.

The princes of York and Lancaster butchered one another in such a manner, that the right of the former centred in Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Edward the fourth, and the pretensions of the latter were allowed, by the whole Lancastrian party, to belong to the earl of Richmond. This was the state of the families.

The faction of York detested Richard for his usurpation and cruelties.—The faction of Lancaster hated him for his name; and neither the great qualities which he really had, nor the good qualities which he affected, could reconcile mankind to his barbarity.—This was the temper of the nation.

The

The opportunity, thus formed, was improved by the universal concurrence, which a spirit of liberty and a regard to the publick good, independent of party, inspired. The faction of York became willing to receive a king of the house of Lancaster; and the party of Lancaster a queen of the house of York. All parties laboured to unite the two roses; and faction itself was bent, in this fortunate conjuncture, to extirpate faction.

The deposition of Richard, and the advancement of the earl of Richmond to the throne, upon this express condition, that he should marry the princess Elizabeth, were pursued with success, even when Richard thought himself most secure; when the parliament had been obliged to confirm his usurpation; to declare the children of Edward bastards; and to attaint the earl of Richmond.

What a scene of national peace and prosperity was opened by this revolution and new settlement! But how soon was it shifted! How soon were the wise and honest views of the many defeated by the cunning and iniquity of the few!—Henry the seventh, a creature of the people, if ever any prince was such, had been raised to the throne, in order to cut up the roots of faction; to restore publick tranquillity; and to establish a legal government on the ruins of tyranny.—He did the very reverse of all this. His reign and that of his son have been two of the severest, under which our country hath groaned since the conquest; and yet, in these very reigns, the foundations of liberty were laid much broader and

stronger

stronger than ever.—How this came about, it must be useful, and perhaps it may be entertaining, to consider.

Henry the seventh, who would have been glad a little before to have assured himself of the crown on any terms, grew difficult as soon as he had obtained it. He durst not avow a title by conquest; but he evaded the appearances of a parliamentary title very industriously, and made the ceremony of his coronation precede the meeting of his parliament. He evaded, in the same manner, the appearances of any communication of right from the princess Elizabeth, by deferring his marriage till an act had passed to settle the crown on him and his posterity, without any mention of the house of York. In short, his whole skill, credit and power were employed to get the act of settlement so generally and so ambiguously penned, as to leave him room to assert afterward a right inherent in himself, and independent of the authority of parliament. Nay, he went farther; for, in the bull of confirmation, which he obtained from the pope, and in which he affected to have all sorts of titles enumerated, he took particular care to have that of conquest inserted.

Such a conduct gave sufficient reason for alarm; but we do not find that it was taken. The tyrant was dead, and the new establishment was made. The nation was overjoyed; and the work of liberty was done by halves. The new king found a compliance with all his measures, as new kings generally do. But little reflection was made,

perhaps, at that time, on these proceedings of the court; or if a just reflection was made, we may easily believe that it was soon stifled by that adulation, which represents the most necessary precautions, the most just complaints, and the assertion of the clearest rights, as proofs of disaffection.

The whole course of Henry the seventh's reign was answerable to these beginnings; and he seems to have established himself in the power of pursuing principles of government, evidently repugnant to those upon which he had been raised to the throne, before the nation was well aware of what he intended. He planted faction anew, and was the true cause of all the disturbances which followed from it, and which began even in the first year of his reign. Many of the York party had signalized themselves in his cause. All of them submitted to his government; and that small branch of this party, which had supported Richard the third, was too inconsiderable to hurt him; but he soon made it considerable by driving almost the whole York party into that interest. "He had "conceived," says Rapin, "so mortal a hatred "for the whole house of York, that he let slip no "opportunity to humble the Yorkists; behaving "always toward them not as a just king, but like "the head of a party."

That some of his ministers, of the Lancastrian party, might find their private account in such a measure, and sacrifice to it both the interest of their master and their country, is obvious enough; but how the king, who was certainly an able man,

could

could prefer dividing, instead of uniting his people in affection and obedience, would appear very marvellous, if experience had not taught us, that men of the greatest genius fall sometimes into the same errours, as men of the least genius would be apt to commit in the same circumstances.—How this happens we are not, in this place, to inquire.

Henry the seventh proceeded as he had been suffered to set out, and established by degrees, and those not slow, a power almost absolute. His jealousy, his pride, and his insatiable sordid avarice had their full swing. He became hated even by his own party, and might very probably have lost his crown, if many circumstances, both at home and abroad, had not conspired in his favour, and if he had not improved them all with the utmost ability of council and dexterity of management. The chief of these circumstances, and it well deserves to be remarked, was this,—they who ventured their estates and lives in several insurrections against him, and they who privately fomented these insurrections, instead of uniting on a national principle, and bending their endeavours to a reformation of government, united on a principle of faction; for the king's behaviour had revived this spirit, as we observed above; but still this spirit, though revived, had not attained it's former strength. The nation in general was tired of faction; dreaded a relapse into the consequences of it, and would not engage for a Simnel, a Warbeck, or even a real prince of the house of

York. A national coolness on one side, and vigilance and vigour on the king's part, defeated all these enterprises as fast as they were formed. Every one of these defeats gave Henry additional strength and increase of reputation, which is strength in it's effects. Thus it happened in this case; and thus it hath happened in many others. By making an ill use of his power, the king was the real author of all the disorders in the state, and of all the attempts against his government; and yet, the better to prevent such disorders, and to resist such attempts, farther powers were intrusted to him. Because he had governed ill, it was put in his power to govern worse; and liberty was undermined, for fear it should be overthrown. It hath fared sometimes with monarchy as with the church of Rome. Both have acquired greater wealth and power by the abuse of what they had, and mankind have been egregiously the bubbles of both.

We must not however conclude, that this king made force the sole, though he made it the principal expedient of his government. He was wise enough to consider, that his court was not the nation; and that however he might command with a nod in one, he must captivate, at least in some degree, the goodwill of mankind, to make himself secure of being long obeyed in the other; nay more, that he must make his people some amends for the oppressions which his avarice particularly exposed them to suffer. For these reasons, as he strained his prerogative on some occasions very high, so he let

let it down again upon others; and affected to show to his parliaments much condescension, notwithstanding his pride, as well as much communication of counsels, notwithstanding his reserve.

To attribute to this Solomon of Great Britain the sole merit of the laws made in his time, as some have done, seems unreasonable; but it was certainly great merit in him, and we may add rare merit, instead of opposing, or refusing, constantly to remunerate his people, by promoting and passing of "good laws, which evermore were "his retribution for treasure." These are my lord Bacon's words, and better than his cannot be found to express the general character of the laws, which the wisdom of those times produced. "They were deep and not vulgar; not made upon "the spur of a particular occasion for the present; "but out of providence of the future, to make "the estate of the people still more and more "happy, after the manner of the legislators in "ancient and heroical times."—Husbandry, manufactures, general commerce, and increase of useful people were carefully attended to, and considerably advanced; so that while the weight of taxes and the vexations of Empson, Dudley, and their subordinate harpies were severely felt, every man felt likewise the particular benefit which he received in the general advantages procured to the nation. These drops of manna, which fell from the throne, softened the murmurs of the people. They could not make the king beloved, but they made him less hated: and the middle and lower ranks of

men, who felt less the rigour of his government, felt more immediately the effects of his care and his wisdom.

We will not refine so much as to say, that the commons were patient under the pressures of this reign, because they foresaw the consequences of those measures which the king took to lessen the power of his nobility. He did not, perhaps, himself discern these consequences in their full extent; but surely if this part of his conduct was politick, it was no less popular at that time; since the same exorbitant power of the peers, which had been so formidable to the crown, had not been less oppressive to the commons. The weight of personal service had been terribly felt, during the wars of York and Lancaster; and the obligation of that tenure had, no doubt, contributed to prolong them. The tenant therefore, who found this service commuted into a rent, could not but think his condition mended, and be extremely pleased with this alteration, though he did not see the consequences of the other; which, by opening a way to the lords to alienate their lands, opened a way to the commons to increase their property, and consequently their power in the state; as may be very easily observed in the succeeding reigns.

LETTER X.

HENRY the eighth came to the crown with very great advantages. Whatever objections had been made to his father's title, there remained no pretence of objecting to his; and if any pretence had remained, the disposition to make use of it would not have been found. The nation was grown weary of faction, fond of tranquillity, and every day more and more attentive to the arts of peace.—The prerogative had been extended wide and carried high; and the means employed to acquire and maintain this authority had been established by a reign of twenty-four years. The treasures which Henry the seventh had accumulated, and left to his son, were immense; and in leaving him these treasures, he left him that which was more valuable than all of them. He left him an opportunity of gaining the affections of his people, on his accession to the throne, by putting a stop to that publick rapine, which had been so long exercised; and by disgracing and punishing those, who had been the principal instruments of it. Henry the eighth seized the opportunity and improved it. He confirmed, in the first moments of his reign, that pardon which his father had granted in the last of his life, and when he could hope for no farther profit by not pardoning. He invited, by proclamation, such as had been wronged to complain, and promised them satisfaction.

engagements, in which he always played gold against counters with allies, who generally played counters against gold. His engagements of this kind, became numberless, frequently inconsistent, and so very rash and unadvised, that whilst his aim, or his pretence, was to keep a balance between the great powers of Europe, he more than once assisted the strongest to oppress the weakest. The spring of all this strange conduct lay in the private interests and passions of Wolsey, who became his first minister very early, and was his favourite earlier. If Henry the eighth negociated perpetually, and was perpetually the bubble of those with whom and for whom he negociated, this happened chiefly because he was, in the first place, the bubble of his minister.—Wolsey's avarice was fed and his ambition flattered by the emperor, by the court of France, and by that of Rome, in their turns. He supported himself, in great measure, at home, by the opinion of his credit abroad; and his master's favour to him was strengthened by the art of those whom he served at his master's and his country's expense. In short, the success, or disappointment of his private schemes, were the hinges on which the whole policy of this nation turned for twenty years: and the grossest mismanagement obstinately pursued, by the minister, in the midst of universal disapprobation, was sanctified by the king.

The king, no doubt, thought himself as infallible in the choice of men as in the choice of measures; and therefore when he had once given his

his confidence to Wolsey, no matter by what inducements, his presumption skreened the minister from his suspicion.

It was easy for Wolsey to keep his master from hearkening to particular advice, or to the general voice of the people; because it was easy to persuade him that he wanted no advice; that he could not be deceived, though his people might; and perhaps, that it was unbecoming a great prince to alter his measures, or withdraw his favour, on the clamours of the publick. At the same time, we may fairly suppose (for the monuments of history will justify us in supposing) that the butcher's son was not such a bungler, nor rendered by a low education so void of address, as not to know how to insinuate without the air of advising; and how to receive all his own suggestions back from his master, in the style of orders, with the utmost demonstration of implicit submission to his judgment, and absolute resignation to his will.

But however blind the king might be, the eyes of the people continued open to his and their true interest. The discontent grew general; and to this general discontent were owing the principal difficulties, which Henry the eighth met with during the first half of his reign.—As much complaisance as he had been used to find in his parliaments, he durst not always demand money of them, for the support of his enterprises. His minister soon put him upon the expedient of raising it by his own authority. But these attempts were resented warmly, and opposed so sturdily, even

even when the rough name of a tax was changed into the softer sound of a benevolence, that the king was obliged to retract; to compound; to excuse himself; to disavow his minister; and to pardon all those who had been concerned in particular insurrections, from a fear of one which might become universal.

No prince could be more firmly seated on his throne. No prince could be less framed to brook opposition. No prince could be less susceptible of fear. And yet to this point of distress did Henry the eighth bring himself, by trusting his first minister too much, and regarding the sense of his people too little.—All orders of men concurred on these occasions; and the merchants signalized themselves. Neither the flattery, nor the menaces of Wolsey could prevail on them to be silent, when they felt that their own and the national interests were sacrificed or neglected at every turn. Much less could they be cozened so far as to expose their fortunes in trade, the only fortunes which merchants acquired in those days, in order to conceal the blunder of a minister, or to stop the clamour against him. We find a remarkable instance of this behaviour of the merchants in the year 1528; when the commerce of the Low Countries, on which our woollen trade depended principally at that time, was interrupted by a war with the emperor, which evidently took it's rise from no other motive than a pique of the minister.

The ill success of these illegal methods obliged the

the king to have recourse to his parliament: but his parliament thought like his people; and the opposition given in the house of commons was such as became the representative body of the nation. That which happened in the year 1523 is worthy of particular observation. It was not grounded only on the exorbitancy of the sum demanded, but likewise on the nature of the service for which the demand was made. As high as prerogative was carried at this time, and as undisputed a point as the power of the crown to make war or peace might be; yet it is undeniable, that the commons would not give money without knowing how it was to be employed; and that they proportioned their grants to the judgment they made of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the employment designed.—Wolsey, the most insolent minister our nation had seen at that time, was however so far from objecting to this method of proceeding in the house of commons, that he opened to that house, in a long discourse, the reasons of the king's measures, as he affected to call his own measures; and endeavoured to prove the necessity of supporting them. Nay, when neither his rhetoric could persuade, nor his authority influence, he offered to debate the whole matter, and to answer the objections of those who opposed the king's desires. The house rejected his offer; observed their forms; maintained their dignity. They disapproved a war, wantonly undertaken, and in which the interests

of

even when the rough name of a tax was changed into the softer sound of a benevolence, that the king was obliged to retract; to compound; to excuse himself; to disavow his minister; and to pardon all those who had been concerned in particular insurrections, from a fear of one which might become universal.

No prince could be more firmly seated on his throne. No prince could be less framed to brook opposition. No prince could be less susceptible of fear. And yet to this point of distress did Henry the eighth bring himself, by trusting his first minister too much, and regarding the sense of his people too little.—All orders of men concurred on these occasions; and the merchants signalized themselves. Neither the flattery, nor the menaces of Wolsey could prevail on them to be silent, when they felt that their own and the national interests were sacrificed or neglected at every turn. Much less could they be cozened so far as to expose their fortunes in trade, the only fortunes which merchants acquired in those days, in order to conceal the blunder of a minister, or to stop the clamour against him. We find a remarkable instance of this behaviour of the merchants in the year 1528; when the commerce of the Low Countries, on which our woollen trade depended principally at that time, was interrupted by a war with the emperor, which evidently took it's rise from no other motive than a pique of the minister.

The ill success of these illegal methods obliged the

the king to have recourse to his parliament: but his parliament thought like his people; and the opposition given in the house of commons was such as became the representative body of the nation. That which happened in the year 1523 is worthy of particular observation. It was not grounded only on the exorbitancy of the sum demanded, but likewise on the nature of the service for which the demand was made. As high as prerogative was carried at this time, and as undisputed a point as the power of the crown to make war or peace might be; yet it is undeniable, that the commons would not give money without knowing how it was to be employed; and that they proportioned their grants to the judgment they made of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the employment designed.—Wolsey, the most insolent minister our nation had seen at that time, was however so far from objecting to this method of proceeding in the house of commons, that he opened to that house, in a long discourse, the reasons of the king's measures, as he affected to call his own measures; and endeavoured to prove the necessity of supporting them. Nay, when neither his rhetoric could persuade, nor his authority influence, he offered to debate the whole matter, and to answer the objections of those who opposed the king's desires. The house rejected his offer; observed their forms; maintained their dignity. They disapproved a war, wantonly undertaken, and in which the interests

of

of the nation were not concerned. They showed however their regard to the king, by giving some part of the subsidy, and their regard to the kingdom, by refusing, to the last, to give the whole.

As for the minister, he received the mortification which he deserved.—These frequent oppositions, on the part of the people and the parliament, were really made to the minister. Henry the ighth seemed, on some occasions, to desire that they should be so understood, even before Wolsey's favour began to be in it's wane; and yet we shall have no reason to be surprised, if we consider the true character of this prince, that these very oppositions prepared his mind for receiving those lessons, which Wolsey was ready to give him, against liberty, and in favour of arbitrary power.—A wicked minister, who neither gains, nor deserves to gain the good-will of a nation, must secure and will endeavour to revenge himself, by persuading his master to neglect it. Force and corruption being the sole means, by which he can maintain his power, and preserve his ill-gotten wealth, it is necessary for him, that the prince whom he serves should look upon those as the sole expedients by which government can be supported. Wolsey pursued this abominable scheme. "He looked "upon the king's subjects," says Rapin, "as so "many slaves; and unfortunately for them, he "inspired the king by degrees with the same "principles; and insinuated to him, that he ought "to consider the parliament only as an instrument

"to

" to execute his will."—These were the seeds he sowed, which fell on a rank soil, and produced in the latter half of Henry's reign such bitter fruit, as this nation never tasted before, nor since.—Wolsey had been the scandal and the scourge of his country while he lived; and he continued to be so even in the grave.

LETTER XI.

THE divorce of Henry the eighth and Catharine of Arragon begins a new and most memorable æra in the general history of England; and indeed of all Europe. It is the beginning likewise of a new period in the particular reign of which we are speaking.—A king, who had been till now the great assertor of the authority of the pope, and the great defender of the doctrine of the church of Rome, undertakes to destroy the former in his dominions, and gives several incurable wounds to the latter.—A king, whose whole attention had been employed abroad, and in whose time "there was no treaty and almost "conventicle in Christendom, wherein he had not "his particular agent and interest," as my lord Herbert expresses himself, becomes wholly taken up with domestick affairs; and if he looks abroad during the rest of his life, it is chiefly on account of what passes at home.—He, who had connived at seditions and pardoned insurrections, grows impatient of the least contradiction.—He, who had often compounded with his parliaments, and submitted to them on many occasions, dictates all their proceedings; and the voice of the law is little else than the echo of the voice of the king.—In short; he who had been led, amused, governed

by his minister, drives, overbears, tyrannizes; butchers his servants and his wives, his commons and his nobility.

When Henry the eighth first engaged in the affair of the divorce, he could not foresee the consequences of it; because he certainly did not expect the difficulties which gave occasion to them. He went on during the two first years in the beaten road, by which so many others had gone before to the same end; and he seemed to have no view beside that of employing the authority of one pope, to undo what the authority of another pope had done. Nay, after Cranmer had began to open other views to him, he seemed still to cling to Rome; resolved to succeed any way, but desirous to succeed that way.—Happy was it that he took his measures no better, and that he was no better served on this occasion than on many others!—He suffered himself to be amused by Clement the seventh, the least scrupulous man alive; and who would have divorced him, or have done any other pontifical job for him, if the league formed to reduce the emperor's power in Italy had succeeded. But the emperor's power there continuing to prevail, the pope concluded his treaty with this prince on the most advantageous terms. He obtained that favourite point, for which he would have sacrificed not only the interests of Henry the eighth, but even those of the papacy itself. I mean the reestablishment of the family of Medicis on the ruins of the Florentine liberty. The loss of Genoa, the total destruction of the

French army in the kingdom of Naples, and several other considerations, induced Francis the first to make his peace with the emperor likewise, and to submit to the treaty of Cambray.

Thus did Henry the eighth find himself at once disappointed in the expectations he had been made to entertain from the court of Rome, and destitute of all foreign assistance; Francis being the only ally, of whom he could avail himself to influence the councils of Rome in opposition to the emperor.

In this state of affairs, Henry resorted to that which will be always the best and surest reserve of a king of Great Britain; the inclinations and affections of his people. He had not the trouble of disposing them, for he found them already disposed to his purposes. The spirit raised by Wickliffe about two centuries before, against the usurpations of the pope and the clergy, was still alive. The sufferings of the Lollards, as his followers were called, had not abated it. The art of printing had been propagated; and the late success of Luther had encouraged it. There were multitudes therefore, in all parts of the kingdom, who desired a complete reformation of the church, both in doctrine and in discipline. Others again were content that the papal authority, grievous in it's nature and scandalous in it's exercise, as well as the extravagant power and impertinent immunities of the clergy, should be taken away. But they meant to go no farther. Many would not go even so far as this; but were still slaves to all

their prejudices; and remained, in the midst of this defection, attached to the pope, as well as to the corrupted doctrine, and the depraved discipline of the church.

While the divorce was solicited at Rome, and the proceedings relating to it were carried on by the direction, and under the authority of the pope, it was the king's affair; it was the affair of his ministers. But when it appeared impracticable in this method, and Henry resolved, in order to accomplish it in another, to deliver himself and his people from the yoke of Rome; the affair of the divorce became a national affair, and the cause of the king became the cause of his subjects. As he proceeded in it, he was encouraged to proceed. The concurrence of his people grew every day more general, and he was supported with the greatest warmth. He soon held the clergy at his mercy, and the popish party was broken and terrified, if not entirely crushed.

During this eager pursuit after ecclesiastical liberty, a power very dangerous to civil liberty was erected. We observed before, that the prerogative had been carried high, and extended wide, in the reign of Henry the seventh, who obtained much by law, and obtained more by his manner of construing and executing the law. His son, parting with none of his authority, and improving the conjuncture so as to acquire a great deal more, acquired so much at last, that the power of the crown exceeded by far that proportion, which is consistent with the security of publick liberty and

private property. It is true, indeed, that he always took care to have the law on his side; and would neither venture on the exercise of acts of power against it, or without it. His experience in the former part of his reign had taught him the danger of such a conduct; and, in the latter part, he had no occasion to pursue it. The opinion of the nation went along with him now; and, as exorbitant as his demands frequently were, his parliaments refused him nothing. At one time, they gave up to him, in a great degree, the legislative authority; and his proclamations were made, under some restrictions, equivalent to acts of parliament. At another time, they ascribed to him a sort of infallibility; and letters patent, under the great seal, were made necessary to determine the articles of faith, which men were to believe fully, and the doctrines, rites, and ceremonies, which they were to observe and practice under severe penalties.—The suspicious state of affairs abroad was amplified to give a pretence to one of these laws; and the confused state of religion at home, and the clashing of parties about it, might afford some colour to the other.—The truth is, that any pretence served, at this time, to grant whatever the king desired; a stronger instance of which cannot be imagined than that of the subsidy, obtained in the year 1540. Henry had got immense riches by the first and second suppression of monasteries. A principal inducement to the last, which was likewise the greatest, was this; that the king might be enabled, without taxing the

people,

people, to defend them against such invasions, as the court had been pleased to suppose; and with the rumours of which the nation had been purposely alarmed. These invasions did not happen. Henry continued in peace with all his neighbours: and yet, the very next year, he not only accepted from the clergy of the province of Canterbury, with the approbation of parliament, a grant of the fifth part of their revenue; but he demanded a subsidy likewise of the house of commons. So extravagant a demand could not but meet with some opposition. The subsidy however was granted in as large a proportion, as if the nation had been engaged in a dangerous war. The reasons for granting it were almost burlesque. It was affirmed, by the king's party, that he had laid out vast sums in securing the coasts; and that the keeping his subjects in peace and plenty cost him more than the most burdensome war.—Thus a precedent was made of converting into ordinary aids of the government those heavy taxes, which ought never to be felt by the people, unless upon the most extraordinary occasions. That they ought to be laid in time of war neither was, nor ever could be doubted. That they were equally necessary in time of peace, was now established by the logick of the court; and we may be sure that the argument would have been urged with still more force and effect, if the nation had fallen, by the management of the courtiers in that age, into such a situation as could neither be called properly a state of war, or a state of peace.

The absolute power which Henry the eighth exercised over the purses, lives, liberties, and consciences of his people, was due to the intire influence which he had gained over the parliament; and this dependency of the two houses on the king did, in effect, establish tyranny by law.—If we look for the true cause of this dependency, we shall find it, as Rapin hath very judiciously observed, in those divisions of the nation concerning religion, which I have mentioned above.—The party, which opposed all reformation, by a bigotted attachment to the discipline, as well as doctrine of the church of Rome, furnished the king with as many pretences for grasping at power and squeezing money out of his people, as ambition could wish, or profusion require.—The other two parties concurred with the king, and went together to a certain point; that is, to throw off the papal yoke, and to lessen the power of the clergy. But here they separated, and went different ways; one to carry the reformation forward, and the other to stop it where it then stood; while the king seemed to keep in a middle way between them both.—Sometimes, he seemed to favour those whose principles led them to an intire reformation, and he touched the doctrine, though with a gentler hand than the discipline of the church.—Sometimes he appeared zealous for the doctrine, and even for some part of the discipline; and the manner in which he often executed that bloody statute, the law of six articles, would incline one to think, that he joined to his political considerations a tincture

a tincture of religious prejudice on these heads. But however that was, certain it is that the hopes which each of these two parties entertained of the king, and the fears which they entertained of one another, occasioned their continual bidding for him, if I may be allowed to use such an expression. This emulation formed then, what it always must form, the most dangerous conjuncture to which liberty can be exposed. When the motives of contending parties are founded on private ambition and avarice, the danger is great. How much greater must it be, when those motives are founded on religion likewise; when the heads and hearts of both sides are heated even to enthusiasm; when this spirit mingles itself with the spirit of faction; so that some through folly, and some through knavery, are ready to sacrifice publick liberty to their particular schemes of religion?

In such circumstances as these was this nation, when Henry the eighth died; and if he had left a son and successor, of full age, and bold and enterprising like himself, our liberties had been irretrievably lost, according to all appearances.—Henry the eighth, by applying to his parliaments for the extraordinary powers which he exercised, and by taking these powers for such terms, and under such restrictions as the parliament imposed, owned indeed sufficiently that they did not belong of right to the crown. He owned likewise, in effect, more than any prince who went before him, how absolutely the disposition of the crown of England belongs to the people of England, by procuring so

many different and opposite settlements of it to be made in parliament, and yet tyranny was actually established. The freedom of our government might flourish in speculation; but certainly it did not subsist in practice.—In the case therefore supposed above, our forefathers would very soon have found how fatal it is, in any circumstances, by any means, or under any pretences, to admit incroachments on the constitution; and how vain it is, when these incroachments are once admitted, for the service of some present turn, to prescribe limitations to the exercise or duration of them.

But providence directed the course of things better, and broke those shackles which we had forged for ourselves. A minority followed this turbulent reign; the government was weak; the governours divided; and the temper of the people such, as made it prudent to soothe them. This the duke of Somerset did out of inclination, and the duke of Northumberland out of policy. To the former we owe not only the complete establishment of the church of England on the ruins of popery, but the first and great steps which were made to restore a free government. In the very first year of his administration, several acts which had passed in the reign of Henry the eighth, and in some preceding reigns, grievous to the people, and destructive of liberty, were repealed; and among others that absurd act, which gave to proclamations the force of laws. The law of the six articles was likewise repealed. Others were explained, and several new laws were made in favour of civil, as well

well as ecclesiastical liberty; both of which got so much strength, in the reign of Edward the sixth, that they were able to stand the short but violent shock of queen Mary's reign. This princess lived long enough to confirm, not to destroy our religion by persecution. The ill concerted insurrection of Wyat gave strength to the faction which prevailed at court, and discouraged, for some time, all opposition; nay, the methods taken to influence the elections, and to gain by corruption the members who were chosen, were carried on so openly, that the price for which each man sold himself was publickly known. No wonder then if the papal authority was restored, and the queen's marriage with Philip the second approved. But this state of things could not last long, nor was the nation disposed to bear a continual sacrifice of her interest to Rome and Spain.

The parliament, corrupt as it was, began to revolt against the court. The spirit of liberty revived; and that spirit, and the spirit of reformation in religion, had made more progress than was readily perceived. This progress had been made principally among the commons; and therefore, though the authority of the crown, of the council, and of the great lords kept up other appearances, yet there was a secret fire burning, which must and would have broke out. The effects of the causes, laid in the reign of Henry the seventh, began now to appear. The lands of the nobility were lessened, and those of the commons increased.

Trade had been encouraged for several years.

We

We see that some care had been taken of it, even in the troublesome times of Edward the fourth, and very much was done towards the advancement of it in the reigns of Henry the seventh and Henry the eighth. The West Indies had been discovered about half a century before; and part of the immense treasures, which flowed from thence into Europe, began to increase the profits; and, increasing the profits, to increase the industry of our merchants. Henry the eighth had sold a very great part of the church lands at low prices, on purpose to engage the body of the nation in one common interest against the Romish clergy. The commons had made their use of this strain of policy, and had got into very great estates in lands, by these as well as by other means: so that the king, the lords, and the church, who had formerly held so great an overbalance of property in land, had now little more than one third of the whole belonging to them; the consequences of which were not foreseen by queen Mary; neither did she live long enough to feel them in any great degree. They did not escape the penetration of her sister. She foresaw them, and the great glory and happiness of her reign may justly be attributed to this first principle; that she had the wisdom to discern not only the actual alteration, which was already made, but the growing alteration, which would every day increase in the state of property; that she accommodated at once the whole system of her government to this great change; and instead of depending

depending upon expedients, which were now no longer of season, chose the sole expedient that remained, for making herself and her people happy; which was to place the whole strength and security of her government in the affections of her people, and in her superior credit with them.

LETTER XII.

WE have now brought these remarks on the English history not only down to times little remote from our own, but to a period, when the monarchy settled on a new foundation; upon which it still continues and rests more firmly than ever at this hour. The observations therefore, which remain to be made, in order to illustrate what hath been advanced, concerning the spirit of liberty and the spirit of faction, will for these reasons be the more apposite, the more affecting, and by consequence the more useful; but, for these very reasons likewise, it is probable that they will become the occasions of louder complaints, and of more impertinent clamour.—We shall be sincerely sorry for this; because we look on the alarm, which hath been taken at our endeavours to revive the spirit, and to confirm and propagate the doctrines of liberty, in a country where liberty is still avowed, and under a government established on the principles of liberty, as a most suspicious and melancholy symptom. But the stronger this symptom appears, the more incumbent we shall think it upon us to pursue the honest design, to which we have devoted ourselves, with constancy and vigour.

The shameless crew, who write against their country, as they would write against their God, for

for hire, shall have little regard from us. The scandalous licence with which they have presumed to draw odious parallels, and the impudence with which they have imputed these parallels to us, have been abundantly exposed already. The few, the very few things, which they have alleged in point of fact, or argument, have been often answered; perhaps too often, considering how little weight they carried with them, and how little impression they were capable of making on the understanding even of those, who had other reasons for inclining to that side of the question. The ribaldry which these scribblers employ hath been and will continue to be despised, not answered. It cannot be expected, that we should take notice of every little, frivolous, childish declamation, which appears in publick, however some persons may demean themselves by pretending to admire them. The menaces affectedly and insolently thrown out on one side, and the flattery, servilely offered on the other, are equally objects of our contempt; and if we take a little notice of the former, once for all, before we proceed any farther in these remarks, it is purely because we cannot understand them to be the language of these writers. When they talk in this style, they speak the language of him who guides their pens, and who is known to reward their labours. To him therefore it may not be improper to address ourselves in the following manner:

"The persons, whom you threaten, sir, neither "value your favour, nor fear your anger. When-

"ever

" ever you attempt any act of power against any " of them, you shall find that you have to do " with men, who know they have not offended the " law; and therefore trust they have not offend- " ed the king: who know they are safe, as long " as the laws and liberties of their country are so; " and who are so little desirous of being safe any " longer, that they would be the first to bury " themselves in the ruins of the British constitu- " tion, if you, or any minister as desperate as you, " should be able to destroy it. But let us ask, " on this occasion, what you are, who thus pre- " sume to threaten?—Are you not one, whose " measure of folly and iniquity is full; who can " neither hold nor quit his power with impunity; " and over whose head the long gathering cloud " of national vengeance is ready to burst?—Is it " not time for you, sir, instead of threatening to " attack others, to consider how soon you may " be attacked yourself?—How many crimes may " be charged upon you and yours, which almost " every man can prove; and how many more " are ready to start into light, as soon as the " power, by which you now conceal them, shall " determine?—When next you meditate revenge " on your adversaries, remember this truth: the " laws must be destroyed, before they can suffer, " or you escape."

Let us now return to our subject—In the early days of our government, after the Norman invasion, the commons of England were rather formidable in their collective, than considerable in their representative

sentative body; by their numbers in extraordinary emergencies, rather than by their weight in the ordinary course of government. In later days, they began to accquire some of this weight by degrees. They represented grievances; they gave, or refused subsidies; and they exercised, in a regular, senatorial manner, the powers lodged in them by the constitution: but still they did not obtain the intire weight, till they were wholly emancipated; and they were not so till the great change, which we are speaking of, happened. Before this time, they had too much of the dependency of tenants, and the king, the nobility and the clergy had too much of the superiority of landlords. This dependency of the commons added to that, which the crown frequently found means of creating, either by influencing their elections, or by corrupting their representatives, notwithstanding all the provisions made against it, which we have touched in a former paper*, kept this part of the legislature in such a state, as made it unable fully to answer the end of it's institution; and the system of our government was by consequence, in this respect, defective.

Could Henry the seventh have found means, as he reduced the nobility lower, to have hindered the commons from rising higher; could he have opened a way to the diminution of the property of the lords, and have prevented that increase of the same property among the commons, to which, on the contrary, he gave occasion, and which time and

* See the Craftsman, No. 225.

accidents

accidents conspired to bring about; the balance of this government would have been totally lost, though the outward forms of it had been preserved. Our liberty would have been lost by consequence; and our kings, with a house of lords and a house of commons, and all the appearances of limited monarchs, might have been as arbitrary as those princes are, who govern countries, where no such constitution prevails. The reason of this will appear plain to those who remember what hath been observed, in some of our former papers, that a dependent exercise of the powers, lodged in the two houses of parliament, will endanger, and may more effectually than any other expedient, destroy liberty; and that the preservation of our freedom is no way to be secured but by a free and independent exercise of these powers. Now such an exercise could not have continued, much less have been improved, if Henry the seventh had been able, at the same time, to weaken his nobility, and to keep his commons from accquiring new strength. But this was impracticable. At least, it was not attempted. Henry the seventh hastened to the cure of that evil which pressed him most, the power of the nobility, as his son soon afterward effectually reduced the exorbitant power of the clergy; and in pulling down these powers, which, as they were constituted and had been exercised, hurt the crown more than they served the people, these princes became the instruments of raising another power, which is the best, if not the sole effectual

barrier

barrier against usurpations of illegal, and abuses of legal prerogatives; and which, at the same time, can never be applied to do any real hurt to the crown, unless in cases where it is bent and forced to do this hurt by the crown itself, in the first place, against the natural tendency and direction of it.

This increase of the property of the commons, by taking off from them a constant dependency of one sort, and by rendering them less obnoxious to an occasional dependency of another, gave greater dignity, and added greater weight in the balance of government, to their representative body. The house of commons became more powerful, without the attribution of any new powers, and purely by the different manner in which their independency, the effect of their property, enabled them to exercise the same powers, which they enjoyed before. A concert with a few great lords, and a few leading prelates, was now no longer sufficient to guide the sense of parliament, and to establish the measures of government; no, not even in cases, where this concert might be extended to some of the commons themselves. Intrigue and cabal became unnecessary, when the national interest was wisely pursued; and ineffectual, when it was not. The way was open to gain the parliament, by gaining the nation; but to impose on the nation, by gaining the parliament was hard; for the weight without doors determined, in those days, the weight within. The same causes, which rendered the house of

commons more considerable to the court, to the nobility, to the clergy, to the commons themselves, rendered likewise the whole body of the commons of more importance to those who were to represent them. Beside which, the frequency of new elections, which was deemed an advantage, as long as the service was deemed an honourable burden, gave the nation frequent opportunities of modelling the representative body, according to the interests and inclinations of the collective body. From hence it followed, that that credit and influence in the nation, which can only be acquired and preserved by adhering to the national interest, became the sole means of maintaining a lasting credit and influence in the house of commons; upon which the harmony of government, and the happiness of prince and people depended more than ever.

Thus were we brought back, in times very distant and in circumstances very different, to the principles of government, which had prevailed among our Saxon ancestors, before they left Germany. Whatever particular preeminencies, or powers, were vested in the principal men, the great affairs of state were directed by the whole body of the nation.—De minoribus principes, de majoribus omnes.

Such were the natural effects of this new settlement; and thus our limited monarchy became capable of as much perfection, as wisdom and favourable accidents can communicate to any human institution; for can we raise our ideas of this

this kind of perfection higher, than ordering the distribution of property and power in such a manner, that the privileges of the people and the prerogative of the crown cannot be taken away, unless with their own consent, or by their own fault? Now to this point of perfection was the constitution of our government brought, and farther it could not be brought; because it is impossible to secure either prince or people against themselves, or against the effects of their own conduct.

One part of what hath been said upon this subject will not, I think, be disputed. The other, perhaps, may seem a paradox; and a settlement, which rendered our government more democratical, will not be readily allowed to have been advantageous to the crown, though it must be allowed to have been so to the people.—Let us examine therefore whether it was really so or not.

In all limited monarchies, and we are not speaking of any other, the power of preserving these limitations must be placed somewhere. The question therefore is, whether it can be placed more advantageously, even for the crown as well as the people, than in the whole body of the nation.

While the commons had not property enough to have any share in this power, the sole check, which could be opposed to the encroachments of the crown, was the power of the barons and of the clergy. But these two orders of men had their particular interests frequently opposite to

each other and to those of the people, as well as to those of the crown; so they were not only very incapable of forming a secure barrier to liberty, but their power became terrible and dangerous to the crown itself. They slided easily into faction. They often encroached on the prince's authority, while they resisted his encroachments, real or pretended, on their own privileges; and under the plausible veil of law, or Gospel, private ambition had a greater share than publick liberty in their contests. It is true, that, during these contests, Magna Charta was signed and confirmed; and the condition of the people, in point of liberty, very much improved. But this was the accidental effect of the contests between the kings, the barons, and the clergy, as we have remarked in speaking of those times, and not the natural effect of the property and power, lodged in the barons and the clergy. The commons were courted by all sides, because they were wanted by all. Had they been bubbles enough to look on the nobility and clergy as the proper guardians of liberty, and to have adhered to them accordingly, they might indeed have avoided being slaves to their kings, but they would have rendered both their kings and themselves little less than slaves to their temporal and spiritual lords.

After the reigns of Edward the first, and Edward the third, power came to be better poized, and our government took a more regular form. The prerogatives of our kings, and the privileges of our nobility, the authority and immunity of the

church, and the rights of the people, were more ascertained; and yet, after this time, the same observations will hold good in a very great degree. It is certain, that the vast overbalance of property and power, which still continued in the nobility and clergy, instead of preventing, softening, or shortening the calamities which followed, helped to form and maintain those factions, which began, renewed, fomented the civil wars of York and Lancaster, as well as the wicked conduct of Richard the second, and the weak conduct of Henry the sixth. Redress of grievances, and sufficient security against them for the future, might have satisfied the people, if they had been left to themselves; but nothing less than revolutions of government could satisfy the factions, into which the great men were divided, and into which they divided the nation, by their influence over the people, and by the advantages which the ill conduct of the Yorkists and Lancastrians gave to each other.

Thus we see how unsafely for the crown, as well as insecurely for the people, that property and power, which are necessary to preserve the limitations of our monarchy, were placed before the time, when that great change in the one and the other happened, which makes the subject of this discourse. But as soon as this change did happen, the crown was no longer exposed to the same mischiefs.

When the little power, which Henry the fourth of France had in the town of Rochelle, was objected to him, he made an answer worthy of his

heroick spirit. "I do," said he, "all I desire to do "there, in doing but what I ought."—This moderation of temper is, in all governments, the best, and, in limited monarchies, the only sure and durable foundation of power. By preventing jealousy in the people of the prince, it takes away all advantage against his government from faction; and the more watchful the people are over their liberties, the more sensible will they be of this moderation, and the more grateful for it. Faction proceeds always without reason; but it can hardly ever succeed without pretence, and sufficient pretence will hardly be found under such a government.

When a prince, who manifests this moderation of temper, pursues the true interest of his people, and suffers no other interest to come into any degree of competition with it, far from being the object of their jealousy, he will be the principal object of their affection; and if he joins to this character of goodness that of ability, he will be the principal object of their confidence likewise. These are the strongest chains, by which a people can be bound to their prince; easier indeed, but far stronger than those of adamant, by which Dionysius the elder boasted, that he had secured the tyranny of Syracuse to his son; force, fear, a multitude of troops, and a guard of ten thousand barbarians.—A prince, who establishes his government on the principles of affection, hath every thing to hope and nothing to fear from his people. A prince, who establishes his government on any other

other principles, acts in contradiction to the very end of his institution. What objection therefore could be made, even on the part of the crown, to a settlement of property and power, which put the guardianship of liberty into such hands as never did, nor ever will invade the prerogative and authority of the crown, while they are employed to those purposes, for which alone they were intrusted? It is confessed, that, if a prince should attempt to establish his government on any other principle than these; if he should choose to depend rather on deceiving, corrupting, or forcing his people, than on gaining their affection and confidence; he might feel the weight of their property and power very heavy in the scale against him. But then it must be confessed likewise, that, in such a case, this opposition of the people would be just; and that the prince, not the people, would be answerable to himself and his family, to God and to man, for all the ill consequences which might follow.

We hope that we have said nothing, in order to show the excellency of our constitution, as it settled about the time of queen Elizabeth, which is not agreeable to reason; and sure we are, that the truth of these general propositions will be confirmed by the particular examples which are to follow.—The reign of queen Elizabeth will be one continued proof, that the power of preserving the limitations of a monarchy cannot be placed better, for a good and wise prince, than in the whole body of the people; and that the spirit of

liberty will give greater strength, as well as procure greater ease, to the government of such a prince, than any absolute monarch can hope to find in the most abject spirit, which principles of blind submission and passive obedience are capable of inspiring.—The reigns immediately succeeding this will be one continued proof, that whenever the power of the people hath been exercised against the crown, it hath been owing primarily to the weak management and obstinacy of the court, and to the unhappy choice which those princes made of governing by factions, in opposition to the sense and interest of the nation. From whence it will follow, that the great calamities which befel our country, in the middle of the last century, are unjustly charged on the spirit of liberty, or on the nature of the British constitution of government.

LETTER XIII.

THERE is no part of our annals, nor perhaps of the annals of any other country, which deserves to be more studied, or to be oftener called to remembrance both by those who govern, and by those who are governed, than the reign of queen Elizabeth. We shall not however descend into all the observations which it affords; nor even into all those, which might properly serve to our present purpose.

In some papers* we made a few remarks on this reign, and on that of king James the first. We apprehend that the contrast between them appeared very strong on that occasion. This contrast will probably appear still much stronger, and by consequence be the more instructive, when those remarks and these we are going to make come to centre in one single point; to show that the conduct of queen Elizabeth, under great disadvantages, produced all the good effects, which prince or people could desire; because it was wisely suited to the nature of our government: whereas the conduct of king James the first, who had many and great advantages, which his predecessor wanted, made his reign grievous to the people, uneasy to himself, and accessory to those

* See the Craftsman, No. 137, 138, 139.

misfortunes

misfortunes which befel his son; because it was ill suited to the nature of our government, and founded on principles destructive of liberty.

Few princes, no, not even her contemporary Henry the fourth of France, have been ever raised to a throne under more disadvantageous circumstances, or have been surrounded in it with more complicated difficulties, than queen Elizabeth.—Let us take a general survey of them.

The division and animosity of parties had been carried to the heighth of religious rage. The cruelty of queen Mary's reign, in which much protestant blood had been shed, and even that of her sister with difficulty spared, rendered of course the persecuting side more desperate, and the other more exasperated. It is hard to imagine, that queen Elizabeth had been able to cultivate many personal attachments to herself, before she came to the crown; except that of Sir William Cecil, afterward lord Burleigh, and perhaps one or two more. Her imprisonment for a time, and the great constraint under which she lived, during her sister's whole reign, gave her little opportunity for it; and the jealous eye, with which Gardiner and other ecclesiastical zealots observed her conduct, made it dangerous to attempt it.

In general, the protestants desired her succession: and the papists feared it. But the former were under oppression, and even a kind of proscription. The latter had the whole authority of the church and the state in their hands, in this kingdom; and that of Ireland, bigotted to popery and prone

prone to rebellion, was at their devotion.—The protestants themselves were divided, and those who meant equally a reformation fell into the utmost asperity against each other, concerning the manner of making it, and the point to which it ought to be carried, on account of religion as well as of policy.

In this divided state, and in the ferment which such divisions must necessarily cause, queen Elizabeth found the people whom she came to govern. Surely, a more nice and perilous state can hardly be imagined; especially for her, who was led by inclination, and determined by particular circumstances of interest, to establish the reformation; that is, to declare for the weakest, though not the least numerous party.

It is observed, I think by Nathaniel Bacon in his Historical and Political Discourses, that the methods taken by Henry the seventh to accumulate treasure made a rich king indeed, but did not enrich the crown. His son had several opportunities of doing both; instead of which he impoverished himself, the crown, and the people, by all the methods which the most wanton profusion could invent. He exhausted the wealth of the nation. He did more. He debased the coin, by mingling it with copper, and loaded the publick with debts. These again were considerably increased in the reign of Edward the sixth. Queen Mary was so far from diminishing them, that one of the principal complaints against her administration, next to the cruelty she exercised, was the great

great dissipation of the revenue, occasioned by her restitutions to the church, and by her new foundations of monasteries.—In this low, encumbered state queen Elizabeth found the revenues of the crown, and the wealth of the nation.

Her situation abroad was still worse than her situation at home. Calais, and the other English possessions in Picardy, had been lost in a quarrel, where the interest of England had no concern. For the sake of Spain, we had war with France. The war with Scotland still continued; and queen Elizabeth had no one ally, on whose assistance she could depend.

Such distressed situations are rare; and when they have happened, they have been often rendered less difficult in reality, than in appearance, by some particular circumstances which have attended them. But when Elizabeth began her reign, no such circumstances existed in her favour. On the contrary, almost every circumstance aggravated her distress. The thrones of France and Spain were filled neither by old men, worn out with age and cares; nor by weak men, unequal to their rank and business; nor by children, under the tuition of regents. Henry the second reigned in France; Philip the second in Spain: princes in the vigour of their age, of great ambition, of great talents, and seconded by the ablest ministers and generals in Europe. The French monarchy had been growing up from the time of Lewis the eleventh, toward that fulness of power and affluence of wealth, at which the Spanish monarchy

monarchy was already arrived. Both these princes were, by bigotry and by policy, attached to the court of Rome; implacable enemies to the reformation; and such by consequence to queen Elizabeth. Henry the second had a farther reason for being so. He grasped, in his ambitious views, the crown of England, as well as that of Scotland; and looked on queen Elizabeth as the usurper of a right belonging to his daughter-in-law. Philip, indeed, kept some faint and affected measures with Elizabeth, as long as he apprehended the union of so many crowns in the house of Valois: but this apprehension was soon at an end; and even his shows of friendship with it. Henry the second, and his eldest son, Francis the second, died in about two years. The deaths of these princes did, perhaps, diminish the difficulties and dangers to which queen Elizabeth stood exposed on one hand; but then they increased these difficulties and dangers on the other; since they took off all restraint from Philip in pursuit of his enterprises against her. His life lasted almost as long as hers, and his inveterate enmity as long as his life.

Another source, from which difficulties and dangers were incessantly arising to queen Elizabeth, lay in the objections which the papists made to her title, on a principle of religion; and which were but too really, though indirectly, abetted by some protestants, on a principle of faction.—While disputes about the succession to the crown confined to England, and turned on maxims of our

own

own growth, if I may use that expression, we have seen how little regard was paid to the titles, and to the pretended divine, indefeasible right of princes. But when foreign nations came to be interested in the succession of our crown, they reasoned and they proceeded on other notions; not on those which both custom and law had established here.

The attacks of this kind, made on queen Elizabeth, were the more grievous to her, because they not only united the Roman-catholick powers against her; but they made the divisions wider and more irreconcilable at home, where she placed the chief strength and security of her government.

Mary, queen of Scotland, was a pretender, neither abjured in England, nor disavowed and unsupported in other countries. Sovereign of one part of the island, she had a powerful party in the other; wife of the dauphin, and after that queen of France; encouraged and assisted by her uncles, who possessed more than regal power in that kingdom, by Spain, and by the whole popish interest; she was justly formidable to queen Elizabeth, as long as she lived.—Another circumstance made her so still more. The success of the reformation seemed to increase the zeal of those who continued in the communion of the church of Rome. The influence of the court of Rome became consequently stronger at this point of time. It appeared both in France and in England too as powerful, though not as successful,

here

here at least, as it had appeared in the eleventh century, in the days of the brave, but unfortunate emperor, Henry the fourth, and of that insolent friar, Gregory the seventh.—Even this circumstance may justly seem to have been inforced by another; by the establishment of the order of jesuits. This order, the offspring of a mad Spaniard, has had the principal honour, though other religious orders have endeavoured to share it, of giving to the pope an authority like that which was exercised by the king of the Assassins, or the old man of the mountain, as he is called by some of the French historians; an authority which proved fatal to Henry the third and Henry the fourth of France; and which had like to have proved so to queen Elizabeth, and even to her successor.

Such were the difficulties and dangers which encompassed this princess. The situation of England, in her time, resembled that of a town powerfully besieged without, and exposed to treachery and sedition within. That a town in such circumstances should defend itself, and even force the enemy, by it's own strength, to raise the siege, hardly falls within the bounds of probability. But that all this should happen, and the inhabitants feel none of the inconveniencies of a long and obstinate siege, nay, that they should grow opulent during the continuance of it, and find themselves at last better able to offend the enemy than they were at first to defend their walls, seems an adventure of some extravagant romance. But

it

it conveys a true image of this reign.—Unallied and alone, queen Elizabeth maintained a glorious and successful war against the greatest power and the richest potentate in Europe. She distressed him in the West Indies. She insulted him in Spain. She took from him the empire of the sea. She fixed it in herself. She rendered all the projects of universal monarchy vain; and shook to the foundations the most exorbitant power, which ever disturbed the peace, or threatened the liberties of Europe. She supported the oppressed people of the Netherlands against the tyranny of their prince. She supported the protestant subjects of France against Catharine of Medicis and her sons, those execrable butchers of their people. She supported the kings of France, Henry the third and fourth, against the ambition of the princes of the house of Lorraine, and the rebellious league of their popish subjects. She, who seemed to have every thing to fear in the beginning of her reign, became in the progress of it terrible to her enemies. The pretender to her crown lost her own. The English, who appeared at first so favourable to the queen of Scotland, became at last as desirous to sacrifice the life of that unfortunate princess to the security of queen Elizabeth. While war, confusion, and the miseries which attend them, raged in the dominions of those who bent their aim at the disturbance of her government; she preserved her subjects in peace and plenty. While the glory of the nation was carried high by achievements in war; the riches

and

and the strength of it were raised by the arts of peace to such a degree, as former ages had never seen, and as we of this age feel in the consequences.—Well therefore might my lord Bacon, speaking of queen Elizabeth, say, " as for her go-
" vernment, I assure myself I shall not exceed,
" if I do affirm, that this part of the island never
" had forty-five years of better times; and yet
" not through the calmness of the season, but
" through the wisdom of her regiment *."

Having made these remarks on the difficulties and on the success which attended queen Elizabeth; it is time to consider the cause, which produced the stupendous effects of her reign. Now this cause is, I think, very plain. She was wise enough to see clearly into the nature of that government, at the head of which she was placed; and to know, that " the supreme head of such
" a government owes a supreme service to the
" whole †." She was wise enough to know, that to be powerful, she must either usurp on her people, deceive them, or gain them. The two first, she saw, were hard, dangerous, and dishonourable. The last, she saw, was easy, safe, and glorious. Her head and her heart concurred to determine her choice. She made herself very soon the most popular person in the kingdom. In her reign, the sense of the court, the sense of the parliament, and the sense of the people were the same; and whenever she exerted her own strength, she exerted the

* Advancement of Learning, lib. 1.

† See Nath. Bacon's Hist. and Pol. Discourses.

whole strength of the nation. Nothing she asked was ever refused by parliament; because she asked nothing which would have been refused by the people. She threw herself so intirely on the affections of her subjects, that she seemed to decline all other tenure of the crown. At least, she was not very solicitous about clearing her title to it by descent. An act, declaring her right according to the order of succession settled in parliament thirty-five Henry the eighth contented her; and she neglected the precaution, which her sister had taken, in getting the act, which excluded them both from the crown, repealed, as far as it related to herself. The particular reasons of her conduct, in this case, might perhaps be guessed at with more probability than they have been; but certainly one general reason outweighed them all in the mind of this heroical princess. She knew that however the subtlety of lawyers and political casuists might influence opinions, nothing but her own conduct could give her the hearts of the people. These she deemed her great security. These she acquired; and the little glosses, which might have been put on her title, she despised. The being not only tied, but knit to her people was her aim; and she pursued this great point of view on all occasions; the least, as well as the greatest; and even on those, where she thought it necessary to refuse or to reprimand. Nature, as well as art, fitted her for this conduct. She had dignity without pride. She was affable, without sinking into low familiarity; and when she courted her people,

people, she courted them like a queen. This popularity was sometimes carried so far, both in her manners, and in her expressions, that her enemies have endeavoured to make it pass for gross and fulsome affectation, and for such, indeed, it ought to have passed, if it had gone alone. It might have shocked, instead of alluring, if it had not been seconded by every action of her life, and contradicted by none.—Let us now consider therefore, in some instances, what that conduct was, which convinced her people so intirely of her goodness and her wisdom; and which procured her such large returns of gratitude, of duty, of affection and zeal.

LETTER XIV.

A FIRST and essential condition, toward obtaining the love and confidence of a free people, is to be neither feared nor despised by them. Queen Elizabeth was, at no time, in any danger of the latter; and she soon put herself above all the suspicions, which might have exposed her to the former. The only difference between her and her parliament, which carried any passion or unkindness with it, happened in the ninth year of her reign. It was founded on the apprehensions of the dangers, which would arise after her death, if the succession was not fixed during her life. But we do not find the least insinuation of any jealousy of her government; though the heat of both houses, at that moment, was too great to have concealed any uneasiness, which had lain at their hearts. That she was fond enough of her prerogative is certain; but then she took care, that it should never be grievous; or that if it was so, on some occasions, to particular persons, it should appear, by the occasions themselves, and by the manner of exercising it, specious to the publick.—The prerogative certainly run high in those days. Her grandfather had raised it by cunning, and her father by violence. The power of the privy-council in civil affairs, and the censorian power of the star-chamber in criminal affairs, as my lord

Bacon very properly styles it, took too much of the pleas of the crown and of the common pleas out of their proper channels, and "served rather "to scare men from doing wrong, than to do any "man right*."—But the exercise of these powers having continued in four preceding reigns, the people were accustomed to it; and care being taken to give no flagrant occasion of clamour against it, we are not to wonder if it was borne, without opposition or murmur, in a reign as popular as this.

The high-commission court, that we may quote another instance, had no doubt very extraordinay powers. The bishops, who held the principal sway in it, exercised by these means two very great authorities at the same time; one, as ordinaries in their dioceses; the other, as judges in this court; so that they might fine and imprison, as well as excommunicate and deprive. Now, it is not very probable, that the parliament, who thought the first of these powers too much, as may be seen by the attempts made against it, in the twenty-eighth year of this reign, were very well pleased to see the second in the same hands. However, the steadiness of the queen in maintaining this part of the prerogative, which had been given her, was the less unpopular, on account of the unsettled state of religion at this time; of the great moderation of the bishops in these early days of the reformation; and of the prudent manner, in which

* Bac. Hist. and Pol. Disc.

the jurisdiction of the high-commission court was executed.

The effects of a barefaced prerogative are not the most dangerous to liberty, for this reason; because they are open; because the alarm they give is commonly greater than the progress they make; and while a particular man or two are crushed by them, a whole nation is put on it's guard.—The most dangerous attacks on liberty are those which surprise, or undermine; which are owing to powers, given under pretence of some urgent necessity; to powers, popular and reasonable, perhaps, at first; but such as ought not to become settled and confirmed by a long exercise; and yet are rendered perpetual by art and management; and, in a great degree, by the nature of these powers themselves. Examples of this kind might be produced from the Spanish, and other histories. But queen Elizabeth was far from setting any such examples. She showed her moderation, in desiring no suspicious powers, as well as in the exercise of her prerogative; and this moderation was the more remarkable, because no prince ever had the pretence of necessity to urge on stronger appearances. Her whole reign may be almost called a state of defensive and offensive war, in England, as well as in Ireland; in the Indies, as well as in Europe. She ventured to go through this state, if it was a venture, without the help of a standing army. The people of England had seen none, from the days of Richard the second; and this cautious queen might perhaps imagine,

that

that the example of his reign, and those of other countries, where standing armies were established, would beget jealousies in the minds of her people, and diminish that affection, which she esteemed and found to be the greatest security of her person, and the greatest strength of her government. Whenever she wanted troops, her subjects flocked to her standard; and her reign affords most illustrious proofs, that all the ends of security, and of glory too, may be answered in this island, without the charge and danger of the expedient just mentioned.

This assertion will not be contradicted by those, who recollect in how many places, and on how many occasions, her forces fought and conquered the best disciplined veteran troops in Europe. Other examples might be brought to show, how careful queen Elizabeth was to avoid every thing, which might give the least umbrage to her people. But we have said enough on this head. Let us proceed to another.

The conduct she held, with respect to parties, deserves to be remarked; because the moderation, the wisdom, and the equity, which she showed in it, contributed very much to cool the ferment in the beginning of her reign; by which she had time to captivate the good will of her people; to settle her government; to establish her authority; and even to change the national religion, with little contradiction, and without any disturbance.

Notwithstanding all the indignities she had suffered, and all the dangers she had run, before her

accession, several persons were restored, and not a man was attainted in her first parliament. The steps I have mentioned being once made, she stood on firmer ground, and had less to fear from the spirit of faction. This clemency once shown, she could, more safely and with greater reason, exercise severity, when the preservation of the publick peace made it necessary.

The peace of the kingdom was the standard, to which she proportioned her conduct. She was far from casting herself with precipitation and violence even into that party which she favoured, and on which alone she resolved to depend. She was far from inflaming their spirits against the adverse party; and farther still from pushing any sort of men, puritans, and even papists, into despair; or provoking them to deserve punishment, that she might have a pretence to inflict it. She pursued her own scheme steadily; but she pursued it gradually; and accompanied it with all the artful circumstances, which could soften the minds of men, and induce those, who were the most averse to her measures, to bear them at least patiently. On these principles she proceeded in the whole course of her reign.

To the papists she used great lenity; till the bull of Pius Quintus, and the rebellion, and other attempts, consequent upon it, obliged her to procure new laws, and execute more rigour. Yet even then she distinguished, "papists in conscience from papists in faction*." She made the

* Walsingham's Letter.

same

same distinction with regard to the puritans. "Their zeal was not condemned; only their "violence was sometimes censured;" until they attempted to set up their own discipline, in opposition to that which had been established by national authority; until their motives appeared to be "no more zeal, no more conscience," says secretary Walsingham, "but mere faction and "division."

Thus cautious and steady was the conduct of queen Elizabeth toward parties; steady to the principle, and therefore varied in the application, as the behaviour of parties toward her government varied; not as success abroad, or the change of servants at home, might have influenced that of a prince of inferior abilities. What has been said relates to parties in the nation; for as to parties at court, the conduct of this queen, though directed to the same general end, seems to have been different. In the nation she chose one party. She rendered the system of that party, the system of the whole. By this establishment, the other parties became so many factions; and by the conduct we have described, she defeated and disarmed these factions. At court she countenanced, and perhaps fomented the parties, which different characters, and different interests created. But however that was, she found means to attach them all to herself; and she found this benefit by keeping her ear open to them all, that the truth could not be concealed from her by the most powerful of her ministers; as we have explained

in

in a former letter upon this subject. On her accession to the throne, she retained thirteen of her sister's counsellors, and balanced them by no more than eight of her own religion. "On those, "as well as on all others, which she afterward "admitted into the ministry," says Camden, "she "bestowed her favours with so much caution, and "so little distinction, as to prevent either party "from gaining the ascendant over her; whereby "she remained mistress of herself, and preserved "both their affections and her own power and "authority intire."

The favours, by which she distinguished the earls of Leicester and Essex, are not exceptions, in the course of so long a reign, sufficient to destroy the truth of this general observation. Besides, both these lords felt the weight of her displeasure, nay one of them, the rigour of her justice, when they presumed too much on her favour, and swerved from their duty. The singular confidence which she placed in Cecil, and some others of her ministers, cannot be quoted in opposition to it; for if she distinguished them, it was rather by the labours, than the favours she heaped on them. She supported them indeed against their enemies; but then the merit of these men was far from being problematical. Their works testified daily for them, in bold and well-concerted enterprises; in wise, and well-conducted negotiations. The people reaped the benefit of their services, as well as the prince. They were justified in the nation, as well as supported at court. In short,

by

by this discernment of spirits, by this skilful management of parties, without the help of military force, unless in actual rebellions, queen Elizabeth preserved her people in tranquillity; though there passed not an hour in her whole reign, without some intrigue against her life, and the publick peace.

This moderation, in assuming and exercising power, might have been illustrated more, and evinced against all the little cavils made, and to be made, if we had not avoided too great prolixity. But it is time to hasten to the consideration of some other parts of her conduct.

Queen Elizabeth was accused of avarice by her enemies; and perhaps she was so by some of her friends. Among that hungry crew, which attends all courts for the loaves and the fishes, she could not escape this charge. But surely, the nation had reason to applaud her frugality. Her grandfather hoarded up riches. Her father dissipated them. The consequence under both these princes was, that every slight occasion became a sufficient pretence to ask for subsidies; nay, they were asked and granted too, when even the slightest occasion did not exist. They were asked by Henry the seventh for wars, which he never intended to make; and by Henry the eighth for resisting invasions, which were never designed against him. Thus was the nation equally oppressed by the avarice of one, and by the profusion of the other.

But queen Elizabeth neither hoarded up, nor lavished

lavished away; and it is justly to be questioned whether any example of a prudent œconomy in private life can be produced, equal to that which she practised in the whole management of her affairs. The famous Burleigh used to say, that "he never cared to see the treasury swell like a "disordered spleen, when the other parts of the "commonwealth were in a consumption;" and his mistress thought that "money, in the pockets "of her subjects, was better placed than in her own "exchequer." Surely these maxims were wise, as well as popular. If a prince amasses wealth, to hoard it up, like Henry the seventh, it is useless to himself, and lost to the publick. If he squanders it away, like Henry the eighth, he will enrich particular men, and impoverish the state. But while these treasures remain in the purse of the subject, they circulate in commerce; they increase the common stock; and they increase by consequence the riches of a prince like queen Elizabeth; for to such a prince this purse will be always open.

As immense as the expenses were, which she found herself obliged to make from the moment she ascended the throne, she received nothing in taxes from her people till the sixth year of her reign. The taxes then given were given by way of retribution; which was generally the method in her time. In former reigns, the people granted aids, not without a general communication at least of the uses, to which they were to be applied; but often without a sufficient assurance, that they should

should be so applied. In this reign that method of proceeding was inverted.

The prince in the world who deserved to be trusted most, desired to be so the least. The aids which she had from her people were not so properly grants, as reimbursements of money, advanced for national services.—And what services? For establishing the protestant religion; for defending England; for rescuing Scotland; for carrying on a succesful war against an opulent and potent enemy; for assisting the subjects and even the kings of France; for supporting the people of the Netherlands; for refining the debased coin; for paying all the debts, and restoring the credit of the crown; for providing ammunition at home, which before this time we had been always obliged to purchase abroad; for improving both home and foreign trade; for rebuilding and augmenting the navy; and for doing all this, without any burdensome imposition on the people; as the parliament more than once acknowledged.

It was so much a maxim of queen Elizabeth, to save for the publick, not for herself; and to measure her riches by the riches of the nation, not by the treasures she had in her coffers; that she refused supplies offered, and remitted payments of supplies granted, when she found that she was able to carry on the publick service without them. The two great principles of that œconomy, which enabled her to do so much for her people, and to oppress them so little, seem to have been these.

First,

First, she made the most of her revenues; not by tormenting and racking her subjects, like Henry the seventh, but by keeping a strict hand over her officers, and hindering them from enriching themselves, either by direct fraud, or by a clandestine management, which may be justly termed indirect fraud, and is often more pernicious than the other.—Secondly, she practised that superior œconomy, of which we have spoken in a former paper, with the utmost ability. What could be done by wisdom, or courage, she never attempted by money; nor expected that her subjects should buy her out of difficulties. Strong at home, she affected little to lean on foreign help. As her alliance was often courted, and she seldom courted that of others, it was in her power, and she took the advantage, to engage in no expense, but such as the interest of her kingdom rendered immediately necessary. To this interest alone she proportioned her expense. This was the sole rule of her conduct. The Huguenots, whom she assisted in their first war, made their peace without her, and assisted to retake from her the places she had bargained for with them: yet she helped them, in the wars which followed, with her troops, her ships, and her money. The Dutch had given her no cause to complain of their behaviour. Yet when France abandoned them at the treaty of Vervins, and they had no support but hers remaining, she made a new bargain with them, and lessened her own charge; because she knew they were able, at that time, to supply the deficiency.

In

In all these expenses, she was careful neither to starve nor overfeed the cause, while it lasted: and she frequently stipulated a repayment; which she might exact afterward, if she found reason so to do; or which she might remit, and thereby create a second obligation to her, if she found her account in such an instance of generosity. Queen Elizabeth was not only thus frugal to her people, but perpetually attentive to the methods of enriching them. In the very first parliament which she held, amidst the most important affairs; such as the settlement of the crown on her own head, the change of religion, and the establishment of the church; regulations for the improvement of trade and increase of shipping were not forgot.

We might pursue the same observation through the whole course of her reign, both in parliament and out of it; and show, in numberless instances, how she rose to the highest, and descended even to the lowest circumstances, which in any degree affected the trade and navigation of her subjects. We might show the advantages she took in these respects, not only of the faults committed by other governments, but of the misfortunes of other countries. In a word, we might show how war itself, one of the greatest publick calamities, instead of impoverishing, became a source of riches to this nation, by the manner in which she made it.

But these particulars would carry us beyond the bounds we have prescribed to ourselves. In general, it will not be denied, that, beside the spirit of

of industry, which exercised itself at home, queen Elizabeth raised and pushed to the highest degree; by the protection and encouragement she gave, a spirit of discovering new countries, making new settlements, and opening new veins of trade. The force of this first impression has lasted long among us. Commerce has thrived under neglects and discouragement. It has subsisted under oppressions and obstructions; and the spirit of it is not yet extinguished by that of stockjobbing; though the spirit of stockjobbing be to that of trade, what the spirit of faction is to that of liberty. The tendency of both is to advance the interest of a few worthless individuals, at the expense of the whole community. The consequence of both, if ever they prevail to the ruin of trade and liberty, must be, that the harpies will starve in the midst of imaginary wealth; and that the children of faction, like the iron race of Cadmus, will destroy one another.

Before queen Elizabeth's reign, the commerce of England was confined and poor. In her reign, it extended itself over all the known, and even into the unknown parts of the world. We traded to the north, and opened our passage into Muscovy. We carried our merchandise up the Duina, down the Volga, and across the Caspian sea into Persia.

Our merchants visited the coasts of Africa; all the countries of the Grand Seignior; and, following the tracks of the Venetians into the East Indies, they soon followed the Portuguese thither by the cape

cape of Good Hope. They went thither through the South Sea, and sailed round the world. In the West Indies, they not only traded, but established themselves in spight of all the power of Spain.

Before queen Elizabeth's reign, the fleet of England was so inconsiderable, that even in the days of her father, if I mistake not, we were forced to borrow, or hire ships of Hamburgh, Lubeck, Dantzick, and other places.

In her reign, it soon grew to such a number and strength, that it became terrible to the greatest maritime powers of Europe.

On such foundations were the riches and power of this kingdom laid by queen Elizabeth; and these were some of the means she employed to gain the affections of her subjects. Can we be surprised, if she succeeded?

LETTER XV.

QUEEN Elizabeth succeeded in gaining the affections of her subjects, not only by the conduct which she held at home, but by that which she held in the management of the national interest abroad.

We have endeavoured to explain some particulars of the former. It remains that we give the least imperfect ideas we are able of the latter, and that we apply the whole great example of this reign, to confirm the doctrines we have advanced.

Queen Elizabeth could not have established and preserved, as she did, the tranquillity of her people in the midst of disturbance, nor their security in the midst of danger, if she had not taken some share in the general affairs of Europe. She took therefore such a share as the interest of England necessarily required at that time; and she conducted herself in the management of it with wisdom and address superiour to any of her predecessors.

Her sister had been rendered by bigotry an egregious bubble to the court of Rome. Persuaded by her husband, and deceived by her ministers, she was so likewise very fatally in the quarrel, which broke out between France and Spain. The parliament, in assenting to her marriage with a foreign prince, had imposed such conditions, as

were judged sufficient to preserve the constitution of the government, and the independency of the kingdom.

Philip had sworn to the observation of these conditions. Such of them, as he had not either time, or opportunity, or temptation to break, were observed; but the others proved too weak to hold him. Thus, for instance, we do not find that he enriched himself at the expense of England. He is said, on the contrary, to have brought hither very great treasures; and his father had trusted the distribution of an immense sum to Gardiner, so that if he bribed the nation, it was with his own money, not theirs; but he engaged the nation in a war with France, because France broke with Spain; notwithstanding the express condition made by parliament, "that the match should "not at all derogate from the league lately con- "cluded betwixt the queen of England and the "king of France, but the peace should remain in- "violate between the English and the French*."

This sacrifice of the national to a foreign interest cost us Calais; a conquest which the French looked upon as a compensation for near two hundred other places, which they were obliged by the treaty of Cambray, to give up to Philip. Boulogne had been sacrificed in the preceding reign, not to a foreign interest, but to that of the minister, Dudley earl of Warwick, afterward duke of Northumberland. The people were willing and able to assert their right, and to defend

* Cambden.

their possession; but the situation of the minister, and the schemes of private interest, which he was carrying on at home, required that he should avoid, at any rate, a war, even a defensive war. In short Boulogne, for which France had engaged to give two millions, was delivered up for four hundred thousand crowns; and the very same minister, who had opposed with violence all the publick considerations, urged by the protector for yielding this place, yielded it to purchase a treaty necessary for himself, detrimental and dishonourable to the nation.

We have said enough, in a former letter, concerning the wild conduct of Henry the eighth in foreign affairs; and there is no need of going any farther back. These examples are sufficient to show the opposition between that of queen Elizabeth and that of her predecessors. She was neither deceived, like them, by her ministers; nor betrayed by her passions, to serve any other interest at the expense of England.

It would be easy to prove, from many instances, how careful she was to avoid every thing, which might even warp the steady tenour of her conduct in this respect. As long as she had no real interest distinct from that of the country she governed, she knew that no fictitious interest could be imposed on her. She kept herself therefore clear of any such real interest, and thought that the crown of England deserved her sole, her undivided care.

Much has been said of her behaviour in all the treaties

treaties of marriage proposed to her. We shall not engage in that disquisition. But this, we think, cannot be controverted; that if ever she was in earnest resolved to marry, she was so when the articles of marriage between her and the duke of Anjou were signed. It is hardly possible, as Rapin observes, to account for her conduct on this occasion by any other principle. Now upon this supposition, what motive could determine her to break this match in so abrupt a manner? The reasons urged by Cambden, and other writers in general, prove too much. They serve rather to prove, that she should not have entered into these engagements at all, than to account for her breaking them as she did. But among the reasons, on which Walsingham insisted, when he was sent into France upon this occasion, we may observe one in particular, founded on a fact, which happened after the signing of the articles; and which accounts for the queen's conduct in this case agreeably to principles, on which she proceeded in all others. The duke of Anjou had accepted the sovereignty of the Low Countries. By this step, he had engaged himself in a war with Spain; and the queen would not, on his account, engage her people in it, "desiring nothing more than that "by this marriage the realm might be preserved "in peace and tranquillity*."

She might incline to marry this prince, under all the limitations and reserves contained in the articles, while he had no dominions on the Con-

* Cambden.

tinent; and yet start backward and resolve to break the match, as soon as she saw him actually possessed of the sovereignty of the Low Countries.

Nay, if we should suppose, against historical probability, that she never designed to consummate her marriage, though she entered into articles, yet there will still remain no reasonable way of accounting for the sudden resolution she took of breaking at this precise point of time; unless we suppose, that she thought this reason the strongest and the most unanswerable of all those, which could be urged in excuse of a measure liable to several objections, and some very inconvenient contingencies.

There were few things, which she had more at heart, than rescuing the Netherlands from the Spanish yoke; and there was nothing in the whole extent of foreign affairs, to which she gave greater attention. Even at this time, she supplied the duke of Anjou with very considerable sums, for the support of his enterprise; and about four years afterward, she espoused more openly the cause of these provinces, by making a treaty with the States, and by sending an army to their assistance. But as she would not marry a prince who was their sovereign, so she would not accept this sovereignty, when it was offered directly to her. She persisted in avoiding an engagement, which might in it's consequence carry her farther than the interest of England required; or oblige her to make greater efforts than were consistent with that

that easy and flourishing state, in which she resolved to preserve her own people.

Much more might be said; but this may suffice to show what the first and fundamental principle was, by which queen Elizabeth governed herself in all foreign affairs. She considered the interest of no kingdom, no state, nor people, no not even the general interest of the reformation, as zealous a protestant as she was, nor the preservation of a balance of power in Europe, as great a heroine as she was, in any other light than relatively to the interest of England. She assisted, or opposed, she defended or attacked, just as this interest directed; and the degree, to which it was concerned, was the exact and constant measure to which she proportioned her good, and her ill offices, her friendship, and her enmity. She was diverted from this principle of conduct neither by weakness, nor strength of mind; neither by fear, nor hope; neither by pusillanimity, nor courage; neither by moderation, nor ambition.

We may conclude this head, by venturing to affirm, that, in the whole course of her reign, there was not a penny of English money spent, nor a drop of English blood spilt, except where it was necessary to keep off from this nation some real, visible disadvantage.

Queen Elizabeth's policy was deep; and the means she employed were often very secret; but the ends to which this policy and these means are directed, were never equivocal. Let us now descend into some particular instances of the

wisdom and address, with which she pursued this great principle.

These particulars may be reduced properly, we think, under two general heads. The first is this; "she watched the ebbs and flows of the power "and interest of Europe; the vicissitudes and "fluctuations in the affairs of peace and war." We use the words of a late writer *, but shall make a very different application of them.

This uncertain, varied, shifting scene was so far from being the cause of bad measures, or the excuse for bad success, at the time we are speaking of, that it was the very source from whence queen Elizabeth derived those opportunities, which she improved so gloriously. A weaker council than hers might have been puzzled, and weaker heads might have been turned by so confused a state of affairs. Unable to steer steadily through so many difficulties, every current would have carried such men along with it. Every blast of wind would have driven them before it. Perpetually tossed about, at the mercy of every event, they must have lived from day to day, or from hour to hour.

If the kingdom had escaped entire destruction in this forlorn condition, it must have been by miracle, and without any merit on the part of those who governed, but this entire destruction would much more probably have followed, after a long series of calamities; without any other excuse on their part, than that of charging the catas-

* See Observations on the Writings of the Craftsman.

trophe

trophe to the account of fortune, the common scape-goat of unskilful ministers.

The conduct and the success of queen Elizabeth and her ministers were very different. She managed France, until she had taken such measures, as left her less to fear from Scotland: and she managed Spain, until she had nothing left to fear from France.

She knew what designs Henry the second built on the pretensions of his daughter-in-law, Mary queen of Scotland; and no one, who considers the history of this time, nay, even as he finds it reduced by Rapin himself, will be of his mind, that she expected to "enjoy great tranquillity by the "peace," which she made soon after her accession to the throne, with France and Scotland.

But the making this treaty gave her time, which was the utmost importance to her to gain, abroad as well as at home, in the beginning of her reign. The manner in which she made it gave her reputation likewise; and she was wise enough to know of what real advantage reputation is, and how much that of a prince depends on the first steps he makes in government.

She practised in this negotiation a rule, which she observed to the last. How much soever Philip resented her proceedings at home, it was plain he could not abandon, at that time, her interests abroad. The point of honour, drawn from the consideration that England had entered into the war for the sake of Spain, did not probably weigh much with him; but the pretensions of

of France gave him a just alarm; and the same reasons, which are said to have induced him to save her life, when she was princess, stood in force to make him support her, now she was queen, against the power of France. Notwithstanding this plausible consideration, queen Elizabeth resolved to treat for herself, and by herself. "She "was of opinion," says Cambden, "that it would "redound to the honour of England, or herself, "to be reduced to the necessity of supporting "her interests by a dependence on Spain." She exerted the same spirit, and behaved herself with the same dignity, on a very remarkable occasion, and in a very nice conjuncture, at the latter end of her reign; at the treaty of Vervins.

She despised the offers made by Henry the fourth. She resolved to continue the war, and to support alone the states of the Low Countries, rather than to suffer the man in the world, who had the greatest obligations to her, to treat for her.—True it is, that she had reason to be dissatisfied with his behaviour; but beside that, the good understanding between this prince and Philip the second being promoted by the court of Rome; it is possible queen Elizabeth might think such negotiators, as were devoted to that court, not quite so proper to be trusted with the interests of her kingdom.

As soon as Henry the second was dead, and his son Francis the second, a young and in every sense a weak prince, was on the throne of France, she acted with less reserve and caution. The treaty,

treaty, which had been privately negotiated before with the malecontents of Scotland, was now signed; her army marched to their assistance; the French were driven out of that kingdom; the reformation was solemnly and legally established there; and queen Elizabeth was the avowed defender of the liberties, privileges, and religion of the Scottish nation.—Francis the second lived a very short time, and died without leaving any children. The fear therefore of a union of the crowns of England and Scotland with that of France, terrified Philip the second no longer. Queen Elizabeth had therefore the more to fear. The court of France had still the same bigotry, and the same hatred to her; though not the same pretensions. The court of Spain could be now no more restrained, by any political consideration, from pursuing those designs against her, even in conjunction with France, which no other consideration had hitherto retarded.

The projects formed and the engagements taken between these powers, at the congress at Bayonne, were not absolute secrets. She felt the effects of them every day, in conspiracies against her government, and even her life. Too weak to defend herself by force on so many sides, she defended herself by stratagem; improved every incident; and took some advantage of every turn. She contented herself to countermine the intrigues of the courts of Rome, of France, and of Spain. With the first she kept no measures, because she could have no war. With the two last she kept all measures

measures to prevent one. Though queen Elizabeth's whole reign was properly a state of war, and there was no point of time in it, where she was free from all attacks, private as well as publick, indirect as well as direct; yet the first twenty-five years of her reign may be said, in one sense, to have been neither a state of war, nor a state of peace; because both sides pretended to look on the treaties of peace as subsisting; and either disavowed, or excused the hostilities reciprocally committed, not constantly, but occasionally committed. If she had fallen into this state from that of a settled peace, disentangled from all pretensions, either of her own upon others, or of others upon her, there would be no occasion to admire her conduct. But that she should be able, when she neither had, nor could have a settled, secure peace with her neighbours, to stand so long on the slippery verge of war, and avoid the necessity of engaging directly in it, till she was in a condition of doing so with success, is justly matter of the greatest admiration.—If she had only aimed to keep off the evil day, it might at last have come upon her with a double weight of misfortune. If she had only gained time to prolong suspense, she might have lost opportunities; wasted her strength; tired, jaded and exhausted her people. But this was far from being the case. She was in this state by good, not by bad policy; and she made the use she designed of it. She disappointed, divided, and weakened her enemies. She prepared the opportunities, which she afterward improved.

improved. She united, animated, and enriched her people; and, as difficult as that may seem to be for a prince in such a situation, she maintained her own dignity, and supported the honour of the nation.—To exemplify all these particulars, would be to write her history; but it is necessary to say something upon them.

Of the two powers abroad, from whom alone she had any thing to apprehend, and with whom she was principally concerned, France gave her the least and the shortest trouble. Charles the ninth came a minor to the crown. Two factions, drunk with religious enthusiasm, and headed by men of the most desperate ambition, desolated the kingdom. The queen-mother blew up the flames first; and tried in vain afterward to extinguish them, by a deluge of blood. Queen Elizabeth, who had probably encouraged the famous conspiracy of Amboise, which broke out just before the death of Francis the second, continued to abet and support the protestant party; but still subordinately to such measures, as her situation, relatively to Scotland, or Ireland, or Spain, obliged her to keep with Charles the ninth. These measures were sometimes such, and even after the massacre of St. Bartholomew, as the zeal of the Huguenots could hardly forgive her. But she went wisely and steadily on to her own purposes.

"Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem."

When Henry the third came to the crown, and the league was once formed, the crown of France wanted

wanted her assistance and had it; and as powerful as the princes of the house of Lorraine were, they could give her little open disturbance; unless they prevailed in their wicked, and almost chimerical projects in France. With these princes and their faction therefore she never kept any measures; as they never kept any with her. As politick a prince as Philip the second is esteemed to have been, he was amused by the regard which queen Elizabeth affected sometimes for his person, and always for the treaties subsisting between them; and he lost the opportunities in which he might have attacked her with advantage. The slow councils of Spain, and the slower execution of them, produced opportunities, which her sagacity and vigour improved. The support she gave to the Huguenots made the Spaniards afraid of provoking her, by too hasty and direct attacks, to give the same support to the people of the Low Countries. She turned their game against them, and acted in the Low Countries in the same manner as they acted in Ireland, and even in England; but with better effect. From the year 1577 she began to favour this revolt, and in the year 1585 she made a formal treaty with the States. Such of these measures as could be concealed, she concealed. Such of them as could not be concealed, she excused, or endeavoured to justify and reconcile with the treaties between Spain and England.

As the time she gained, and the diversions she gave by this management, put it quite out of the power

power of France, and made Spain less able to hurt her; so they alone put it in her power to settle her government, and to do all the great things at home, of which we have spoken in other papers*. We shall not repeat them here; but shall conclude this head by observing, in an example or two, how she maintained her own dignity in other cases, beside that of treating, which is taken notice of above, and how she supported the honour of the nation, and the interests of her subjects.

During the time she was the most careful to avoid a war with Spain, and had the most reason to be so; even in the year 1568, while those revolutions which broke out soon afterward were preparing, she would not suffer the least injury to be offered to any of her subjects with impunity. Some vessels and effects, belonging to an English merchant, had been seized by the Spaniards in the West Indies. She did not make war upon this; but she soon found and seized an opportunity of resenting the insult. She laid her hands on very great sums of money, claimed indeed by Genoese merchants, but sent to the Low Countries, and designed, no doubt, for the Spanish service there. The duke of Alva seized, in return, the persons and effects of the subjects of England; and she immediately made reprisals on those of the Flemings. What composition was made with the Genoese does not, I think, appear; but as the seizure was to the disappointment and loss of

* See the first seven volumes of the Craftsman, printed for R. Francklin.

Spain,

Spain, so the composition was probably to the advantage of England; since, at this very time, queen Elizabeth discharged the debts contracted by her father and brother to foreigners. As to the effects of the Netherlands, she returned the overplus of the value, after having repaid to her own subjects the full amount of their losses. She carved for her people; and would not leave it to a dispute, what reparation they should have; much less whether they should have any reparation, or not.

Such a conduct as this which she held, even while she kept measures with Spain, and avoided a war, foretold what might be expected from her, and what she actually performed, when she thought it no longer expedient to keep the same measures. But this will come, with other reflections, more properly under the next general head; to which we think that the particular instances of queen Elizabeth's wisdom and address, in the management of foreign affairs, may be reduced.

LETTER XVI.

IF queen Elizabeth considered every former interest relatively to the interest of England, she considered likewise every measure to be taken in foreign affairs relatively to the situation of England. This we establish as the second general head, to which the particular instances of her wisdom and address, in the management of foreign affairs, may be properly reduced.

She considered herself as queen of a country cut off from the Continent, and separated by the sea from all other countries, except Scotland. Her conduct therefore toward Scotland was very different, in many respects, from that, which she held toward every other nation.—A due observation of these different principles, on which queen Elizabeth proceeded in the divided state of our island, may serve to set, in a stronger and clearer light, that single principle, which remains to be followed in our united state.

The situation of an island affords great advantages, when they are wisely improved; and when they are neglected, as great disadvantages may result from this very situation.—The reign, now before us, is a glorious and unanswerable proof, that the halcyon days, so much boasted of, and so seldom found, days of prosperity, as well as peace, may be enjoyed in an island, while all

the neighbouring continent is filled with alarms, and even laid waste by war. But our own histories will show us likewise, how an island may approach, as it were, too near the continent, and be fatally drawn into that great vortex. Lest we should ramble too widely in the large field which opens itself, let us confine our reflections to some of those different means and objects, either of defence, or offence, which nature, improved by art, presents to people who inhabit islands, or to people who inhabit the continent, according to their different situations. A powerful navy is of indispensable necessity to the former of these. Without it, they must be poor and exposed. With it, they may be rich and secure. Barriers of fortified towns, and great standing armies are of the same neeessity to the latter. Without this security, they lie open to every inroad, and at the mercy of every neighbour. With it, they may be safe from foreign danger, and even terrible to those who live round them. But then, as the sea is a barrier of no expense, and as a maritime force carries no domestick danger along with it, but enriches the community it defends, so a fortified barrier, and a regular army, which are necessary to secure a nation situate on the continent against foreign danger, carry great domestick inconveniencies, and even dangers too, along with them. Both of them, like armour too heavy to be borne, waste the strength of those who are covered by them: and an army, like a sword, which recoils on the blow, may wound the constitution it was meant to de-

fend.—But farther: as particular families, by uniting together, formed larger societies, for their common defence, and gave rise to the kingdoms, and states, which have appeared in the world; so these larger societies have, ever since, found it necessary, or advantageous, to unite together in various manners; sometimes by an entire union, or an incorporation of different people into one body politick; sometimes by a partial, or federal union of distinct states in one common cause; and at all times by alliances, made on particular occasions, and suggested by a real or seeming conformity of interests. This occasional union, by alliances with other states, of which alone we are to speak in this place, is so necessary to all the nations on the continent, that even the most powerful cannot subsist without it; and those who manage it best, are accounted wisest. Their several interests are the objects of their alliances; and as the former are subject to change, the latter must vary with them. Such variations, whether occasioned by the course of accidents, or by the passions of men, though made by a few, will affect many; because there always are and always must be, systems of alliances subsisting among these nations; and therefore, as a change in some of the parts of one system necessarily requires a change in all the rest; so the alteration of one system necessarily requires an alteration of the others.

Thus are they always tossed from peace to war, from war to peace. Perpetual negotiation is the

life and soul of their governments. Their well-being, nay their safety at home, require that they should be always busy abroad. It is necessary for them to be mediators, arbitrators, or, which is infinitely worse, guarantees; to be contracting parties in preliminary, provisional, or explanatory treaties; in defensive, or offensive alliances; by which means, they get over daily difficulties, by the multiplication of lasting incumbrances.

The interfering and clashing of their rights and pretensions, and the various obligations, by which they stand bound to one another, appear to be and are the immediate causes of all these disputes and contentions. But the principal and remote cause arises from the proximity and other circumstances of their situations. That necessity, or advantage, which gave occasion to the original engagements, has maintained and multiplied them since; and the last would not be reasonable, if the first had not been necessary.

Here then arises an essential difference between those objects, which are proper to the policy of an island, and those which are so to the policy of the continent; a difference greatly to the advantage of the former; the circumstances of whose situation not requiring so constant and intimate a union with other states, either for defence or offence, render unnecessary a great part of the engagements, which prove such heavy and lasting incumbrances on the latter.

An island under one government, advantageously situate, rich in itself, richer by it's commerce,

merce, can have no necessity, in the ordinary course of affairs, to take up the policy of the continent; to enter into the system of alliances we have been speaking of; or, in short, to act any other part, than that of a friendly neighbour and a fair trader. If an extraordinary crisis happens on the continent, which may endanger the safety even of those who are separated from it, such as we saw at the beginning of the present century, self-preservation will no doubt determine men, as it ought, to unite by stricter alliances with those powers, with whom they are occasionally united by a more immediate interest; but even in this case, neither will self-preservation require, nor good policy suffer, that such a people should enter deep into the quarrels, or involve themselves intricately, much less continually, in the political schemes of the continent. We pass over offensive cases, because it is manifest, that the people of an island can have no interest in making foreign acquisitions; and that therefore it would be absurd in them to spend their blood and treasure in acquiring only for others; or to attack any farther than is necessary to defend.

We confine ourselves to the case of defence before mentioned; and upon that we say, a people on the continent may have reason to engage as deeply in defence of another country, as if they defended the walls of their own towns, or the doors of their own houses; because another country may be the sole barrier of their own. But this can never be reasonably done by the

people of an island, who have another, and a better barrier than any the continent can form for them. Such a people are to look on their engagements with other countries, as on outworks cast up in haste, which may serve to defeat a weak attack, or to delay and disappoint a strong one. But it would be the height of folly in them, even in one of those extraordinary conjunctures, which we now suppose, to lay the whole stress of their defence here; to spend their strength improperly; and to forego those advantages, which nature has given them.

The nations on the continent might teach them another lesson. They are careful to employ every advantage of their situation; a river; a lake; a ridge of mountains; and shall the inhabitants of an island neglect the sea? Shall they do by choice all which other nations are obliged to do by necessity? Surely not; and if at any time such a conduct can be proved necessary to certain purposes, we think it will result from this proof, that such purposes should be laid aside, not that such measures should be pursued.

These reflections, with others of the same kind, present themselves naturally to those who consider the conduct of queen Elizabeth, and the events of her reign. We may therefore conclude, that they were, at least, some of the principles of her government.

How she formed, or rather how she protected and aided a party already formed in Scotland, on principles of religion and liberty, has been observed;

served; as well as the success of this measure, by which the troops of France were driven out of that kingdom, and the influence of France on the government was either removed, or guarded against. To maintain and improve this advantage, was the great affair of her life. England was, with respect to Scotland, like a kingdom on the continent, and queen Elizabeth employed, with respect to Scotland, all the policy of the continent.

We find her busy on that side in almost every page of her history; almost always negotiating, and always intriguing. A friend, an enemy, a mediatrix, an umpire, a gaurantee, she played every part, which might keep others from hurting Scotland, and Scotland from hurting her. Her armies were at all times ready to march, and her fleets to sail thither. As strict an œconomy as she practised every where else, she was profuse there; but her profusion turned to account, and therefore deserves another name. There may be such schemes, such management, and such success, as may render even the smallest expense profusion; but those of queen Elizabeth were sufficient to justify the greatest. The secret service of her reign was private in transaction, and publick in effect; not equally inscrutable in both.

About the fourteenth year of her reign, she had brought the affairs of Scotland to such a pass, that she seemed to have nothing to fear from that quarter. The plots, in favour of queen Mary, had been discovered; the insurrections defeated;

and the duke of Norfolk executed in England. In Scotland, the same party was broken. The earl of Morton, a man absolutely devoted to queen Elizabeth, was regent; the castle of Edinburgh was taken; the civil war was finished with complete success; and she enjoyed great tranquillity; because, according to Rapin's observation, she could now be only attacked by sea; that is, she had now the whole advantage of an island.

This happy state did not continue long without interruption. Morton lost, and reassumed his power, was disgraced, prosecuted, and at last beheaded. King James had taken very young the government of this kingdom; and young, as well as old, was governed by his favourites. The party of his mother in Scotland did not indeed rise again, so as to give queen Elizabeth any umbrage. But his general character, and his behaviour on some particular occasions, the character of his favourites, and the intrigues they were known to carry on, obliged her to reassume, if she had ever laid it aside, and to pursue her ancient conduct toward Scotland. She pursued it to the end of her reign: and although king James, when he had more experience, and was better advised, kept such measures with her, as were necessary to secure and to facilitate his succession; yet this wise queen continued to give quite another attention to the affairs of Scotland, than she gave to those of any other country; or would have given to these, if Scotland had been divided from England by the sea.

It

It is impossible to make these reflections, and not to reflect, at the same time, on that happy change which the union of the two kingdoms has brought about. We are now one nation under one government; and must therefore always have one common interest; the same friends, the same foes, the same principles of security, and of danger. It is by consequence now in our power, to take the intire advantage of our situation; an advantage, which would make us ample amends for several which we want, and which some of our neighbours possess; an advantage which, constantly attended to, and wisely improved, would place the British nation in such circumstances of happiness and glory, as the greatest empires could never boast. Far from being alarmed at every motion on the continent; far from being oppressed for the support of foreign schemes; we might enjoy the securest peace, and the most unenvied plenty. Far from courting, or purchasing the alliances of other nations, we might see them suing for ours. Far from being hated or despised, for involving ourselves in all the little wrangles of the continent, we might be loved and respected by all those who maintain the just balance of Europe, and be formidable to those alone who should endeavour to break it.

Having made these few reflections on that part of queen Elizabeth's policy which regarded Scotland, it is necessary that we should say something of that which regarded the nations on the continent. Now with these it is plain she took the fewest engagements

gagements she possibly could, and shunned as industriously the occasions of mingling her interests and counsels with theirs, as she sought the occasions of mingling both with those of Scotland.

We believe, upon very good grounds, that periods of four or five years might be pointed out, in which this nation has been a party to more treaties than were made by queen Elizabeth in the course of forty-five years; and yet we presume it will not be easy to show, that this nation had more imminent dangers to avoid, and more formidable powers to resist; or that such ends were attained with greater glory and success at these, or any other periods, than in the reign of queen Elizabeth. Let us descend into some particulars.

With the northern crowns she kept in terms of amity, and good correspondence; and had some negotiations with that of Denmark, concerning the interests of her subjects in trade. The same interests drew her into negotiations with the Muscovite, and she found means to conduct them to her great advantage.

The settlement made in Germany, a little before the abdication of Charles the fifth, continued. The protestants were quiet there, and desirous to remain so. The general interest of religion did not call upon her to look that way; and it is evident, by the whole conduct of her reign, that she thought the particular interests of her kingdom very little concerned in those of the empire.

How attentive soever she might be to penetrate into the councils of the court of Rome, and to

to trace the intrigues of the Vatican from their source; she bore no part whatever in the affairs of Italy.

In short, as all the measures she took in foreign affairs were considered relatively to the situation of England, she had nothing to do in the much greatest part of the business of the continent; and she was so far from entering into engagements by treaty, that she was scarce ever concerned in negotiations about it. In France, Spain, and the Low Countries she had more to do; but even there the part she took was strictly no more than the security and welfare of her own kingdoms required; and she acted it in no other manner than was suitable to the situation of England.

The state of Scotland, of Ireland, and for some time of England itself, gave her just reason to apprehend, that the French, or Spaniards, or both, might get footing there. Each of these had at different times pretensions of their own to her crown. The cause of Mary queen of Scotland afforded them for a long time both pretence and opportunity; and the united force of the Roman catholick party was, at all times ready to support their enterprises. Spain was the greatest maritime power in Europe, and able to attempt the invasion of England, even when queen Elizabeth had been above thirty years on the throne, and had raised her navy from the low condition in which she found it. In a word, the whole coast, from the strait of Gibraltar almost to Jutland, belonged to France and Spain. Such circumstances

circumstances formed a conjuncture, wherein these two powers had advantages against her, which they could have had in no other; and if she was obliged to act toward them in a different manner from what she did toward the other powers of the continent, it was because she stood exposed to lose, at least in part, with respect to them, the advantages of her situation.

How she acted toward them has been observed already. She amused them and eluded their designs, by the most artful series of management. She sought no alliances against them with other nations; and though she did not fail to abet and support the insurrections of their subjects, yet even with these she was cautious of entering into engagements by treaty. She did it with the Huguenots by a treaty signed in 1562, which the vidame of Chartres had negotiated. The success of the treaty, and the ungrateful behaviour of the Huguenots to her, confirmed her in the principle of depending little on allies, and much on herself. She chose rather to assist when and where she thought fit, and to assist gratis, than to be tied down to the consequences of constant obligations, for the notional advantage of reciprocal engagements.

In the year 1577 she began to take so intimate a concern in the affairs of the Low Countries, that the most important counsels and resolutions of those states were communicated to her; and she lent them a hundred thousand pounds; yet it does not seem probable, that she entered so soon

into

into a formal alliance with them, though such an alliance be mentioned by Meteren, as well as Camden, and inserted from the former in the collection of treaties.

In the year 1585 the clouds gathered on every side, and threatened queen Elizabeth with that terble storm, part of which fell upon her, and part of which she averted. She beheld Philip master of Portugal as well as Spain. She beheld the duke of Guise growing apace to be master of France. She saw these two princes closely united by principles, which might continue in force long enough to complete her ruin. She saw the Low Countries almost quite reduced by the arms of Spain; and the protestants of France in the utmost danger of being so by the league. Dangers from Ireland, and dangers from Scotland, impended over her.

In such a crisis, more terrible, as we apprehend, than any which has threatened this nation since that time, what was the conduct of our heroick queen? Did she immediately prepare to oppose these dangers, by making alliances on the continent? Did she purchase accessions to these alliances? Did she raise armies and pay subsidies abroad? Did she give guaranties to every prince and state who asked them; and, in order to ward against one danger, sow the seeds of many? By no means. She sent indeed sir Thomas Bodley to the king of Denmark, as well as to the andgrave of Hesse, and other protestant princes of the empire; "to procure a league for defence of their religion," says

says Camden. But this league does not appear, nor any other effect of these negotiations. "As "she was very saving of her money, it is likely," says Rapin, "that she did not employ the most "proper means to bring the princes of Germany "into her interests." She secured herself by a great deal of management on the side of Scotland. She assisted the king of Navarre, and the prince of Conde, with money and ships; and the sole treaty she made on the continent was that with the states of the Low Countries, concluded the tenth of August 1585 at Nonesuch. Her chief dependence was upon her own ability and courage; upon the affection and zeal of her people. Neither failed her. Sure of being attacked, she began the attack. While Cavendish pillaged the coasts of Chili and Peru, she sent Drake to the coasts of Spain, with orders to burn all the Spanish ships he should meet. Her orders were executed with the spirit, with which they were given. More than a hundred vessels loaded with provision and ammunition were burnt at Gibraltar. The Spanish admiral was insulted at the mouth of the Tagus, and the Spaniards were taken, or destroyed, even under his eyes; an infamy so great, that the suffering of it was scarce in example before that time. The riches coming from the Indies to Spain fell into the hands of the English. The projects of Philip were disappointed in the year 1587; and when the invasion was attempted in the year 1588, his army was blocked up in the ports of the Low

Low Countries, and his invincible armada was beat, scattered, and destroyed.

We have now gone through all we propose to say at this time, concerning the conduct of queen Elizabeth both at home and abroad; concerning that conduct, which, by convincing her people of her goodness and her wisdom, procured from them those large returns of gratitude, of duty, of affection and zeal, the sole foundations on which she rested her authority and her security; and the sole foundations on which they can be rested, suitably to the nature of our government. The limitations, necessary to render monarchy consistent with publick liberty, must be many and great; for which reason it has been objected to them, that they took off from that weight of authority, and restrained that fulness of power, which are many times necessary to be exerted, even for the good of the whole community. If this objection was well founded, it would be a sufficient answer, to say that a few accidental inconveniencies, which may happen, and which may be recompensed too, in government, deserve not to be prevented, at the expense of leaving liberty perpetually exposed. But the reign of queen Elizabeth proves, beyond contradiction, that a prince like her will enjoy, at the head of the freest people on Earth, all the authority, and all the power necessary to promote the joint security, prosperity, and glory of prince and people. So that all the objections, which can be raised

raised on this side to the British constitution of government, will centre here; that it has not provided for strengthening and enlarging the authority and power of a weak or a wicked prince.

A prince who never separates the interests just mentioned, and who pursues them wisely, will have absolute power in the most limited monarchy. A prince who separates these interests, turns government itself into faction; and the spirit of liberty will rise against him. An arbitrary government is suited to any character. A free government requires a great, at least, a good one. In the former, all kinds and degrees of power are in the prince, or flow from him. In the latter, his powers are limited and confined. When he wants to increase, or extend them, he must derive the faculty of doing so from his people; and from hence it follows, that as long as such a constitution remains entire and uncorrupted, the prosperity, nay the ease, and even the security of the government, will depend on the disposition of the people toward the prince; as the disposition of the people will always depend on the behaviour of the prince toward the people. Queen Elizabeth saw these truths in all their force. She was both willing and able to proportion her conduct to them. She never felt therefore any want of power. She was supported by the spirit of liberty; and she overcame that of faction. Some of her successors either did not see these truths in all their force, or were unable

to

to proportion their conduct to them. The princes therefore felt the limitations of our monarchy like shackles upon them. The spirit of liberty either opposed, or did not support them; and they nursed up a spirit of faction to the ruin of themselves, of their families, and almost of the nation.

LETTER XVII.

THE scene we are now going to open will appear vastly different from that which we just closed.—Instead of an uninterrupted, pleasing harmony of government, we shall meet with a perpetual, jarring dissonance; instead of success and glory abroad, disappointment and contempt; instead of satisfaction, prosperity and union at home, discontent, distress, and at last civil war will present themselves to us in all their horrors.

To consider this melancholy change, and to show from whence it proceeded, whether from the prince, or from the people, is our present business. That it was brought about and carried on by faction, must not be denied. The sole question will therefore be, which was the factious side? Now to determine this, we need only inquire, which side was for usurping on the other; which was for preserving and which for altering the established constitution of government. On this point the question will turn; for in a country of liberty, in a limited monarchy, whatever some persons may think, or desire to have believed, it is certain that there may be faction for the crown, as well as against the crown. The reason is plain. There may be conspiracies against liberty, as well as against prerogative. Private interest may screen or defend a bad administration, as well as attack

attack or undermine a good one. In short, conspiring against any one part of the constitution, in favour of another, or perverting, to the support of national grievances, the very means, which were instituted to redress them, are destructive of the whole frame of such a government, and are the proper characteristicks of faction.

On which side faction, thus defined, is likely to be found the oftenest, and to act the most effectually, we shall not stay to examine here. They, who have read the first of these letters, may remember what is there said, to show the difference between the motives and the means, which a prince hath of usurping on his people; and those which the people have of encroaching on their prince. We shall only observe, to our present purpose, that as he, who confines his notions of faction to oppositions made to the crown, reasons, in an absolute monarchy, in favour of the constitution; so he, who confines them thus, reasons, in a limited monarchy, against the constitution; is weak enough to deceive himself, or wicked enough to attempt deceiving others; and, in either case, is thus far a betrayer of publick liberty.—On such principles as these we said, in our last paper, that government itself might be turned into faction; and that some of queen Elizabeth's successors had nursed up a spirit of faction, to the ruin of themselves, of their families, and almost of the nation. —We presume that this will appear, in the course of our inquiries, to be undeniably true; and that there will be as little room to doubt, whether the

factious conduct of the court, in the reigns of king James and Charles the first, gave a rise to all the struggles between them and their people, as there is room to deny, that the destruction of our constitution in church and state was the dreadful consequence of these struggles. The spirit of liberty and the British constitution of government, whose cause we are pleading, and whose cause we are sorry there should be so much occasion to plead, will therefore, we hope, remain clear of all imputations.

We wish that this justice could be done without opening wounds which are hardly yet intirely healed, and without arraigning the conduct of princes, whose memories have been held in great veneration by many worthy persons: but since this cannot be; nay, since the opening of these wounds may contribute to the more effectual healing of them; and since arraigning the conduct of these princes hath been rendered the more necessary by the accounts which have been given of it, and by the principles on which it hath been defended; we must speak with the same liberty of them, as we have used in speaking of those who reigned before them.

The Ægyptians paid so much respect to their very limited monarchs, that when they meant to warn these princes against particular vices, they commended them for opposite virtues. We cannot persuade ourselves, that this method of reforming or instructing, by panegyrick, the usual and most deadly poison of other princes, had a good

good effect on those of Ægypt. But however this might be, when these princes were dead, notwithstanding the respect shown to them living*, they underwent the same trial as the custom of the kingdom had established for all private persons, and funeral honours were equally denied to them, and to the meanest and most guilty of their subjects, when their memories were condemned, on a solemn and strict examination of the conduct they had held in life.

Though we propose to inquire with all this freedom; and though we are persuaded that the result of these inquiries will be a confirmation of what hath been advanced by us; yet are we very far from admitting many of the objections, which have been made to the conduct of king James and king Charles the first. Much less do we approve those cruel insinuations against them, which are to be found in several invectives, not histories, dictated by a spirit of faction, not by the spirit of liberty. The spirit of liberty reflects on the errours of princes with sorrow, not with triumph, and is unwilling to aggravate what it wishes had never happened.—In the temper which this spirit inspires therefore, we shall proceed. We shall dwell on no facts, but such as we think uncontroverted; and shall make no reflections, nor draw any consequences from them, but such as arise naturally and without the least force.—The truth would not be so evident, as we presume it is in this case, if any thing more was necessary to the illustration of it.

* Diodor. Sic. l. 2, c. 3.

Among the many advantages which king James had, on his accession to the throne of England, we might very justly reckon the recent example of his predecessor. Her penetration discovered the consequences of that great change in the balance of property, of which we have spoken in letters XI and XII; and she accommodated at once the whole system of her government to it, as we have there observed.—Whatever doubts she might have entertained, concerning the success of her own measures, before she had experienced the happy effects of them, king James could reasonably entertain none. Experience, as well as reason, pointed out to him the sole principle, on which he could establish his government with advantage, or even with safety; and queen Elizabeth's reign had every year afforded him fresh proofs, that this principle of government, which is easy in the pursuit, is effectual in the end to all the purposes which a good man and a just prince can desire to obtain. But king James paid as little regard to her example, as he did to her memory. In the last respect, he was indecent; in the other, unwise. He boasted most ridiculously of an influence, which he never had, over her councils. Happy would it have been for him, for his family, and for this whole nation, if her example had really had a due influence over his conduct; or, at least, if his example had obtained less influence over the conduct of his successor.—Fraught with learning, not with knowledge; ignorant of the true principles of government; more

a stranger to our constitution by his notions and his habits of thinking, than to our country by his birth; obstinate, though not steady; misled by self opinion, and confirmed in errour by superlative pedantry, king James the first seemed to expect the love, and to demand the obedience of his subjects, purely because the crown had dropped on his head. Whereas queen Elizabeth seemed, both by her declarations and her actions, to think herself entitled to the first, and secure of the last, for no other reason than this; because she wore the crown to the greatest advantage of her people. Her good sense taught her what he had not found in his books; that the ties between prince and people are not the same with those between particular persons in private life. These persons converse and live familiarly together. Natural sympathies therefore, more easily to be felt than described, may unite them without the motives of gratitude, or expectation. Those common good offices, which the heart alone suggests, are often sufficient to maintain such unions; and a man, who is neither a saint, nor a hero, may hope to find and keep a friend. But publick, or political, or state-friendship, by which we mean an intimate and affectionate union between the governour and the governed, cannot be contracted without gratitude, or expectation, nor maintained without both. If it could; if subjects were attached to their prince by a kind of instinct, as hard to be accounted for, and yet as prevalent as the sympathies we have mentioned; the assertors of the divine right of

princes, and of the universal obedience due to them, would have had long ago a more plausible argument than they have yet produced, in favour of their doctrines. They would have been able to stop the mouths of all gainsayers; even of him who required a miracle to become their convert; and who resolved never to believe, that slavery was of divine institution, till he beheld "subjects born with bunches on their backs, like "camels, and kings with combs on their heads, "like cocks;" from which marks it might be collected, that the former were designed to labour and to suffer, and the latter to strut and to crow. But till some such miracle is wrought, or the instinct supposed above is born with men, we think it will remain true, that the union we speak of, between prince and people, neither can, nor ought to subsist on any other terms, than those of good government on one part, and of gratitude and expectation on the other.—This union may be, and hath been, maintained by absolute princes with their people; because it is not impossible that an absolute prince should be a wise and good man; and because some such there have been. But here lies a difference. The absolute monarch may exert the whole power of the state. He may govern easily, safely, and with all other advantages, though he neglects to cultivate this union; or, which is worse, though he breaks it. But the case of a limited monarch is not the same, for the reasons which we touched upon, at the end of our last letter. It is therefore the immediate,

the

the personal, the highest interest of such a prince, as it is the duty of every prince, to contract this union, and to maintain it inviolate. The wisdom of our constitution hath made it so; and, in making it so hath imitated that divine wisdom, which appears in the consitution of the moral world. In this, it may be easily proved from a consideration of the circumstances in which we stand as individuals, that the general good of society is the particular interest of every member. Our Creator designed therefore, that we should promote this general good. It is by consequence our duty to do so; and every man, who believes a wise, all-directing mind, and who knows that proportioning of means to ends is essential to wisdom, must subscribe to this opinion.—And yet, determined by false appearances of good, or attracted by the force of immediate objects, men may, and they frequently do, imagine that they pursue their particular and separate interest, while they neglect or act against the general and common interest of society.

In like manner, king James the first, and those princes who have trod in his steps, imagined no doubt that they pursued a particular, separate interest of their own, while they neglected a union with their people, and even made such a union impracticable, by transgressing, in pretensions and in fact, the bounds which our consitution prescribed to them. But the mistake is equal in both cases; for in both cases, interest and duty remain indivisibly united, however they may be separated

separated in opinion; and he who sins against one, sins most certainly against the other; though the natural consequences of his actions do not appear immediately, nor on every occasion, to follow.

These consequences followed in a signal and terrible manner upon the occasions which we have mentioned, and into the particulars of which we shall descend some other time. These examples therefore are complete. The causes and the effects come together under one view; and if we carry our observations forward to later times, we shall see causes of the same kind laid again, and producing effects of the same nature; effects always proportionable to them; sometimes jealousy, discontent, tumult; sometimes open resistance, and deposition of the prince; for though, in all these cases, the people have suffered, as well as the prince; yet in some, the prince alone hath been undone; and thus, by an equal distribution of justice, the principal share of the common calamity hath fallen on him, without whom no part of it could have happened.

Though these general reflections, which we have premised, may appear long to some of our readers, and may seem too nearly allied to reflections already made; yet we hope for indulgence, on account of the importance of the matter. It must surely be of use to explain very clearly, and very fully, from whence the weakness of our government at some times, and the disorders and revolutions of it at others, have proceeded since that æra,

æra, when our liberties became better secured, and our constitution capable of greater improvements, by a new settlement of the balance of property and power. No point hath been more mistaken. None hath been more artfully misrepresented.

LETTER XVIII.

WE have observed already of how great advantage the example of queen Elizabeth might have been to king James the first. It might have taught him to struggle through the most intricate difficulties. But he had none such to encounter, till he created them by his own management.—On the contrary, his accession to the throne of England was accompanied with all the favourable circumstances of ease and security, which were necessary to form a conjuncture proper for him; so that with abilities, much inferior to those of his predecessor, he might have reigned as gloriously abroad, and as happily at home.—Many of the difficulties and dangers which surrounded her, were personal to her. They arose from her birth: from her title; and from that which Mary queen of Scotland pretended. They therefore ceased with her. Many others she conquered by a wise and steady administration. Many had been worn out by length of time; and many had been so changed by the course of events, that king James was safe, where she was most in danger; and strong, where she was weakest.—His title was not contested; nor any opposition, either open or secret, given to his succession. They who had sounded so high the right of his mother, could not refuse to acknowledge the same right

right in him; and the rest of the nation submitted to it; for how little regard soever many of them might pay to this right in their hearts, or how great suspicion soever of his future conduct might be justly infused into them by his past behaviour, the people would have a king, and there was no other prince, in whom the protestant interest could unite at that time.—That riddle of a plot, in which sir Walter Raleigh was involved, does not deserve to be mentioned, as an exception to the national unanimity we speak of.—True it is, that, in other respects, the nation was far from being united, either by a conformity of opinion, or by an acquiescence of those who differed from the establishment.—It was, no doubt, a severe misfortune, and such it continues to this very hour, that the great and glorious work of the reformation, being carried on at different times, and in different places, was carried on likewise without a general concert. The several churches reformed themselves, according to the different circumstances they were in, and according to the different characters of the few, who led the many in each of them. The separation of them all from the church of Rome was intire; but, in some, it was thought proper to reform; in others to alter the whole model; in some, many things were retained, which had been in practice before the reformation; in others a total opposition to every instance of conformity with the church of Rome seemed to be the sole standard of christian purity.—This variety of opinions and establishments among the reformed

reformed was a great evil in itself; but this evil was aggravated by a circumstance of the most fatal consequence. The reformers, and especially those who came latest, as our excellent Mr. Hooker* observes, by enforcing too peremptorily their particular modes of reformation, brought the people in many cases to receive and respect, as divine laws, even those orders and that discipline, which expediency or other political motives had suggested. Now, the natural tendency of this persuasion was not only to render all comprehension or reconciliation among the reformed churches impracticable; but to make the divisions, in any particular church, incurable.—Thus, when queen Elizabeth completed that establishment of a church, which Edward the sixth had begun, many dissented from it; and the scruples of private conscience were pleaded against submission to the publick authority of the state.—If regard had been paid to all who petitioned the queen, or admonished the parliament, in the heat of these times, it seems probable, that no establishment at all could have been made, and if none had been made, an ecclesiastical anarchy must have ensued.—How far the number of separatists might have been lessened by more compliances with the learned and moderate among them, for such there certainly were, we shall neither presume to determine, nor go about to inquire. It is sufficient for present purpose to observe, that although these seeds of disturbance had been sowed before the accession of king James; yet

* Eccl. Polity, pref.

no

no disturbance had happened, nor was any likely to happen at that time. The measures which had been pursued, and the temper which had been observed in queen Elizabeth's reign, tended to diminish the religious opposition by a slow, a gentle, and for that very reason an effectual progression; and, in the meanwhile, to prevent such consequences of it as might disorder or weaken the government.—By the laws which were made, the several dissenting sects were discouraged and kept in awe; but by the execution of these laws, they were not exasperated. They were punished, not provoked. They felt the weight of the government, as often as they attempted to disturb it, but they never felt the oppression of party; and when they were treated like factions, they had not the pretence to complain, that they were treated so by a faction.—Upon this foot there was even room to hope, that when the first fire of these men's zeal was spent, reasonable terms of union with the established church might be accepted by such of them as were not intoxicated with fanaticism. Such as these were friends to order, though they disputed about it, and could have the less pretence to reject with obstinacy that which had been settled by queen Eilzabeth, because they knew that their own discipline had been established where it prevailed, as the church of England had been by the supreme authority; that it had been made a law of the country; that the people had been bound by oath to the maintenance of it; and that Calvin himself had been a most

a most rigorous exactor of conformity to it.—If such as these had been once incorporated with the established church, the remaining sectaries would have been of little moment, either for numbers, or reputation; and the very means, which were proper to gain these, were likewise the most effectual to hinder the increase of them, and of the other sectaries in the meantime.—Upon the whole matter, we think it plain, that king James the first, beside the advantage of coming to the crown after all the difficulties and dangers of completing the reformation and establishing a new church were over, had an easy and secure opportunity of preventing any bad consequences, which might be apprehended from the divisions of his protestant subjects; and that the improvement of this opportunity consisted in giving neither alarm to the well-affected, nor pretence to the factious.

The designs of the Roman catholick party, against the constitution in church and state, were carried on with as much rage, but not with as much strength as ever. The hydra heads, which sprouted continually out of that body in the former reign, had been lopped so often, that they appeared more rarely; and if the venom of that principle which produced them was not abated; yet many of the springs, which fed and nourished it, were exhausted. The Guises, Mary queen of Scotland, Philip the second, were dead. The reformation was established; not only in outward form, but in the hearts of men. It was grown up to be a part, and a favourite part, of the constitution

tion. The spirit of liberty had blended our civil and religious rights together, and was become equally jealous of both. Let us add, for we may add it with great justice, that the church of England was, by the sobriety, wisdom, and sanctity of her institution, established on a rock; that this rock was defended by the greatset number of excellent men, which any christian church could boast of: and from all this let us conclude, that as she was able to resist the attacks of those sects, which private conceit, mistaken zeal, some enthusiasm, and perhaps some faction had nursed up in her own bosom; so she was better able than any other protestant church to defend herself, and the state too, against the fallacies, the seductions, and the violence of Rome. The policy of this court saw it, and neglected nothing to prevent the consequences. Seminaries had been erected at Doway and other places abroad, for the education of English youth in popery. Gregory the thirteenth had given the direction of that, which was erected at Rome, to the Jesuists; and upon that occasion these incendiaries crept into England. If we may believe some accounts, they mingled themselves among the clergy of the church of England and the puritan ministers. That they took all methods to foment our divisions is probable; and that they were not men, who would stick at any, may be certainly collected from that account of their conduct here, and of the doctrines they taught, which is contained in the com-

plaints exhibited against them by the rest of the popish clergy*.

Thus was the spirit of the church and court of Rome kept up here, even at the time of the accession of king James; a spirit, which might serve to bring about an assassination, or any barbarous and desperate stroke, like that of the gunpowder-treason, which a few enthusiasts were capable of executing; but not to subvert the reformation, and introduce popery anew. The efforts of this party now were like the last convulsions of a strong body, mortally wounded; frightful to behold; sufficient to hurt others; but tokens of death, not symptoms of recovery.—King James had it therefore in his power to keep down with ease a party, which queen Elizabeth had subdued with pain; and whatever impression the bloody designs they had often formed, and sometimes brought to effect, might make on his mind; certain it was, and the event made that certainty undeniable, that no degree of favour to them, except the utmost, could effectually secure him against their attempts; and that the least degree of favour shown, or encouragement given them, would be productive of the greatest national mischief.

We have dwelt longer on these points of religious divisions, because we think a clear and just notion of them absolutely necessary to fix a right opinion, concerning one of the principal causes, which were laid in this reign, of all the national

* Thuan. lib. 126.

calamities

calamities that followed.—We shall mention the other advantages which attended king James the first, as briefly as we can; not because they were small, for, on the contrary, they were exceedingly great; but because they are more notorious, and have no need of being so much developed, in order to be made sensible.

Thus, for instance, the different condition in which he found the navy, the commerce, and the wealth of the nation, as well as the revenues of the crown, from that in which queen Elizabeth had found them all at her accession, is known in general by every one who hath dipped into history. Without entering into more particulars therefore than we have done already, we may venture to conclude that he reaped the benefit of her economy, and was a rich, as well as a powerful king. We know very well that when the session of parliament was opened by commission in 1610, by the earls of Suffolk and Salisbury, one of the reasons urged, for demanding money of the commons, was grounded on a debt of queen Elizabeth, which was said to have absorbed three hundred and fifty thousand pounds, due on the last subsidies granted to her. If this fact was true, all that resulted from it is; first, that queen Elizabeth left a mortgage on the lands of the crown, and money enough to discharge it; secondly, that king James parted with his money to recover his lands; and we shall not oppose any person, who will charitably believe, that this prince would have paid the debts of his predecessor, though

they had not been thus secured, out of the money she left in her coffers; because to have done otherwise, would have been a manifest violation of all the rules of religion, honour, and common morality. But we much doubt whether even this averment of the lords, who opened the session, will have any great weight, when it shall be considered, that their whole discourse was too ministerial to be sincere; and that some of the reasons, by which they accounted for the king's want of money, such, for instance, as the charge of protecting his wife and children from being robbed on the road to London, were really burlesque.

The advantages which this prince had in the situation of foreign affairs, both at his accession to the throne, and during the greatest part of his reign, were remarkably great; and we doubt whether it is possible to find more than one conjuncture equally favourable since that time.—Philip the third was on the throne of Spain; a prince of small capacity, and less application; governed by his favourite, and his favourite detested by the people. Before the end of king James's reign he died; and Philip the fourth, his son, succeeded; a youth of sixteen years old, and governed as absolutely by Olivarez, as his father had been by the duke of Lerma. The declension of the Spanish monarchy hastened on apace, under these princes. It is said that Philip the third refused to support the Roman-catholick party, in the beginning of the reign of king James; which is the more probable, on account of the early and precipitate steps

made

made by this prince toward a peace with Spain. The defeat of don John d'Aquila in Ireland, and the intire reduction of Tyrone, which happened a little before the death of queen Elizabeth, discouraged the Spaniards from making any more attempts of that kind. They turned their eyes from these islands to the continent; to the Low Countries and to Germany, where they continued, during the course of many years, to consume their remains of strength, in abetting the ambitious projects of that branch of the house of Austria.

As king James had nothing to apprehend from the enmity of Spain, so he was secure of the friendship of France. Henry the fourth was now established on that throne. He was in peace indeed with Spain, but intended not to be so long. We are very far from believing, that this prince could seriously entertain so chimerical a project as that of making an intire new settlement of Europe, by dividing it into fifteen states, which Perefixe and other authors have related, upon the faith of the compilers of Sully's memoirs; but, without doubt, he had great views of checking the ambition, and reducing the power of the house of Austria. It was therefore his interest to live well with the king of Great Britain; and accordingly he sent the marquis of Rosny, afterward duke of Sully, to renew the treaties with king James, as soon almost as this prince was seated on the throne of England. When Henry the fourth was stabbed by Ravaillac, a minority followed in France, and the counsels of that court were for many years

chiefly employed about their own affairs; so that nothing could happen on that side, even after this great change, to give the least disturbance to king James.

The states of the Low Countries were no longer in the same distressed condition. Their commonwealth had taken form; their naval force was increasing; and their commerce extending itself every day. Ostend kept the Spanish forces at bay for more than three years; and when Spinola made himself master of that heap of ruins, the Dutch thought themselves sufficiently recompensed by the acquisition which they had made, in the mean time, of Sluyce and other important places. The truce of eight months between Spain and the States was signed in 1607. It was prolonged afterward; and in the year 1609, the truce of twelve years was concluded at Antwerp; by which the king of Spain was forced to acknowledge the liberty and independency of the United Provinces. Thus was that commonwealth established, to be a great and lasting accession of strength to the protestant interest; and king James might have reaped the benefit of a useful alliance, where queen Elizabeth had no other advantage than that of defending the oppressed, and diverting the forces of a common enemy.

The affairs of the North, indeed, were in great confusion about the same time. The crown of Sweden belonged to Sigismund in course of descent; but Sigismund was a papist, and king of Poland. For both these reasons, he had been excluded, and

his

his uncle Charles preferred to the throne by the states of Sweden; who provided, by the act of settlement, not only that their kings should be of the religion of the country, but that none of the princes of the royal family should accept another crown, nor any foreign dominions. Their experience, it seems, had shown them the necessity of such limitations. This gave occasion to those long and cruel wars, which followed between Sweden and Poland. Others succeeded between Sweden and Denmark; but the scene of them all was so remote, and the interests of this country so absolutely unconcerned in the events of them, that he, who should have advised king James to take any part in them, would have passed, in those days, for a very bad politician.

The indolent Rodolphus slept on the throne of the empire till the year 1614. His brother Matthias succeeded him; and their cousin Ferdinand succeeded Matthias. During the reign of Rodolphus, there were troubles in Hungary, in Transilvania, in Bohemia, and in several parts of the empire. Most of them were caused, all of them were fomented, by religious divisions. During the reign of Matthias, these troubles increased. They grew up to maturity, as the accession of Ferdinand to the empire approached. The Bohemians, long oppressed, and long provoked, took arms at last in 1618. Many causes conspired to render all accommodation impracticable. Among the principal were the designs, which all the branches of the house of Austria had laid and

begun to execute against liberty and the protestant religion in Germany; the character of Ferdinand, violent, cruel, a bigot, though artful; and, to speak impartially, the ambition of Frederick, elector Palatine. If this ambition had been the sole motive to engage king James in these quarrels, we must think that he could not have answered to his own people the engaging in them, as popular as the Palatine, his wife, and his cause were in England. But these quarrels were of another importance. Frederick lost not only the crown of Bohemia, but his own patrimony. The protestant religion, and the liberty of Germany were well nigh sacrificed to the bigotry and ambition of the emperor; so that the interest of this nation, as well as the king's family interest, was very much concerned to prevent these consequences; and yet, even upon this foot, we must likewise think that it would not have been long popular in those days, when the memory of queen Elizabeth's policy was fresh in the minds of men, to have maintained great armies on the continent, and to have fed with subsidies so many hungry princes, who had, at least in the beginning, nothing less at heart than the common interest.

This difficult and dangerous situation of affairs on the continent, in which we allow that king James ought to have taken some part, may be thought, perhaps, to form an exception to what hath been said, concerning those circumstances of advantage, of ease, and security, which accompanied the reign of this prince; but there will be

room to think so no longer, when it shall be considered, that king James had time and means to prepare for this critical conjuncture. The distress in foreign affairs began with queen Elizabeth's reign; and she was in danger abroad, before she was settled on her throne at home; but he had reigned near eighteen years before any thing happened on the continent, which could give him a just occasion of acting vigorously in that scene. Besides, when this occasion did happen, he had it in his power to have acted with great glory to himself, and effectually for the service of those whom it was his interest to support, without taking any other part than that which becomes a king of England, in opposition to that which becomes a prince on the continent, and agreeably to the principles of his predecessor's conduct. This will appear evidently true, when we come to consider the part he did take; and we shall insist upon it the rather, because we observe with how much affectation the case we are now speaking of, hath been quoted as parallel to the present situation of affairs; and how impertinently it hath been taken for granted, that king James the first was condemned in his own time, and hath been condemned since, for not doing what these time-serving politicians recommend; that is, for entangling himself in the affairs of the empire, as if he had been a prince of the empire; and for not acting on every appearance of danger, or even of inconveniency to any little state of Germany, in such a manner as is agreeable neither to the interest, nor situation of our island.

What

What hath been said may be sufficient to show, how few the difficulties were, compared with the advantages, which king James had to encounter both at home and abroad; and how fortunate a conjuncture was prepared for him by the wisdom of his predecessor, and by a happy combination of circumstances.—What use he made of these advantages, what conduct he held, and what consequences it had, must be the subject of another discourse.

LETTER XIX.

BY what hath been said, in former letters, we think it appears, that from the time our constitution settled on the foundation on which it remains still, there hath been not only no possibility of governing this nation with strength and dignity, without the concurrence of the people in their representative body, nor with ease and safety without their concurrence in their collective body; but that this concurrence hath depended, and does and must always depend, on the union of interest and affection between the king and his subjects.

We beg leave to repeat, that queen Elizabeth saw this to be a sure, and the only sure principle on which she could establish her government under such a constitution; that she very wisely took the government on the terms of the constitution, and the constitution as she found it; that instead of struggling through trouble and danger to bend the constitution to any particular notions or views of her own, she accommodated her notions, her views, and her whole character to it.—Let us observe, by the way, that this is no more than what every prince ought to do; and what every free people will expect and exact too, if need be, that he should do. He is made for their sakes, not they for his. He is raised to maintain, not to alter the constitution.

Now king James begun and continued, through the

the whole course of his reign, to govern without any regard to this principle; nay, in absolute defiance of it. He chose other expedients of government, and trusted to so many broken reeds. Without any talents to procure the esteem, he awakened the jealousy and never courted the good-will of his people; but, instead of it, endeavoured to instil into their minds what was rooted in his own, a very good opinion of himself, and a very mean opinion of them. He endeavoured to persuade men, who felt that the balance of property was on their side, and that they held a great share of the supreme power in their hands, that though they had this property, yet they had no right, or a very precarious one, to this power. He meant, by the force of new-fangled opinions, to attach the nation to him as queen Elizabeth had done by the ties of affection and confidence; or he meant to govern without the concurrence of the nation; or he meant nothing. The first was chimerical; the second was wicked, and the third was stupid.—Elizabeth had been jealous of her prerogative, but moderate in the exercise of it. Wiser James imagined, that the higher he carried it, and the more rigorously he exerted it, the more strongly he should be seated in his throne. He mistook the weight for the strength of a sceptre; and did not consider, that it is never so likely to slip, or to be wrenched out of a prince's hands, as when it is heaviest. He never reflected, that prerogative is of the nature of a spring, which by much straining will certainly relax and often break;

break; that in one case it becomes of little, and the other of no use at all.

As absurd as the notions and principles of government were, by which king James hoped to establish his authority, he found numbers to adopt them; for numbers are at all times liable to be deceived, ready to be tempted, and prone to be corrupted.—New systems of law and policy were not only received but propagated. Some men were heated by opposition. Others were educated in prejudice. The plainest rights of the people were called in question. The least justifiable pretensions of the crown were established as true axioms of government, and certain principles of the English constitution. What father Paul observes to have happened in the church, happened here in the state. Our court, like that of Rome, by affirming and denying boldly, and by insisting peremptorily, brought many things to be received as certain, which had been never proved, and many others to be looked on as problematical, which had been often demonstrated. Thus were those divisions created, which could alone render the others fatal. Disputes about the use of the surplice, or the cross in baptism, would not have unsheathed all the swords in the nation. Puritanism neither did, nor could make such deadly wounds; but when they were once made, puritanism festered in the sore, and rendered them mortal. King James conjured up, by using tricks of government, that storm in which his successor perished. His successor, for we will finish the sketch

sketch we have begun, a religious and a just prince, came a partyman to the throne. His prejudices, confirmed by habit, fortified by the flattery of his courtiers, and provoked by the opposition which his father and he met with, carried him to continue an invasion on the people's rights, while he imagined himself only concerned in the defence of his own. The faction of the court tainted the nation, and gave life and strength, if it did not give being to the factions in the state. If the spirit of liberty could have prevailed in time against the first, there had been no danger from the others. But the long and obstinate resistance of the first gave time and opportunity and even assistance to the others to extinguish this spirit. Cavaliers and Roundheads divided the nation, like Yorkists and Lancastrians. No other option was left at last. To reconcile these disputes by treaty became impracticable, when neither side would trust the other. To terminate them by the sword, was to fight, not for preserving the constitution, but for the manner of destroying it. The constitution might have been destroyed, under pretence of prerogative. It was destroyed under pretence of liberty. We might have fallen under absolute monarchy. We fell into absolute anarchy. The sum of all is this. We were destroyed by faction; but faction prevailed at court near forty years before it prevailed among the people. It was the original principle on one side. It was an accident on the other. Churchmen and royalists attacked the constitution. Puritans and

commonwealths-men, and, above all, a motley race of precise knaves and enthusiastick madmen, ruined it. But the last could never have happened, if the first had not; and whoever will dispassionately trace the causes of that detestable civil war, will find them laid in the conduct of king James the first, as early as his accession to the throne of England.

Having given this general idea of the two reigns which followed that of queen Elizabeth, it is time to examine whether this idea of them can be supported by a series of uncontroverted facts.—Let us descend into some particulars.

" A prince, that is invited, or comes newly to " a kingdom," says Wilson, " must have his cha- " riot wheels smooth shod;" and surely if ever prince had motives and an opportunity to render himself popular, king James had both. Essex, Southampton, and others, even Cecil, a principal minister of the late queen, had held a correspondence with him, for their own private interest; but the millions who submitted to his accession, submitted to it upon trust, and were determined by the nature of the conjuncture, not by any knowledge of the persons who composed this new royal family. It was not therefore enough for them to be placed in and about the throne. Their true interest required that the hearts of the people should be gained to them; and that popularity should supply that spirit in their favour, which seldom fails to operate in favour of those princes, who are born and bred among the people

people they are to govern. The opportunity of doing this lay fairly before king James. He was received with transports of joy, and all ranks of men made their court to him.—If he looked on this national behaviour, for so it was, to be the effect of a desire in the people to endear themselves to him, and to unite closely with him; this should have suggested to his mind the ease with which he might acquire popularity, by improving the disposition, and captivate the good-will of a people, so desirous to be pleased with their king. If he looked on this national behaviour as the effect of levity, inconstancy, and love of change, it should have taught him to apprehend how soon this honey-moon would pass away; how soon the stream of popular favour might turn against him; and how soon they, who seemed to have forgot queen Elizabeth, might return to regret her.—But that which a Scotsman foretold, happened. This behaviour of the English spoiled a good king; or made a bad king worse. It was natural for a vain man to believe what his flatterers told him, and what he, his own greatest flatterer, told himself; that these applauses and transports of the people were due to his eminent merit, and were a homage paid for the honour he did them in accepting their crown.—He took therefore much state. He did not indeed make his journey, as Henry the seventh made his entry into London, in a close chariot; but he forbid by proclamation the concourse of the people to him*. "He dispersed

* Wilson.

"them

" them with frowns, that we may not say with " curses."—Such different turns of thought can vanity inspire. Some will be respected, like eastern monarchs, unseen within the shrine of their court. Others grow fond of publick triumphs; delight in noisy acclamations; and are pleased to drive, like Indian pagods, over a prostrate crowd.

As much as king James neglected to gain the publick, even at the cheap price of affability, he sunk into low familiarity with his favourites, and was profuse of riches and honours to particular men. He bestowed, at first on a few, and afterward on one man, that affection which he had promised the whole nation, in some of the plausible, commonplace discourses which he held at certain times. There is no need of mentioning the particular instances of a profusion he acknowledged himself. The estates he gave to his courtiers impoverished the crown; and, as it always happens, the people were forced to pay for those very grants, at which they murmured. Honours he bestowed in so lavish a manner, and with so little distinction, that they ceased, in some sense, to be honours. To know the British nobility, it was become almost necessary to have nomenclators, like those who attended the candidates at Rome, to tell them the names of the citizens. The jest went so far, that an advertisement of " an art to help weak memories to " a competent knowledge of the names of the " nobility," was pasted up at Paul's*.

* Wilson.

Thus king James began, and thus he continued his reign. That experience, which he said in his first speech to his parliament would teach him not to be so easily and lightly moved in granting, taught him nothing. What a contrast does this conduct make with the affability of queen Elizabeth; with the œconomy and reserve she used, in disposing of her treasure, and in conferring honours?—But king James stood in need of helps, to the want of which she was superior. "A good government," says one of our writers, "makes a good people." When a prince hath turned the spirit of a nation in his favour, he need not be solicitous about gaining particular men; but when he hath turned this spirit against him, he must employ all arts, even the lowest, to detach particular men from the body of the people, and to make them act by motives of private interest against the publick sense. This is faction; and therefore whenever a court is industrious to seduce, to inveigle, to corrupt particular men, we may securely conclude, without waiting for any other sign, that such an administration stands on a factious, not on a national bottom.—But to return to king James.

While he neglected the affection and sought the reverence of the publick, he lost one, and was disappointed of the other. His private and his publick character both fell into contempt. Learning was the part upon which he valued himself. This he affected more than became a king, and broached, on every occasion, in such a manner

as would have misbecome a schoolmaster. His pedantry was too much even for the age in which he lived. It would be tedious to quote the part he took in the conference at Hampton Court; and in the theological wrangles between the Gomarists and Arminians; or to go about to prove, by some instances, what appeared in all his words and actions; what is universally allowed; and what the unkingly volume he left behind him testifies.—Let us only observe, that the ridicule which arose from hence, and which fixed on him, was just; because the merit of a chief governor is wisely to superintend the whole, and not to shine in any inferiour class; because different and, in some cases perhaps, opposite talents, both natural and acquired, are necessary to move, and to regulate the movements of the machine of government; in short, because as a good adjutant may make a very bad general; so a great reader, and writer too, may be a very ignorant king.

There were many other circumstances, which concurred to lessen this prince in the eyes of his subjects and of all mankind; as we shall have occasion to observe frequently in the course of these remarks:—In the mean time, we shall observe here, that the state he affected, and the pompous titles he was fond of, served to render his pusillanimity, which, with his vanity, made up the main of his character, more conspicuous, and his person by consequence more contemptible. —The hostilities between the English and Spaniards continued, when queen Elizabeth died.

This great queen, not content to have done herself and her subjects justice, on many signal occasions, put it likewise into their power to do themselves justice, by granting letters of reprisal on the subjects of Spain. King James was so fond of peace, that is, so afraid of war, that without staying to be solicited on this head, or to be complimented on his accession to the throne by the king of Spain, he revoked these letters in a few weeks after he came into England. He disarmed his subjects, before he had provided for their better security. He stopped them in the course of doing themselves justice, before he was sure of obtaining reparation for their past losses. The impressions, which such a proceeding must make on the minds of a trading people, are easily felt. He, who had revoked these letters in such a manner, was not likely to grant them on any other occasion. What protection therefore, and much less what encouragement to trade could be expected from a prince, who began his reign by sacrificing this, the most valuable interest of his people, to a foreign and hostile nation; to the mean arts of false policy, and even to his fears? —Again; one of the first embassies, which king James sent abroad, was that of the earl of Hertford to Brussels. A Dutch man of war, meeting the ship which carried the ambassador, refused to strike*; and having offered this affront to the

* N. B. This fact stands in history, as it is here related; but having looked into sir William Monson's naval tracts, we find

the united crosses, which had never been offered to that of St. George, went off with impunity. It is said that the ambassador hindered the captain from asserting the honour of the British flag. But two things are certain; one, that queen Elizabeth would have severely punished her officer, and have exacted ample reparation from the States General; the other, that king James did neither. This commonwealth had been raised by queen Elizabeth, and was still in want of the

find it differently told. He says nothing of striking or not striking the flag; but confesses that an affront was offered by two Dutch men of war. He adds, that he sent for the captains on board his ship; that he threatened to right himself upon them; but that he dismissed them at the intreaty of my lord Hertford, on their excusing themselves, and promising to punish the offenders. How severely these offenders were punished may be collected from hence. "One of these captains," says sir William Monson, "was he, who since that time committed "a foul murder upon his majesty's subjects in Ireland, that "were under protection."—If we had no other proofs of the indignities offered to our nation by the Dutch, from the time of the accession of king James the first, than the memorials of this gentleman, they would be sufficient. He complains of these indignities very much, and mentions several. In this very tract he affirms, that the Hollanders took and burnt our ships, and murdered our men, for trading to the ports of Flanders, while they suffered their own countrymen, even in our sight, to trade thither. The truth is, that our nation was insulted with impunity, during this pacific reign, not only in Europe, but in every other part of the world; not only by the Dutch, but by other nations; and that our government fell from the highest esteem into the lowest contempt. If therefore the instance we have quoted should be disputed on the representation of this fact by sir William Monson, a hundred others, and several of them more flagrant, might be soon produced.

support of England. The sovereignty of her state had not been yet acknowledged by any of the powers of Europe. How much the pacific temper of king James was capable of bearing had not yet become so apparent, as he made it in the course of his reign. From all which it is easy to collect, that if he had demanded satisfaction, he must and would have received it. But the good prince was afraid, where no fear was, and bore dishonourably what he might have resented safely; nay, what he ought to have resented in any circumstances, and at any hazard. We are not to wonder if so poor a conduct as this soon brought king James into contempt, mingled with indignation, among a people, eagerly bent on commerce, and in whom high notions of honour and a gallant spirit had been infused by the example of queen Elizabeth, and encouraged during the whole course of a long reign.

These things, and several others of the same kind, which I omit, might however have been borne. The ridicule might have appeared less in the eyes of men accustomed to it. The other faults might have been excused, or softened at least, by hopes of amendment. But there are some things behind, which no excuse would alleviate, nor any patience endure. We shall now bring them forward, and shall speak of them under three heads.—The pretensions set up, and the attempts made against the freedom of this constitution.—The management of parties.—The conduct of our national interests abroad, against the sense of the nation.

LETTER XX.

A Fundamental principle, on which king James affected to establish his authority, was that of an hereditary right to the crown. This sacred right, according to the political creed which he imposed, was not to be contested, much less to be set aside; and yet this sacred right was a mere chimæra; contradicted by the general tenour of custom from the Norman invasion to his time; by the declared sense of his immediate predecessors; by many solemn proceedings of parliament; and by the express terms of law.—Two families (for the race of Plantagenet was grafted on the Norman race, and they may be reckoned properly as one) had furnished, indeed, all our kings; but this constituted no hereditary right. When a prince of the royal family, but in a degree remote from the succession, comes to the crown, in prejudice of the next heir, hereditary right is violated as really as it would be, if an absolute stranger to this family succeeded. Such a prince may have another, and we think a better right; that for instance, which is derived from a settlement of the crown, made by the authority of parliament; but to say he hath an hereditary right, is the grossest abuse of words imaginable. This we think so plain, that we should be ashamed to go about to prove it; and yet there are men, in

this age of paradoxes, either dull enough, or prostitute enough, to assert hereditary right, even in the case above-mentioned.

Our kings of the Norman race were so far from succeeding as next heirs to one another, and in a regular course of descent, that no instance can be produced of the next heir's succeeding, which is not preceded and followed by instances of the next heir's being set aside.—Thus Edward the first succeeded his father Henry the third; but his father Henry the third and his grandfather John had both been raised to the throne in plain defiance of hereditary right; the right of Arthur, nephew to John, and the right of Arthur's sister, cousin-german to Henry.—Edward the second succeeded his father Edward the first; but Edward the third deposed Edward the second; the parliament renounced all allegiance to him; and Edward the third held the crown by a parliamentary title, as much as William the third.—If we go up higher than this æra, or descend lower, we shall find the examples uniform. Examples, sufficient to countenance this pretension of hereditary right to the crown of England, are to be found no where.—But we hasten to king James; who raised, or, if you please, revived this pretension, so needlessly for himself, and so very unprofitably for his posterity.

The British race began in Henry the seventh; and from him alone king James derived that right, which he asserted in such pompous terms; that undoubted right to the throne, as he called it in his

his first speech to parliament, which God, by birthright and lineal descent, had in fulness of time provided for him. Now surely, if ever any prince came to the crown without the least colour of hereditary right, it was Henry the seventh. He had no pretence to it, even as heir of the house of Lancaster. His wife might have some, as heir of the house of York; though her hereditary title was not free from objections, which the character of Edward the fourth rendered probable; but the title of his wife had no regard paid to it either by him, or the parliament, in making this new settlement. He gained the crown by the good-will of the people. He kept it by the confirmation of parliament, and by his own ability. The notional union of the two roses was a much better expedient for quiet than foundation of right. It took place in Henry the eighth; it was continued in his successors; and this nation was willing it should continue in king James and his family. But neither Henry the eighth, nor his son Edward the sixth, who might have done so with much better grace, laid the same stress on hereditary right as king James did. One of them had recourse to parliament on every occasion, where the succession to the crown was concerned; and the other made no scruple of giving the crown by will to his cousin, in prejudice of his sister's right. This right, however, such as it was, prevailed; but the authority of parliament was called in aid by Mary, to remove the objection of illegitimacy, which lay against it.

Elizabeth

Elizabeth had so little concern about hereditary right, that she neither held, nor desired to hold her crown by any other tenure than the statute of the thirty-fifth of her father's reign. In the thirteenth of her own reign, she declared it by law high treason, during her life, and a præmunire after her decease, to deny the power of parliament, in limiting and binding the descent and inheritance of the crown, or the claims to it; and whatever private motives there were for putting to death Mary, queen of Scotland, her claiming a right, in opposition to an act of parliament, was the foundation of the publick proceedings against her.

Such examples, as we have quoted, ought to have some weight with king James. A prince who had worn the crown of Scotland, under so many restraints, and in so great penury, might have contented himself, one would think, to hold that of England, whose pensioner he had been, by the same tenure, and to establish his authority on the same principles that had contented the best and greatest of his predecessors; but his designs were as bad as those of the very worst princes who went before him.

Happily for Great Britain, he wanted the capacity of Henry the seventh; the resolution of Henry the eighth; and the favourable opportunities which they had the luck to find, or the art to contrive, of raising prerogative, acquiring wealth, and encroaching on liberty.

We observed, in discoursing on the reign of Henry the seventh, that he had laid the founda-

tions

tions of an exorbitant power, before the nation was well aware of what he intended.—King James, on the contrary, showed his whole game from the first. Beside the pleasure, which his vanity found in boasting of an absolute, independent right to the crown, inherent in himself, he imagined that the transition would be easy, and so indeed it proved among many, from this to some other useful apophthegms. He hoped to get, and he did get, an act of recognition of his right of succession; for we cannot persuade ourselves, with Rapin, that he was indifferent on this point: and though this act, as well as the oath of supremacy, which had been established long before, and that of allegiance, which was established soon after, is in itself, as it hath proved in effect, but a feeble prop to support the pretence of hereditary right; yet king James certainly looked on it as an admission of his claim, and meant a real advantage, where the parliament very probably meant nothing more than a compliment.—This prince brought with him the true spirit of a missionary; and, by preaching a new doctrine, endeavoured to establish a new power. From the notion of independent right was deduced the notion of independent authority; a right superior to law; an authority unbounded by it; a right, which could not be proved; an authority, which might not be defined.—The inference from both these was obvious. This independent king must be accountable to God alone. He could not be accountable to man.

If

If this excellent system of policy could have been generally imposed, his sacred majesty might have battened, with great ease and delight, in the full sunshine of arbitrary power; and that he should succeed in imposing it, his own vanity and the servile flattery of his ministers had made him to expect. True it is, that the language he held was not so plain, nor the efforts he made so direct and violent, in the beginning of his reign, as they grew soon afterward; but yet, if we consider the multitude of his proclamations; the nature of some; the style of all; the obedience he exacted to them; the acts of power which he exercised; those which he essayed; and many other particulars of his conduct, which for brevity we omit; we must of course conclude, that he thought himself sure, at that time, of laying the foundations, since he prepared to erect so great a superstructure. He was deceived. Instead of making his impositions pass on the people, he only awakened their jealousy. He had, in his own age, and he hath, in ours, the demerit of beginning a struggle between prerogative and privilege; and of establishing a sort of warfare between the prince and the people. But the spirit of liberty baffled all his designs. The spirit of liberty was not enervated by luxury in those days. It was not only alive, but vigorous and active. It rose in the nation, as that of faction rose at court. The same principle which complied with queen Elizabeth, resisted king James. The opposition began as soon as the invasion; and tyranny was, at least, nipped in the bud.

King

King James made one attempt, indeed, in the beginning of his reign, which bid fairer for success than any of those which he made afterward; and which, if it had succeeded, would have done the great work of his reign, by means more silent and more dangerous; more soft in appearance, and more deadly in effect. We mean the attempt he made on the privileges of the house of commons, in the case of elections. In the proclamation for calling his first parliament, he assumed a new and unjustifiable prerogative, by his manner of prescribing to the electors and to the elected; and by subjecting both to severe penalties, if they failed, not only against the laws and statutes, but against the purport, effect, and true meaning of his proclamation. In the course of the session, he endeavoured to put this prerogative in execution, by insisting first, that the commons should confer with the lords; and when this was refused, that they should confer with the judges, on the merits of an election and return for the county of Buckingham, which they had already heard and decided. If the king had prevailed in this attempt of garbling the house of commons, he would have prevailed very probably in that, which he made some time afterward, of imprisoning and punishing the members of it. Thus he might have intimidated those by one prerogative, whom he could not exclude by the other. Such an influence as must have resulted from hence, joined to that which the executive power gives unavoidably to every king, would soon have rendered the

house

house of commons as dependent upon him, as the house of lords at that time appeared to be; for if money gets money, which will not, we suppose, be denied in this stock-jobbing age, it is no less true, and perhaps no less visible, that influence begets influence. Now we apprehend that, in this case, the barrier of liberty had been totally destroyed, and that king James would have virtually been in possession of arbitrary power; for whether the will of the prince becomes a law, by force of prerogative, and independently of parliament; or whether it is made so upon every occasion, by the concurrence of parliament, arbitrary power is alike established. The only difference lies here. Every degree of this power, which is obtained without parliament, is obtained against the forms, as well as against the spirit of the constitution; and must therefore be obtained with difficulty, and possessed with danger. Whereas in the other method of obtaining and exercising this power, by and with parliament, if it can be obtained at all, the progress is easy and short; and the possession of it is so far from being dangerous, that liberty is disarmed, as well as oppressed, by this method; that part of the constitution, which was instituted to oppose the encroachments of the crown, the maleadministration of men in power, and every other grievance, being influenced to abet these encroachments, to support this maleadministration, and even to concur in imposing the grievances.—National concurrence can be acquired only

only by a good prince, and for good purposes; because publick good alone can be a national motive. But king James was not ignorant, that private good may be rendered a superior motive to particular men, and that it is morally possible to make even parliaments subservient to the worst purposes of a court. Richard the second, by influencing the elections, and queen Mary, by corrupting the members, had created such a dependence of the parliament on the court, that the first had well nigh established, in spight of all other opposition, his absolute power; and that the latter was able to subvert what her father and her brother had done; to govern with the utmost cruelty; and to sacrifice the interests of the nation to those of a husband, whom she took against the general inclination of her people.—If therefore king James could have created the same dependence, he might have promised himself the same success. He might have governed in great quiet and safety, with the concurrence of parliament, tyrannically at home, and ignominiously abroad. He might have beggared the nation, as he beggared himself, and have given an absolute dominion over both to one insolent and incapable minister. But this concurrence could not be obtained; because the dependence of parliaments upon the king could not be created. By asserting their privileges, they prevented any direct and open influence of the crown. Had king James been rich, and it was in his power to have been so; had luxury and the offspring of luxury,

corruption,

corruption, both which he introduced, prevailed in the body of the people, an indirect and private influence might have been established; this nation might have been enslaved by the least beloved and most despised of all her kings. But the king continued poor, and the nation honest; this indirect and private influence was either not attempted, or attempted without effect; and we are persuaded, that no advocate for it could have been found, even in this reign or the next. There were men wicked enough to ascribe such powers to the king, as would have destroyed effectually the powers of parliament; but there was no man absurd, as well as wicked enough, to allow those powers which are given to parliament by the constitution, and to argue for an expedient, which must of course render them ineffectual, or pervert them to purposes opposite to those for which they were instituted. Thus liberty was preserved, by preserving the independency of parliaments. The proceedings of the commons, in the whole course of the affair we have mentioned, were extremely moderate. They went farther, not only in expressions and outward demonstrations of respect and submission, but in real compliances, than could have been expected, or than was perhaps strictly right: and when an expedient was fallen upon to draw the king, with some reputation, out of the contest, they gave way to it; although, by admitting a writ for the election of a member, in the room of one whose election they had allowed, they suffered a precedent to be established, which might

might be turned against them. But the spirit of liberty, though easily alarmed, is slow to resent even great provocations, and to act with violence, even against the worst princes. Repeated injuries, imminent and extreme danger, can alone bring things to such a pass; and no king of this nation was ever distressed by his people, without receiving frequent warnings, as well as accumulating insupportable grievances. King James felt some part of this distress in process of time. He deserved it perhaps already. The commons however contented themselves, in an address to him, to assert their privileges, and to complain of this invasion of them, among other grievances.—The proceedings of parliament were carried on in subsequent sessions, with the same moderation and temper. In that which followed the discovery of the gunpowder treason, the oath of allegiance was imposed; and this pledge of fidelity, for the future, was the sole hardship, for such the court of Rome and a great number of that communion esteemed it, which the Roman-catholick party drew on themselves by so execrable an attempt. The parliament complied, on this occasion, with the king, probably against their own sentiments; since nothing could be more different than his notions and theirs, concerning the conduct to be held with papists, and even concerning popery itself; and since the favour he showed, not to say the court he made to this party, had already created great uneasiness, and began to be a most unpopular part of his government.—He had no

war on his hands, and his revenues were at least as considerable as those of the late queen. The commons however gave him one of the greatest supplies, which had ever been given in parliament; and upon this occasion it may not be improper to observe, in confirmation of what we have advanced already, that the natural bent of the people, to live well with their kings, is so strong, that parliaments under no other influence than this, will neglect nothing to gain them; nay, that a prince like king James, disliked, distrusted, despised, may prevail on his parliament, for a time, and till all hopes of gaining him are lost, to do as well as bear in his favour, what would not be attempted in a better reign, nor succeed, perhaps, if it was attempted.

His design of uniting the two kingdoms of England and Scotland failed. It was too great an undertaking for so bad a workman. We must think, that the general arguments against it were grounded on prejudice; on false and narrow notions. But there were other reasons, drawn from the jealousies of that time, and from the conduct of the king, who had beforehand declared all the post-nati, or persons born since his accession to the English throne, naturalized in the two kingdoms; and these were, without doubt, the true reasons which prevailed against the union.—The next time the parliament assembled, to proceed on business, was in the year 1610, and by that time the general discontent of the nation began to show itself in loud and universal murmurs.

Some monopolies, the rigid and impolitick proceedings of the high-commission court and star-chamber, and many other causes, combined to raise them. But no particular grievance either had, or deserved to have, so great an effect as the continual endeavours which were used to establish practices and principles, absolutely destructive of the general constitution of the English government.—Such was the attempt made by Bancroft, archbishop of Canterbury, when he presented the twenty-five articles, commonly called Articuli cleri, and petitioned the king to grant prohibitions upon them.—Such again were the books published by Cowel and Blackwood, asserting, that the king is neither bound by the laws, nor by his coronation-oath; that he hath a right to make laws and impose taxes, without the consent of parliament; and that the nation was reduced to a state of slavery by the Norman conquest.—Such, to conclude this head, were the many acts which the king himself had done, and the many declarations which he had made; nay, such was the declaration he made in this very parliament, when he affirmed, that, although "all "kings, who are not tyrants, or perjured, will "bound themselves within the limits of their "laws; yet as it is blasphemy to dispute what "God may do, so it is sedition in subjects to "dispute what a king may do in the height of his "power."—These doctrines were new, ungrateful, and shocking to English ears; yet the parliament kept in temper, and bore such language from

this fearful, bullying prince, as the fiercest of his predecessors, since Richard the second, had never presumed to hold. They took no notice of Bancroft, nor pursued any farther measures against Cowel and Blackwood, after these libels had been called in by proclamation, and the reading of them had been forbid. Nay, there was a subsidy granted in this very session, with as little pretence as there had been for granting the former.—All this temper, submission and generosity of the parliament were lost on the king. They would not connive at grievances, nor sacrifice liberty; and those were the only terms, upon which a union with him was to be obtained.—From the year 1610 to 1614, he held no parliament; and it is evident, that he would never have called another, if his ministers could have supplied his profusion by all the illegal and oppressive means, which they used to raise money on the people, and which we forbear to enumerate, because the most partial writers, who have endeavoured to excuse them, have not presumed to deny them.—Even under this necessity, he did not take the resolution of calling a new parliament, till he was prevailed on by his favourite, Somerset, who had formed a scheme for influencing the elections, and, at the head of several other undertakers, flattered himself and his master, that he could get such members chosen, "as should comply solely to the king's desires*." But this project proved abortive. "The English

* Wilson.

"freedom

" freedom cannot be lost," says Wilson; and may his saying prove true to all future generations! " by a few base and tame spirits, that would " unmake themselves and their posterity, to " aggrandize one man." It happened to king James, as it happened to his son. Disgrace at court proved a recommendation in the country; and the faces which appeared in this new parliament made the countenance of the court to droop.

From this time began that conduct, on the part of the court, and on the part of the parliament, which continued to be held, with very fatal uniformity, till it ended in a civil war. That the people had reason to be jealous of the designs of the court hath appeared, and will appear still more flagrantly in the sequel; but that the court had at this time, nay even in the month of May 1640, when king Charles dissolved the last parliament he had it in his power to dissolve, any reason to be jealous of the parliament, or the people, we deny; and are able to justify our denial by fact and authority; even the authority of my lord Clarendon.—But the father and the son, and especially the former, having no end in calling their parliaments but to get money from their people, and to evade rather than refuse the redress of grievances; the art of the court was constantly employed, under pretence of the urgency of affairs, and in the parliament of 1614 without any pretence at all, to get the subsidies first dispatched. The commons, on the other side, who knew for what

they were called together, and who expected that little time would be allowed them to inquire into maleadministration, and to represent grievances, when they had once given the money, insisted for the most part, for there happened occasions in which they did not insist, that the consideration of grievances should precede, or at least go an equal pace with that of the supply. This was the rock on which so many parliaments split. This alone occasioned the dissolution of that we are speaking of, and made king James resolve, though he could not support his resolution to the end of his reign, to govern by his prerogative alone, and without the assistance of his parliament; that is, to avow absolute power.

LETTER XXI.

IN our last discourse, concerning the pretensions set up, and the attempts made by king James against the freedom of the English constitution, we carried these remarks down to the year 1614. We chose to stop there, because it seems to be the very diametrical point of opposition, or a point very near to that, between the government of this prince and the government of queen Elizabeth, which we have so largely insisted upon.—The distrust between him and his people was now entirely formed. His offensive and their defensive pretensions were now fully explained. A union of affection between him and his people, which the latter still desired and had long courted, was now grown desperate. A union, unworthy of a free people, a factious union between the parliament and the court, founded in the dependence and submission of the former, and so much affected by the latter, was after many trials become evidently impracticable. The king, as he had managed affairs, could never govern with parliament, nor without it; and those powers, which are designed to be mutual helps, were turned to be mutual clogs on one another; not by any deviation on the side of the people, or of their representatives, from the true line of go-

vernment; but by a manifest and almost continual deviation from it on the side of the crown.

Thus were those great disorders in government and that national confusion raised, which in a few years more destroyed the whole constitution. In short, that melancholy scene, which had been preparing ever since the accession of king James, was opened about this time, and continued open with few variations, every one of which was for the worse, till that tragedy began, wherein the noblest as well as the meanest blood in the nation was shed so profusely, and with the beginning of which we purpose to conclude these remarks.

We have charged the whole, and we think very justly, to the account of king James; who attempted to govern England by foreign, not by English maxims; nay, by such as he was unable to govern his own country. Sure we are, that no part of it can be laid to the constitution or people of England. The constitution was the same in his time as in the time of queen Elizabeth; and the people claimed under him no other privileges, nor powers, than they had enjoyed under her. It was his fault, not theirs, if by treading in the same path, which had kept them united with her, they were divided from him. These are points, on which we think it proper to insist a little more in this place, in order to cast a greater light on the particulars which follow, and to avoid any prolix repetitions, when we come to wind up the whole.

King

King James had opened the parliament, which met in 1614, by asking money for the portion and other expenses of his daughter's marriage to the elector Palatine, and promised the commons leave and leisure to inquire into grievances, when they had complied with this demand; but distrust, the bane of all harmony, prevailed among them, as it is plain even from this conditional promise that it prevailed with him, and they resolved to begin the work of the session by a representation of grievances.

A principal article in this roll was the growth of popery, encouraged no doubt by several passages in the conduct of king James, and particularly by two; his employing not only suspected, but known roman-catholicks, in offices of the highest trust and consequence; and his avowed design of marrying his son to some princess of that religion. Shall we say, in the style of king James, that it was presumption in the commons to meddle in such deep matters of state? Shall we not rather think it was presumption in the prince to determine a matter of this importance to the publick welfare, to the present and to future generations, without the advice, nay against the opinion of the great council of the nation? Shall we not rather applaud the wisdom and foresight, as well as the virtue of those men, who discovered the fruit in the seed; whose minds foreboded all the mischievous consequences of such an alliance, and who did their utmost to prevent

prevent the true, original cause of our greatest misfortunes?

Under another head of grievances, complained of at this time, were the monopolies, and many illegal exactions of money from the people. The parliament had the more reason to lose no time, and to spare no endeavours in putting a stop to these encroachments on liberty, because the longer they lasted, the more familiar they grew. The court improved in the practice of them. The people, who submitted to them by force, might have been brought to submit to them by custom, and the king might become able in time to supply his wants without the assistance of parliament; a case almost as desperate as that of his being able to supply them when, in what manner, and in what proportions he thought fit, by the assistance of parliament. We say almost as desperate, on the principles touched in our last letter; for, in the first place, if king James could have supplied his wants without parliaments, he would certainly have called none, and the condition of this nation had been worse than that of Spain, of France, and of other nations, whose examples have been absurdly enough quoted, to justify these arbitrary methods of raising money, and to induce mankind to submit to them. In France, for instance, the people must suffer; but they may complain. Their mouths are open; that is, their parliaments may represent, and even remonstrate; nay, they have gone so far, as to refuse with success to

register

register and give the necessary forms of a law to an edict of the prince, which they judged oppressive to the people. But if king James had prevailed, he would have governed without even these shadows of a parliament. The people must have suffered, and could not have complained. Their sole mouth, the mouth of parliament, would have been stopped, and redress of grievances being no longer attainable by the applications of their representative body, which would have no longer existed, they must have submitted tamely and silently, or have sought a remedy in their collective body, which can only act by resistance and force. This situation would have been bad enough, God knows; yet not so bad as the other; for, in the second place, if the parliament had been made dependent on the crown, no matter by what kind of influence; whether by the distribution of honours, the translations of bishops, the corrupting the electors and the elected, or the other methods king James took, the mouth of the people had not been stopped indeed; but it had been formed to speak another language than that of the heart.—The people must have suffered, and the parliament must have rejoiced.—If they had felt an increasing load of debt, the parliament must have testified great satisfaction at the diminution of it.—If they had felt the decay of trade, and the growth of national poverty, the parliament must have boasted of the wealth and flourishing state of the kingdom.—If they had seen the interest and honour

of

of the nation, as they saw it too often, neglected or sacrificed, the parliament must have exulted in the triumphs of both.—In short, such a depending parliament must not only have connived at the grievances of their country, but have sanctified them too. They must not only have borne the rod, but have kissed it too; not only the rod of their prince, but the rod of some upstart minister, who owed his elevation to his dishonour, and his favour to his shame.—But as the integrity of parliament secured the nation from any danger of this kind; so the necessities of the king were the great security against any danger of the other.—Was the parliament therefore to blame, who opposed strenuously every innovation set on foot, to lessen this security?

A third grievance, which the parliament desired to have redressed, was that incredible waste, which king James made of the revenues of the crown. These revenues were, at that time, so much more than sufficient for all the ordinary occasions of the government, that queen Elizabeth, who had so many extraordinary occasions of expense, who paid so many old debts, without contracting new, and achieved such glorious enterprises abroad, as well as at home, did not receive in grants from her people above * four

* We do not want to be told, that the value of money was very different at that time from what it is now; but though we admit of the highest calculations, this sum will appear surprisingly small for so many years, when compared with the profusion and extravagance of some latter reigns.

millions

millions in more than forty years.—If king James, who had no extraordinary occasions of expense, who paid no debts, who achieved no glorious enterprises any where, had neither asked money, nor raised it without asking, the squandering his revenue had not probably come under debate in parliament; but since he expected, that the people should provide for his debts, and supply his necessities, it was just that the representatives of the people should examine how they were contracted. The immense estates, which were made in these days at court, the known corruption not only of inferiour agents, but of principal ministers, and even of those who were at the head of the treasury, made such an examination the more necessary, and provoked and excited the more to it. The house of commons would have thought, that they had betrayed their trust, if they had neglected so important a part of it. By the proceedings as well as declarations of the parliaments in these times it is plain, that they thought they had not an arbitrary, but only a conditional power over the purse of the nation, though the strings of it were in their hands; that they were to tax the people in no greater proportion than was strictly necessary to support the honour and interest of the nation, and the dignity of the crown; that they could make no judgment concerning this proportion, if they had not a full communication of the nature of the service, for which extraordinary aids were demanded; and if they did not examine, before they granted these aids,

aids, how the ordinary revenues and any precedent extraordinary grants had been applied. Such maxims as these will not be condemned, we presume. They have been always professed and frequently pursued, from the time we speak of, down to the age in which we live. Since the reign of king William the third, our princes have indeed stood on a different foot. They have had a distinct revenue assigned to them for their particular use. The annual expenses and the debts of the nation have been separately provided for by parliament; and yet not only the management and application of these annual grants, but also the immense property of the creditors of the publick have been left to the crown, as the management and application of those revenues were, which belonged properly to the crown, and by deficiencies on which the crown, not the nation, was immediately affected. It is no wonder therefore if our parliaments have thought themselves obliged, since this great alteration, sometimes by committees, and sometimes by extraordinary commissions, to inspect more narrowly into revenues, which are still managed by the officers of the crown, though they make no longer any part of the estate of the crown; and we persuade ourselves, that no honest man would be sorry, if the wisdom of our present representatives should think fit to make any inquisitions of the same nature; but even before this alteration, before the settlement of a civil list, and when our princes stood on the same foot as king James the first, with respect

respect to their private and publick revenue, the maxims we speak of were pursued on many occasions, and always with the universal applause of the people. In the reign of king Charles the second, for instance, our whig-patriots endeavoured not only to detect and punish frauds and abuses, by inquiries into the management of the publick money, but to prevent them likewise, by appropriating what they gave to the uses for which it was given; and thus much we think may suffice, to clear the conduct of the parliament of 1614 from any imputations on this head.

Let us mention, in this place, one grievance more, which we have touched upon in another. A former parliament had taken some notice of it, and this parliament would probably have taken more, if the king had allowed them time. The doctrines which established the unbounded and ineffable prerogative of the king; which reduced the privileges of parliament to be no longer an ancient and undoubted right and inheritance, but derived them from the permission and toleration of the crown, and declared them liable to be retrenched at the will of the prince; and which by necessary consequence changed at once the nature of the English constitution, from that of a free to that of an arbitrary government; all these doctrines, we say, or the principles, on which they were established, had been already publickly and frequently asserted by king James. They were the language of the court; and a party had

had been formed in the nation, who made profession of them. They were maintained in conversation. They were pleaded for in print; and they became soon afterward the disgrace and profanation of the pulpit.

We have sometimes compared, in our thoughts, these usurpations of king James over the privileges of his people to those of the popes, which gave that prince so much offence, over the rights of the emperors, and indeed over the civil rights of mankind. Charlemagne had made these priests princes. They continued for about two hundred and sixty years, to submit, in the main, to those rules, which the imperial constitutions and ecclesiastical customs had established; after which they started, at once, out of these bounds. They would be limited pontiffs no longer, but arbitrary high priests like the dairo of Japan, something more than human, and civil as well as ecclesiastical tyrants. They scorned to go to tyranny by degrees, but carried their usurpations at one leap to the utmost pitch of extravagance. Alexander the second denied the right of the emperors to choose, or to confirm the election of a pope. His successor took the investitures from them. Henry the fourth asserted the imperial rights, in opposition to this invasion; but Gregory the seventh asserted, in opposition to him, that Rome was the capital of the World; that the pope was independent of all powers on Earth; that kings and emperors were liable to be deposed by the plenitude of his authority. The pope was believed by many, on his word; and there

there were more, who found their private account in seeming to believe him. Factions were raised to maintain these principles. They were consecrated by the church. They prevailed in those days. More than five centuries were not sufficient to abolish the practice, and more than six have not been sufficient to extirpate the principle. True it is, that these popes had several advantages, which king James had not; and, among others, the minority of Henry the fourth at the time when they began this monstrous usurpation; whereas when king James set up his pretensions, and talked, and writ of prerogative, in terms as ridiculous and full of as much bombast as those which the briefs and other publick acts of Hildebrand contained, the commons of England were grown up to a full maturity of property and power. Shall we condemn them for endeavouring to preserve the principles of liberty, that they might preserve the spirit of it; and by preserving the spirit, deserve and secure the continuance of so great a blessing? Should an English parliament have sat quiet and silent, in humble dependence on the prince, while slavery in speculation, as well as practice, was making such large advances; while the laws of the land, the laws of nature, and those of God himself were perverted to impose a yoke of base and servile prejudices on the understandings and consciences of mankind? We think not. Sure we are that our parliaments have been always watchful to censure and explode, in time, such doctrines as might, even by

induction and consequence, weaken the foundation of liberty. The instances of this kind are so well known, and some of them so recent, that we need not quote them. But, in order to justify still farther the sense and conduct of our forefathers, let us appeal even to the present sense of mankind. We all know that there are mercenary and abandoned wretches among us, who have dared to plead for a dependence of the parliament on the crown; not for that dependence of the several parts of the government on one another, which our constitution hath formed, and on the preservation of which the freedom of our government intirely rests; but for the most indirect, the most iniquitous, as well as dangerous dependence imaginable; for a dependence, to be created by corruption, which must always produce effects as infamous as it's cause. Corruption, we say, hath been defended, nay, recommended, for we will repeat the assertion, as a necessary expedient of government. The representation of the country by the independent gentlemen of the country, hath been saucily and awkwardly ridiculed; as if a bill, to prevent all persons, who have neither places nor pensions, from sitting in parliament, was proper to be passed, and those salutary laws, which are in force for preventing persons who have places and pensions from sitting there, were as proper to be repealed. Nay, these incendiaries, who go about to destroy our constitution, have not blushed in the same breath to admit, that standing armies have

have been generally the instruments of overturning free governments, and to affirm that a standing army is necessary to be kept up in ours; if you ask them against whom, they answer you very frankly, against the people; if you ask them why, they answer you with the same frankness, because of the levity and inconstancy of the people. This is the evil; an army is the remedy. Our army is not designed, according to these doctors of slavery, against the enemies of the nation, but against the nation. We are confident that the present army is incapable of being employed to such purposes, and abhors an imputation, which might have been justly cast on Cromwell's army, but is very unjustly insinuated against the present.

Now let us suppose that the time was come, when the parliament should think fit to censure and put a stop to the influence of such writings as these; would any honest man, if he laid his hand upon his heart, disapprove their proceedings? On the contrary, would not every man, who wished that the constitution of this government might be preserved, applaud such measures, and bless the representatives of his country for their zeal against the betrayers of it?

Upon the whole matter, we think it very plain that the alarm, which was taken at the propagation of those infamous doctrines, in the reign of king James the first, is abundantly justified, not only by the examples of other parliaments, but by the general sense of mankind in all ages.

Whenever the fundamentals of a free government are attacked, or any other schemes, ruinous to the general interest of a nation, are pursued; the best service that can be done to such a nation, and even to the prince, is to commence an early and vigorous opposition to them; for the event will always show, as we shall soon see in the present case, that those who form an opposition in this manner are the truest friends to both, however they may be stigmatised at first with odious names, which belong more properly to those who throw the dirt at them.

If the opposition begin late, or be carried on more faintly, than the exigency requires, the evil will grow; nay it will grow the more by such an opposition, till it becomes at length too inveterate for the ordinary methods of cure; and whenever that happens; whenever usurpations on natural liberty are grown too strong to be checked by these ordinary methods, the people are reduced to this alternative: They must either submit to slavery and beggary, the worst of all political evils; or they must endeavour to prevent the impending mischief by open force and resistance, which is an evil but one degree less eligible than the other. But when the opposition is begun early and carried on vigorously, there is time to obtain redress of grievances, and put a stop to such usurpations by those gentle and safe methods, which their constitution hath provided; methods, which may and have often proved fatal to wicked ministers, but can never prove fatal to the prince himself.—He is never in danger but when these

methods,

methods, which arbitrary courts dislike, are too long delayed.

The most plausible objections to such proceedings, and by which well-meaning men are frequently made the bubbles of those who have the worst designs, arises from a false notion of moderation. True political moderation consists in not opposing the measures of government, except when great and national interests are at stake; and when that is the case, in opposing them with such a degree of warmth, as is adequate to the nature of the evil, to the circumstances of danger attending it, and even to those of opportunity. To oppose upon any other foot; to oppose things which are not blame-worthy, or which are of no material consequence to the national interest, with such violence as may disorder the harmony of government, is certainly faction; but it is likewise faction, and faction of the worst kind, either not to oppose at all, or not to oppose in earnest, when points of the greatest importance to the nation are concerned.

The truth of all this reasoning will be confirmed by what remains to be said of king James and king Charles the first.—If there had not been an early and honest opposition, in defence of national liberty, against king James, his reign would have sufficed to establish him in the seat of arbitrary power.—If the opposition had been more generally backed with the weight of the nation in due time; if the court had not been able to divide men against their general interest, upon

principles of prerogative and liberty, king James must have complied in time, the constitution would have been resettled on it's right foundation; his family would have been preserved; all our national calamities would have been prevented; and the sins of the court might have been expiated by the punishment of one or two of the ministers.—But a prerogative party having been nursed up from the beginning, and gained strength in the whole course of king James's reign, the strength of the nation was divided, and the contest continued so long between the king and the people, that resentment, and passion, and prejudice, and faction took place on all sides. The soft and gentle methods of cure, which our constitution had provided, became impracticable. A provoked people sought their remedy in resistance. A civil war followed. The English government was subverted, instead of being reformed.

What hath been said will serve to justify the conduct of the parliament, as well as the general alarm, which the nation had taken in 1614. These were the crimes, the heinous, unpardonable crimes, for which king James dissolved this parliament, with so much indignation, after they had sat but a few weeks, and had not time given them to pass even one law. These were the crimes, for which he confined to the Tower and other prisons, and punished in other ways, so many of the most active members. Lastly, these were the crimes which made him resolve, what he had before attempted, to govern without parliament.—The

particular

particular consequences of these measures will appear in our next letter, when we come to consider his conduct of our national interests abroad, against the sense of the nation; in which period of time, the foreign affairs are so intermixed with parliamentary domestick affairs, that we shall not divide them, but speak of them together, having first very briefly made our observations on his management of parties.

LETTER XXII.

IN letter XVIII we have spoken of the state of parties at the accession of king James. We are now to make our observations on his management of them. It is necessary we should do this, in order to give a complete and just idea of his government; and yet so much hath been said on the subject by writers of all denominations, and even by ourselves, that there remains but very little to be added, either for curiosity, or instruction.

We might observe how he drew himself into some trouble if not danger, and exposed himself to the necessity of shedding some blood, in the very first months of his reign, by espousing the passions of a party; by disgracing and proscribing men, who had no crime at that time toward him but their attachment to the late queen; by avowing the cause of the earl of Essex, whose designs had been, no doubt, as treasonable, at least, and as chimerical too, as those into which he drove Grey, Cobham, and Raleigh, or which were imputed to them.

Several other anecdotes, concerning factions at court and parties in the nation, might be collected and remarked upon. But we shall pass them over, and confine ourselves to observe, in

a very few instances, how he adapted his particular management of parties to the general and main design of his policy; what strength he acquired; what strength he lost by this conduct; and what contests he entailed on posterity.

There were no parties, at this time, in the nation, but such as were formed on religious differences; and it had been a great object of the policy of queen Elizabeth, to keep all parties within these bounds. We know the maxims on which she proceeded, by a letter of sir Francis Walsingham, writ expressly on this subject. She thought that "consciences were not to be forced, "but won and reduced by truth, time, instruction, "and persuasion; and that causes of conscience "lose their nature, when they exceed their "bounds and grow matter of faction."—By keeping to these maxims, she succeeded. The parties in the church made none in the state. They were obliged to live in due subjection to laws, wisely made and moderately exercised. They were never punished, while they continued in this subjection, much less were they provoked or encouraged to go out of it. The powers of the church were applied to the support of the establishment, not rendered subservient to any factious designs of the court; and ecclesiastical violence was restrained from confirming the obstinacy of those who dissented, by persecution of them, or from increasing their numbers, by persecution of others.

Directly opposite to this conduct was that of king

king James.—In haste to show his parts, he had a conference between the bishops and the puritan ministers at Hampton-court, in a few months after his accession; where he made himself a principal party in the dispute. His courtiers flattered him, and archbishop Whitgift, who died soon afterward, and probably doated then, declared himself "verily persuaded, that the king "spake by the spirit of God." But surely such a conference, however it might frighten and silence, could neither instruct, nor persuade; and the king was so far from trusting, like his predecessor, to the force of truth and the aid of time, that in this very conference he threatened to employ another kind of force, if he did not meet with compliance in a time to be limited. The bishops were at first to admonish paternally and to confer amicably; but lest they should not succeed by preaching, writing, and living men into conformity, the sole means they ought to desire; or, if they desired others, the sole means they ought to be suffered to employ, they were to have recourse to compulsion afterward.—The same spirit reigned in the first speech which this prince made to his parliament; for there he not only massed together, imprudently as well as unjustly, all the dissenters from the established church, under the general denomination of puritans and novelists, but he declared them all "insufferable in any well-governed commonwealth:" so that he put them all out of his protection, even though they confined themselves within those bounds, to which causes

causes of conscience may reasonably extend, and proscribed them for their opinions, not their practices.

On these principles he proceeded, and what we have said here may suffice, upon this head, for his whole reign.—The consequence of this conduct was that those sects, who were not dangerous at first, became so at last. They became so, in some degree, from the moment the declarations we have mentioned were made: for nothing is found more true in nature and experience than this; that they who are oppressed by governments, will endeavour to change them; and that he who makes himself terrible to multitudes, will have multitudes to fear.—But this was not all.—As he made these sects his enemies, so he gave them great advantages of popularity and strength. The first of these advantages, which we shall take notice of, arose from the great indulgence he showed to the roman catholicks, and the favourable sentiments of that religion, which he expressed on all private, and many publick occasions. We need not descend into the particular instances; for though we give little credit to Deageant's memoirs in general, and none to what he says of a letter written by king James to the pope, acknowledging him vicar of Christ and head of the church; yet is there a multitude of other proofs, too notorious and too well supported to be denied.—We think it plain upon the whole matter, that several passages in his conduct, both before and after his coming into England, were unworthy

thy of a protestant king at any time, and were equally impolitick at this time, when the zeal of papists to attack, and of protestants to defend the reformation was at the highest pitch; and when even the least condescension on either side, would have been thought little less than apostacy. Fear for his person, and little notions of policy, were probably the motives which determined this part of his conduct; but whatever the motives were, the effect was certainly this. He made the cause of the court to pass among many for the cause of popery; and it was not hard by consequence for the puritans who were oppressed by the court, to make their cause pass for that of the reformation. We are far from thinking that this was properly the case on either side; but the appearances were strong enough to fix such prejudices in the minds of men, already prepared by jealousy and suspicion. This advantage, so foolishly given, operated strongly against the court, both in this reign and the next. In this it was applied to no ill purposes. In the next, it was very wickedly improved; but they who gave it first, and who continued to give it afterward, are justly to be reputed the accomplices of those who improved it so wickedly, how much soever they stood in opposition to one another.

A second advantage of popularity and strength, which king James gave to the puritans, was this: He ranked among their party, nay he drove into that party, as much as he was able by severe usage,

usage, all those who stood up in defence even of civil liberty. The aversion which he expressed to the puritans formed a kind of league between him and the warmest of the established clergy; and when these were once become a court party, we are not to wonder if others grew as warm as these, and if the greatest part of that body of men united in a cause which flattered their passions, and opened the road of perferment to them. No king, no bishop, was the language of the court. No bishop, no king, was that of the church. Had the monarchy and the hierarchy been attacked, this united zeal in a common cause would have been commendable and successful too; for the nation was not now, nor for a long time afterward so distempered, that any faction could raise it's head with effect against the just prerogative of the crown and the established rights of the church. But the truth requires we should say, that this union was formed to offend and invade, and to extend both beyond the bounds prescribed to them by the English constitution. It was great blindness in the clergy not to see, that, to enlarge the bottom of the court, they narrowed their own; that they fixed a centre of union, wherein all their divided enemies would meet and unite with many, who were then friends to the church, but might come, as it happened afterward, from being against the clergy to be against the church itself. It was a great misfortune to the nation, that the clergy did not see these truths in time; since if they had seen them,

they

they might have been happy instruments of preventing that mischief, which followed soon after the time we speak of, and that division of interests between the crown and the people, which was created by king James, and hath proved so fatal to his posterity.—But to return.—By a contrary conduct, by espousing and sanctifying the principles and by promoting the measures of king James, the clergy became part of the faction of the court, and shared very unjustly the imputation of favouring popery, but very justly that of advancing tyranny. This was a second advantage, which king James gave to the puritans. He varnished their cause with popularity, and he increased their numbers. He made puritans in his time, as Jansenists have been since made in France, and Jacobites in Britain, by calling men so, and by treating them as such.—They must have been sharp-sighted, indeed, of whom my lord Clarendon speaks, and who could discern "the rebellion "contriving from, if not before, the death of queen "Elizabeth;" but they must be quite blind, who do not discern the seeds of rebellion sowing in every part of the conduct of king James, and particularly in this which we have now touched; the management of parties.

These evils were aggravated, and the consequences of them were precipitated by his conducting our national interests abroad against the sense of the nation.

During the first period, into which we divide this reign, that is, to the year 1614, king James meddled

meddled little, and, to say the truth, had little occasion to meddle in foreign affairs.—The treaty which he made with Spain in 1604 had been much censured, and sir C. Cornwallis, in a letter to the lord Cranburne, asserts, "that England "never lost such an opportunity of winning "honour and wealth unto it, as by relinquishing "the war against an exhausted kingdom, and a "prince held in little veneration for suffering "himself to be wholly governed by a man gene-"rally hated." This treaty, however, was not probably so bad as it had been represented, and the commerce opened with Spain became a source of inexhaustible riches to our nation; but still there was something preposterous and mean in the conduct of king James abroad, even while he had so little to do there, and so safe a part to act. He courted that very power, the power of Spain, whom queen Elizabeth had broke, and who would have courted him, if he had known how to put so much as dignity in his proceedings. He disobliged the Dutch, whose power had been raised by queen Elizabeth, and who must have continued to depend on him, if he had known how to be either a friend, or an enemy; and yet he bore most ignominiously from this very people the greatest injuries and affronts imaginable. He had neither the courage to chastise this infant state, nor the sense to protect it. Their treaty with their old masters, the Spaniards, began in the year 1607; was continued in 1608; and ended in 1609, in a truce of twelve years. During the whole

whole course of this long negotiation, king James showed his partiality in favour of the Spaniards; and though he signed, about this time, two treaties with the States as sovereigns; yet he made no scruple, upon some occasions, of declaring them rebels.—The death of the duke of Cleves, and the disputes about that succession, presented to Henry the fourth an opportunity he waited for; and he was ready, when Ravaillac stabbed him, to attack the house of Austria, whose power in Germany began once more to give umbrage, though Rodolphus the second was still on the imperial throne. King James left his troops with the Dutch, notwithstanding the truce. They were employed in this quarrel; and we cannot think him to blame for taking no farther part in the hostilities. His views were, and they ought to have been at this time, and in this respect, very different from those of that heroical king of France. But in the new scene of German affairs, which opened a few years afterward, and which continued, during the last period of his reign, that is, from the year 1614, nothing could be more scandalous than his taking no part at all, except his taking the part he did take.—That he should have made himself a principal in that terrible war, which broke out in Germany in 1618, and which lasted thirty years, we cannot persuade ourselves; neither do we believe, that any man, who does not take up his opinions on trust, but examines this intricate and perplexed

part

part of the history of the last century with care, will be of another mind; and yet king James must have made himself a principal in this war, if he had engaged in it, as he was advised by some to engage, and as he hath been blamed by many for not engaging.—The censures, under which he hath passed on this occasion, would have been juster, if those who have made them had distinguished better between the patrimony of his children, by defending the Palatinate, and promoting their grandeur, by seconding their ambition; between contributing to support the protestant interest abroad, and taking on his shoulders a load, which it was neither reasonable nor possible that he should bear; between that conduct, which he ought to have held, as king of this island, and that which he might have been obliged to hold, if his dominions had lain on the continent. Our writings will not pass, we believe, for apologies in favour of king James; and yet we shall explain this point a little less to his disadvantage, perhaps, than it hath been usually taken.

If king James had followed the advice of those who would have had him enter into an immediate war to maintain the elector Palatine on the throne of Bohemia, he must have exhausted and ruined this nation to support it. He must have furnished subsidies to Bethlem Gabor and the prince of Anspach; he must have fed the war in Hungary; fomented the revolt in Austria; paid the army of the princes of the union; opposed the duke of Bavaria in Bohemia, and Spinola in

the Palatinate.—Let us consider in opposition to whom, and in concert with whom, he must have carried on this vast undertaking.—On one side, the whole popish interest in the empire was closely united, and the cause of Ferdinand was the common cause of the party. The popish interest, out of the empire, conspired in the same cause. The king of Poland assisted the emperor in Hungary. Troops from Italy and a great army from the Netherlands acted for him in Germany. The purse of the pope and that of the king of Spain were open to him. Even France, who ought in good policy to have opposed the house of Austria, was induced, by the bigotry of her court, and, perhaps, by the private interest of Luines, to declare for the emperor against the king of Bohemia.—On the other side, the protestant interest, in the empire, was far from being closely united, and farther still from making the cause of Frederick the common cause of the party. Even the princes of the union had different views; many of them leaned to the emperor; none of them could be entirely depended upon; and the elector of Saxony, the most powerful of the protestant princes of the empire, was so far from uniting with the others, that he was first privately, and afterward openly, but all along very steadily on the side of Ferdinand. Out of the empire, some assistance might have been expected from the king of Denmark and the Dutch; but even their accession must have been purchased; at least, it must have been made useful at the

expense

expense of Britain. What other allies could king James have hoped for; and who can see, without smiling, in that godly prelate, archbishop Abbot's letter to sir Robert Naunton, the name of the duke of Bouillon, together with Tremouille, a rich prince in France, mentioned upon such an occasion?—Short and imperfect as the account we have given is, those, who know the state of Europe at the time we speak of, know that it is true; and if we were to look no farther than the representations made by Juliana of Nassau to her son against his accepting the crown of Bohemia, we should discover in them, with the true and fatal reasons why king James did not assist Frederick at all, unanswerable reasons why he ought not to have taken upon him the Bohemian quarrel in the manner he must have taken it, if he had taken it upon him at that time. That king James should have prepared for this storm, which was long in gathering; that he should have laboured to unite and to fortify the protestants of Germany, before it happened; and to comfort, and succour, and protect them, after it happened; that he had many fair opportunities of doing this, without engaging farther than the interest of Britain allowed; and that he neglected them all, we admit, and are able to show.—He might have put himself on such a foot in Europe, as to have mediated at least, which was the only part he attempted to act, successfully for the Bohemians, and to have screened his son-in-law from the vengeance of the emperor, and the ambition of the duke of

Bavaria. But he put himself on such a foot, and he accquired such a character, that he had no credit among the protestants, nor much influence over his son-in-law, and that the roman catholick party, sure of amusing him, neglected and despised him. He might have declined taking the Bohemian quarrel upon him, and yet not have made his court to the emperor and the king of Spain, by disavowing and condemning Frederick, and even by suffering them not only to drive this prince out of Bohemia, but to take the Palatinate from him and his family, and give a wound, almost mortal, to the whole protestant cause in Germany. Nay, he did worse. By foolish embassies and ridiculous negotiations, he gave time and furnished advantages, which could not have been had without his assistance, to the popish party. By the same means he checked, he weakened, he discouraged, and more than once disarmed the protestant party. In short, not only the principles of his conduct were wrong, but the measures of it composed such a series of blunders as we seldom find in history; because it is hardly possible, in the course of nature, that such characters, in such situations, should appear above once in a century.

It may be objected, perhaps, by some of the writers, who adorn and instruct the present age, that king James was universally and justly condemned for not taking the Bohemian quarrel upon him, as well as for not defending the Palatinate; and that he must have pursued, in the last case, the

the same measures as we think him justified for not pursuing in the former. We shall not refute this objection by showing, as it would be easy for us to do, in various particulars, the prodigious difference between the two cases; the insuperable difficulties he would have encountered in one, and the many facilities he would have had in the other. The deduction would be too long and extensive for the narrow limits of these essays. But we shall content ourselves with making two observations, sufficient to satisfy any reasonable man, and which will show, at the same time, what different notions of the part this nation ought to take in foreign affairs were entertained by our forefathers, from those which we, their wiser offspring, have pursued. When king James took the resolution of calling the parliament, which sat in 1621, the battle of Prague was lost, and Bohemia too with it. The affections of the people were raised, but it was for the recovery of the Palatinate; and in this point the sense of the parliament went along with the affections of the people *. On the other point, the sense of the parliament had not been expressed, there having been no parliament held from the year 1614 till this time. But what this sense would have been may be easily collected, from the advice given in the petition and remonstrance of the commons at this time. As zealous as they were to engage even in a war, for recovering the Palatinate, they were not enough transported by

* See Rush. Coll.

their zeal, or enough biassed in favour of any foreign interest, to forget the true interest of Britain. They advised the king to a war; but they advised him not to rest upon a war in those parts only, which would consume his treasure and discourage his people. They advised that the bent of this war might be against that prince, the king of Spain, whose armies and treasures had first diverted and since maintained the war in the Palatinate. On which side now was the sense of the nation; and how impertinent are they who have quoted this sense, to authorize our taking part in every German quarrel, by paying subsidies, maintaining armies, and involving ourselves in all the affairs of the continent? How monstrous is the absurdity and impudence of those who have asserted, that the case of the people of the Palatinate, invaded by a powerful enemy, who pretended to nothing less than the conquest of them, is parallel to that of the people of Hanover, invaded by nobody, and over whom no foreign power pretends to any dominion *!— The parliament pointed out to king James a measure effectual for supporting the protestant interest abroad; but such a measure as this nation might pursue by exerting her natural strength.— The power of Spain supported the emperor and the popish league; an army of Spain conquered the Palatinate; and yet the artifices of that court deluded king James to such a degree, that he dreamed of recovering the patrimony of his

* See Observations on the present State of Affairs.

children

children by the good offices of the Spaniards, and was incapable of pursuing, in earnest, any other measures, even at the time when Spinola was stripping them of this patrimony, and reducing them to seek their bread in another country. To this dependence in Spain he sacrificed not only them, but his own honour, the affection of his subjects, the prosperity of his kingdoms, and the security of the protestant religion. It was this magick charm, which the parliament endeavoured in vain to dissolve, by pressing him to a war with Spain, which his maritime force could have carried on principally; which would have stopped that source from whence the popish party in Germany derived so many supplies; and which would have rendered the protestant party, by consequence, a more equal match for the emperor.—But this was not the sole wise and honest view, which the parliament proposed, by pointing out and insisting on this measure. There was another, which touched them more nearly, and which they had more at heart. We shall mention it in our next discourse, and it will lead us from our observations on this reign to those few on the next, with which we intend to close, at least for the present, all our remarks on the history of England.

LETTER XXIII.

ANOTHER object, beside recovering the Palatinate, which the parliament had in view, when they pressed king James to break with Spain, was preventing the marriage of the prince of Wales to the infanta. He had been bantered and abused by the Spaniards, when he treated a marriage between his eldest son, prince Henry, and Anne of Austria; and yet no sooner did the duke of Lerma, in the year 1616, make some overtures of marrying the infanta Mary, second daughter of Philip the third, to prince Charles, but this Solomon of ours catched at the bait which was thrown out to him, and hung fast on the hook for seven years together.

The scheme of farther usurpations in Germany was already laid by the house of Austria; and the character of Ferdinand, who was to succeed Matthias, and who did succeed him three years afterward, gave hopes of pushing these usurpations with vigour and advantage.—The part of Spain had been great in promoting these designs. It was essential to their success, that it should be so likewise in the execution of them. No opposition, of any moment, was to be apprehended from France, where the principles of despotism and of bigot-popery prevailed more than ever, and who had concluded, in the year 1615, a double marriage with Spain. The truce of twelve years, made

made with the Dutch in 1609, would enable the Spaniards to support the popish league from the Low Countries, as in all cases they might do from Italy; and if they could keep the king of Great Britain from diverting the forces of Spain in the meantime, there was reason to hope that these united powers might conquer both the Palatinates, as well as Bohemia, and break the force of the protestant league in Germany, before the expiration of the truce and the renewal of the war with the united provinces of the Low Countries should create another diversion.—This was a principal part of the plan laid by the house of Austria and the other roman catholick princes, for oppressing the protestants and invading the liberties of Germany. To the eternal infamy of king James, it succeeded even beyond the hopes of those who laid it.—The hints, which Digby gave him in the very beginning of this negotiation, might have put him on his guard; and a thousand things, which happened in the course of it, would have undeceived, provoked, and determined any other man. His presumption, his fear, and, above all, his perverse system of policy, prevented any effects of these kinds. We forbear entering into the particulars of what he did for Spain; of what he suffered Spain to do; and of all the indignities, which he received from every branch of the house of Austria, during these transactions. Most of them have been observed, and are sufficiently known; and it would be an unnecessary work to point out some few instances more, which have not been, perhaps, taken

taken notice of, or explained as much as they deserved. We shall spare ourselves and our readers this disagreeable recollection, and only observe in general the plan upon which king James appears to have acted; as we have observed what the plan was of those, who made so fatal a use of his weakness. His silly pride could not be satisfied, unless he matched his son with a daughter of Spain, or France. He had been disappointed formerly on that side, and lately on this. He was resolved at any rate not to be disappointed a third time. The immense sum, which had been promised for the infanta's portion, tempted him the more, because for several years he would call no parliament to grant him supplies, and he found it hard to raise them, even in small proportions, without a parliament. He imagined vainly, that this alliance with Spain would give him great consideration abroad; and wickedly, that it would afford him means of raising and extending his prerogative at home. He saw the mischiefs which accrued to the protestant interest abroad, either as immediate, or as remote effects of his conduct; either in consequence of what he did, or in consequence of what he neglected; and we are willing to believe that he felt, in some degree, those which fell on the family into which he had married his daughter. But the interest of the protestants in general touched him little. Abroad, as well as at home, he chose rather by condescensions and submissions to court his enemies, than to unite his friends among one

another, and to attach them to himself. In his zeal for the imaginary rights of princes, he could not forgive the elector Palatinate for taking arms against the emperor; and while he looked on him as a rebel, forgot that he was his son. If he remembered it at any time, and felt any concern, the sentiment was surely very faint; since we find that the distant and uncertain prospect of making some tolerable composition for this unhappy prince, by the intercession of Spain, was always sufficient to calm his paternal solicitude. He saw, without doubt, at least during the life of Philip the third, who did not die till the year 1621, that Spain was not much in earnest to give him the infanta; but he seemed resolved to overcome all difficulties, and to determine the councils of Spain, and even of Rome, in his favour, by dint of concessions. The truth is, he went so far in his concessions at last, that these councils seemed to be determined. Those of Spain, at least, were so most certainly in the year 1623, even before the voyage of the prince into Spain; and the articles sworn to both by him when he was there, and by his father here, amounted to little less than a direct establishment of popery. That this charge is just will, we think, appear evident, when it shall be remembered, without entering into more particulars, that by these articles the king and prince of Wales engaged for the suspension, and even abrogation of all laws made against roman catholicks; that they engaged never to consent to the making any new laws of the same kind; and that, as the children to be born

born of this marriage were to be educated by their mother, till ten years of age, in compliance with the king of Spain's demands; so the prince was prevailed on to promise, that he would lengthen this term till twelve years, according to the desire of the pope.

Thus was king James amused till the beginning of the year 1623, when the Upper Palatinate and the dignity of elector were taken from Frederick, and conferred on the duke of Bavaria, by the diet of Ratisbon: or, to speak more properly, by the prerogative of Ferdinand, who acted in the diet as dogmatically and as absolutely as king James endeavoured to act in his parliaments. When this point was gained by amusing king James, and the protestant interest was broken in Germany; the next point was to be carried by concluding with him, and making the match on such terms as might secure an immediate toleration, and open the prospect of a future establishment of popery in this kingdom.—The parliament of 1621 beheld part of this scene, and apprehended, upon very just grounds, the sequel. They saw the fatal consequences of the negotiation, while it was in suspense, and they dreaded those which would follow the conclusion of it. To stop the first, and to prevent the last, there was but one expedient; the forcing king James into a war, for recovering the Palatinate. This they endeavoured with all their might; but he meant nothing less, and had called a parliament purely to get money from his people, on pretence

of

of a war he was resolved not to make. Some money he got by this trick; but when he had squandered it away in trifling negotiations and a ridiculous show of war, he could get no more: so that this parliament ended as others had done, and even with greater dissatisfaction between the king and the people, both on account of his conducting foreign affairs against the interest and sense of the nation, and of his attacking more openly than ever the privileges of parliament. The parliament remonstrated, petitioned, protested. The king dissolved the parliament in a rage; imprisoned several members of the house of commons, and even some of the house of lords. He resumed his project of governing without parliaments, since he could not govern as ill as he had a mind to govern with them. But this project was not pursued above two years; for what his parliament could not obtain from him, an unworthy favourite did obtain. Motives of private interest, and perhaps of a worse nature, made that great turn in affairs, which so many motives of a publick nature and of national interest had never been able to make. In short, a cabal at court prevailed on this prince to alter his conduct in those very points, on which the parliament, seconded by the clamours of the whole nation, had been never able to prevail.—We shall not attempt to guess, as many have done, at the secret reasons, which determined Buckingham, nor at those by which he determined the prince of Wales to undertake the romantick, and in every

every light, ridiculous journey into Spain, to carry the treaty of marriage to a conclusion; then to break it off again in so abrupt and ungracious a manner; and to become so earnest for engaging in a war with Spain. Whatever these reasons were, the reason given for breaking the match was not the true one. The restitution of the Palatinate had been very coolly pressed, not to say neglected, even while the prince was at Madrid; and yet after he came from thence, the king of Spain had signed an act, by which he engaged forthis restitution: so that on the principles on which this negotiation had been conducted, there seemed to be no reason for breaking it off given by Spain at the time when it was broken. But the parliament, which king James called upon this occasion, proceeded like the last, on other principles than the court had done, and was therefore, very consistently with these principles, ready to seize the opportunity offered, by advising the king to break the match, and enter into a war for recovering the Palatinate, and by giving him very large supplies for this purpose.—We cannot upon this occasion subscribe to the censure passed by my lord Clarendon, how much soever we esteem his history, and honour the memory of that noble historian; for in the first place, the supplies given by this last parliament of king James were not only very large, as we have just now said, but they were such as the king was contented with, and thanked the parliament for, in his answer to the speaker of the house of commons. Secondly,

we

we cannot agree that it was the parliament properly speaking, who prevailed on the king, and engaged him in the war. The parliament advised him to it indeed; but nothing can be more manifest than this, even by my lord Clarendon's own account, that the measure was resolved on before, and that it was the measure of the prince and of Buckingham, which the king, however unwillingly, adopted. The parliament in truth did no more than advise him to break a treaty, which he had already broken; and those who reflect on precedent passages will easily concur with us, that if this had not been the case, it would not have been in the power of the parliament to break the match; much less to engage the king in the war. Thirdly, if subsequent parliaments did not support those great mountains of promises, as they are called, which this parliament raised, we shall venture to affirm, that it was the fault of the court, not of the parliaments.

This last article requires to be set in a very clear light, because it opens to us a source of causes, from whence a great part of the mischiefs, which followed in the next reign, arose; or by which, at least, they were aggravated and precipitated.—First, therefore, we observe, that the measures of the court were so foolishly taken for pushing the war, that if parliaments had given by millions, and given with as little stint in those days, as they have given since, their grants must have been ineffectual to any good purpose. Just before the death of king James, an army had been raised

raised for the Palatinate war, under the command of the famous Mansfeldt. The French first and the Dutch afterward refused passage to these troops, or even to suffer them to land. The cry of the court was loud against the perfidy of France, as it had been against the emperor and Spain in their turns. This will be always the case, when silly ministers bungle themselves into difficulties, of which others make their profit; or when they knavishly engage a national quarrel for some private, indirect interest, and inflame the people to resent imaginary injuries. But the truth is, that king James had nobody to blame but himself, when he took general and ambiguous answers for sufficient engagements, and did not see, that France would refuse passage to these troops for the same reasons as made her decline entering, at that time, into a league against the house of Austria.

Another blunder committed about the same time, by this wise king, and that wise minister, his scholar, Buckingham, must be mentioned. He was to take possession of Frankendal, which had been deposited in the hands of the infanta Isabella. The infanta agreed to yield the place to him, and to give passage to his troops, who were to compose the garrison, according to her engagements; but refused to answer for their passage over the lands of the empire, to which she was not engaged. Then, and not till then, he made this discovery in geography, that his troops must march over the lands of the empire to get from

from the Low Countries into the Palatinate. Such blunders as these were sufficient to disgust the parliaments of that age, and to make them backward in supplying a war thus managed. Much more reason had they to be so, when they saw the same managers and the same management continue in the next reign. This disgust at the management of the war, however, would not have produced so many fatal consequences, if it had stood alone. But we observe in the second place, that the parliaments, which met after the accession of king Charles, became incensed, as they discovered more and more that the account given by the duke of Buckingham, in the reign of king James, and on which the resolutions of that parliament had been taken, was false in almost every point. A system of lies dressed up to deceive the nation, and imposed on the parliament, could neither remain undiscovered, nor escape the resentment and indignation it deserved, when discovered. Besides, that parliament and the nation too, when they expressed so much joy at the breach with Spain, flattered themselves that, by preventing the marriage with the infanta, they had prevented all the dangers, which they apprehended from that marriage; whereas it appeared soon afterward, that they stood exposed to the very same dangers by the marriage concluded with France; nay, to greater; since the education of the children by the mother, that is in popery, had been confined to ten years by the former treaty, and was extended to thirteen by the latter.

In short, it cannot be denied, and my lord Clarendon owns, that as the insolence of Buckingham caused the war with Spain, so his lust and his vanity alone threw the nation into another with France. Spain was courted first without reason, and affronted afterward without provocation. Ships were lent to the king of France against his protestant subjects; and the persecution of his protestant subjects was made the pretence of a rupture with him. Thus was the nation led from one extravagant project to another, at an immense charge, with great diminution of honour and infinite loss to trade, by the ignorance, private interest, and passion of one man. The conduct therefore of the parliament, who attacked this man, was perfectly consistent with the conduct of that parliament, who had so much applauded him; and one cannot observe without astonishment the slip made by the noble historian we have just quoted, when he affirms, that the same men, who had applauded him, attacked him, without imputing the least crime to him, that was not as much known when they applauded him, as when they attacked him. Now it is plain that many of the crimes imputed to him, in the reign of king Charles, when he was attacked, could not be known, and that many others had not been even committed in the reign of king James, when he was, upon one single occasion, applauded.

To the disgusts taken at the management of foreign affairs must be added those, which were daily given by the court in the management of

domestick affairs. Real, not imaginary, grievances arose and were continued in every part of the administration. Some of these king Charles, like his father, was obstinately bent to maintain, and his right of imposing them was asserted. Others were disguised and excused rather than defended; but in redressing even these he showed such a reluctance, that he complied without obliging, and increased the disgust of his people, even while he granted their requests. We have said in a former discourse, that king Charles came a party man to the throne, and that he continued an invasion on the people's rights, while he imagined himself only concerned in the defence of his own. In advancing this proposition, we were far from meaning a compliment at the expense of truth. We avow it as an opinion we have formed on reading the relations published on all sides, and to which, it seems to us, that all the authentick anecdotes of those times may be reconciled. This prince had sucked in with his milk those absurd principles of government, which his father was so industrious, and, unhappily for king and people, so successful in propagating. He found them espoused, as true principles both of religion and policy, by a whole party in the nation, whom he esteemed friends to the constitution in church and state. He found them opposed by a party, whom he looked on indiscriminately as enemies to the church and to monarchy. Can we wonder that he grew zealous in a cause, which he understood to concern him so nearly, and in which he

saw so many men, who had not the same interest, and might therefore be supposed to act on a principle of conscience, equally zealous? Let any one, who hath been deeply and long engaged in the contests of party, ask himself on cool reflection, whether prejudices concerning men and things have not grown up and strengthened with him, and obtained an uncontrollable influence over his conduct. We dare appeal to the inward sentiments of every such person.—With this habitual biass upon him king Charles came to the throne; and, to complete the misfortune, he had given all his confidence to a madman. An honest minister might have shown him how wrong his measures were; a wise one how ill-timed. Buckingham was incapable of either. The violence and haughtiness of his temper confirmed his master in the pursuit of these measures; and the character of the first minister became that of the administration. Other circumstances, which often happen, happened likewise in this case. The minister was universally hated; the king was not. To support the minister, it was necessary that the prerogative should be strained, and violent and unpopular means should be employed. To support the government, nothing of this sort was necessary. Nay, the very contrary measures were necessary to reconcile the king to his people, and to stop in time that alienation of their minds from him, which began even then to appear. In this difference of interests, those of the crown were sacrificed to those of the minister.

King

King Charles, who had encouraged parliamentary prosecutions in his father's reign, would not suffer them in his own. He dissolved his parliaments, and broke almost all the few ties of union, which remained between himself and the nation, that he might screen some of the most unworthy men, who ever disserved a prince, or dishonoured a court.—Before the death of Buckingham, irreparable mischief was done. "The distemper of the nation "was so universal," according to my lord Clarendon, "that all wise men looked upon it as the "prediction of the destruction and dissolution "that would follow." This prediction was soon verified. The king executed what he had often threatened. Parliaments were laid aside. The very mention of them was forbid; and he continued to govern without any for twelve years. During this interval, the distemper lurked indeed; but it grew more malignant; and if a national serenity appeared about the time when the king went into Scotland, it appeared just when the poison worked most effectually, and began to seize the heart. Jealousies about religion and liberty were now at their height. The former, as far as they affected the king and his protestant ministers, were ill-founded; but for that very reason, it would have been easy to cure them; and if they had been cured in time, as we think, on my lord Clarendon's authority, that nothing could have led the Scotch nation into rebellion, so are we persuaded, that a great motive and spur to the rebellion in England would have been taken away.

The latter were certainly but too well founded. The king had, in a manner, renounced the constitution; and instead of governing with the assistance and concurrence of a parliament, he governed by illegal acts of power, which the council, the star-chamber and the high commission exercised. —There was something still more dangerous to liberty in practice. Not only the government was carried on without law, or against law, but the judges were become the instruments of arbitrary power, and that law, which should have been the protection of property, was rendered, by their corrupt interpretations of it, so great a grievance, that "the foundations of right were, to the appre-"hension and understanding of wise men," says my lord Clarendon, "never more in danger to be "destroyed."

While things were in this situation here, king Charles lighted up another fire in Scotland, by resuming the project of modelling that church, which king James had begun. Archbishop Laud, who had neither temper nor knowledge of the world enough to be intrusted with the government of a private college, conducted this enterprise, and precipitated the publick ruin. The puritans of England soon united in a common cause with the puritans of Scotland; and the army, which the latter had raised, marched into England. Many of those who had appeared against the court, and even some of those who were on the side of the court, favoured, in different manners, the Scots, and hoped to apply this

force,

force, and to improve this incident, so as to restrain the prerogative within known, perhaps narrower bounds, and to strengthen the barriers of publick liberty.—That this might have been brought about, and that the civil war, which followed, might have been prevented, appeared very manifestly in the temper and proceedings of the parliament, which met in April 1640, when all had been done, which could be done, to destroy the constitution; for if the king had been able to continue to govern without parliaments, the constitution had been destroyed; and when calling a parliament was visibly the effect of necessity and fear, not choice, the parliament, which was called, showed wonderful order and sobriety in their whole behaviour. If some passion had appeared in their debates, it might have been well excused in a house of commons assembled at such a time, and yet scarce an angry word was thrown out. The few, that escaped from some, were either silently disliked, or openly disapproved. The king, even in this crisis of affairs, preserved the same carriage he had formerly used toward them, and showed too plainly, that he regarded them only as tax-layers. In a word, about a month after their meeting, he dissolved them, and as soon as he had dissolved them, he repented, but he repented too late, of his rashness. Well might he repent; for the vessel was now full, and this last drop made the waters of bitterness overflow.—Here we draw the curtain, and put an end to our remarks, by observing, first, that, if

the spirit of liberty had once relaxed in the space of almost forty years, liberty must have been swallowed up by prerogative; secondly, that after these long contests between the king and the people, and when the latter had received the utmost provocations, the spirit of liberty was not transported into any excess; determined to defend the people, but unwilling to offend the king. The king, and he alone could have done it, forced the affairs of the nation, as he had put his own long before, into the hands of a faction. The true friends of the constitution were divided; and divided, were too weak to prevail on either side. The spirit of faction, not the spirit of liberty, is answerable for all which followed; and who is answerable for reducing the contest on both sides to be the contest of faction may, we think, be sufficiently collected from what hath been said in these discourses.

LETTER XXIV.

SIR,

SINCE you have gone through the task, which you undertook at my desire, and have carried your remarks on the History of England, as far as you judge them necessary at this time, I think myself obliged to return you thanks for your trouble, and to say something to you concerning the clamour raised and the conduct held upon this occasion by those, who, not content with the merit of being your adversaries, have declared themselves such at last to the very being of the British constitution, and to the principles on which the present establishment is built, and on which alone it can stand secure.

Before I left the town, nay as soon as my first letter to you appeared, the whole posse of ministerial scribblers was summoned. Their numbers were augmented; perhaps their pensions. Their strength, indeed, continued much the same; but their fury redoubled. At my return to London, I am informed that these weekly swarms have continued to buz about ever since; that the insects have been dispersed by every flap of your pen; but that, like true insects, they have still gathered again and renewed their din.—I say, that I am informed of this; because among other circumstances, which compose the ease and quiet of a country

country life, we are sure of not being infested there by these mighty swarms of little creatures. As their lives are short, the extent in which they ramble, is narrow, and few of them take their flight beyond the bills of mortality.

The manner in which these writers have supported the dispute between you and them, and the explanations to which they have been pushed, confirm all the suspicions which it was natural to entertain, when so great an alarm was taken at the first direct avowal of an attempt to revive the spirit of liberty, and to recall to the minds of men the true notions of the British constitution. They were so earnest to discourage the prosecution of such a design; they were so eager to find fault, where so little fault was to be found; that they catched at every word, in which they imagined the least slip had been made, though the subject would not have been affected, nor the merits of the cause have been altered, if these slips had been real, and had proceeded from your ignorance, as the objections proceeded from theirs.

I should not so much as mention this, if it was not necessary to show that your real crime, as well as mine, toward the persons, who encourage and direct these authors, is our starting the subject, not our manner of treating it. Their anger appeared, the clamour of their party was raised, and all the powers of scurrility and calumny were called forth to their aid, before any of those pretences were found out, which they afterward so meanly and so immorally employed against us. To

prove

prove this beyond the contradiction of any man of sense and candour, it will be only necessary to appeal to the whole scope of my first letters to you, which raised the storm; for what do those letters contain beside general and inoffensive reflections on the nature of liberty and of faction, and on the necessity of keeping the spirit of liberty alive and active, even in times of apparent security? Your writings were justified, indeed, in these letters; but so they had been in others, and on many precedent occasions. The charge of Jacobitism was refuted, indeed, with the contempt it deserved, and factious designs of another kind were pointed out; but factious designs had been imputed to the same persons before and upon the same grounds. It remains then, that this new alarm was taken, as I just now said, at the general design of those papers; and if that was sufficient to give such an alarm, sure I am that you are more than justified for all you writ before this dispute begun, and for all you have published in the course of it.

The old gentleman, who defended you in the former letters, thought you deserved the acknowledgments of every honest man for attempting to revive this spirit, even supposing you to have no other reason than your observation that a contrary temper prevailed. How much is this reason inforced, how much more do you deserve the acknowledgments of every honest man, if it is become evident, not only that a supine temper, contrary to the activty of this spirit, had prevailed; but

but that a contrary spirit hath been raised, and that principles, destructive of all liberty, and particularly adapted to destroy that of the British government, are avowed, taught, and propagated? If I pronounced too hastily, in my second letter, that the mask was pulled off, surely we may now say, upon knowledge, not belief, that the mask is fallen off from your adversaries in the scuffle. I shall not repeat what is said in your discourses, nor add any thing to them. You have there quoted the doctrines of slavery. You have showed the direct and indirect tendency of them all; and you have remarked, that some of them have been taught even by those, who have in the same breath admitted the consequences of them. Nothing less therefore than a constant and vigorous opposition, of which you have set us the example, will be able to stop the progress of those pernicious doctrines. The principles which king James the first established, were not more absurd than these. Their tendency was more obvious; but for that reason they were less dangerous. If those principles prevailed very far by time and encouragement, and had like to have prevailed farther; why should not these have the same, or greater success? It may be said, perhaps, that the authority of the crown helped the progress of the former, which is not our present case. To this distinction I shall submit very readily; but if these principles have gained some ground already; and that they have gained some cannot be denied, without this authority to inforce them; is there not reason to fear,

that they may gain more, and is not every degree they gain a degree more of danger to this constitution of government? Surely, sir, there can remain no doubt in the breast of any man, who hath given the least attention to the disputes between you and your adversaries, whether they or you are on the side of liberty; and therefore it is an aggravation of their guilt, that they have endeavoured to make your writings pass for an opposition to the present happy establishment, and their cause for that of the crown. You and I have sufficiently declared ourselves, and answered them on the first head. If they had been able to produce an instance, where, departing from your subject, you had given occasion to draw any odious parallel, the intention of drawing such a parallel might, with some colour, have been imputed to you; but since they have not been able to do this, and have been defied to do it, the reproach and infamy of making such parallels, as well as the scandalous immorality of imputing them to others, must lie at their door.—Let us see how well their pretensions are supported on the second head, and whether we cannot prove, without any forced constructions of their words, or arbitrary interpretations of their meaning, that the open and secret abettors of these writers are either enemies of the present establishment, or have some private interest more at heart than the true interest of this establishment.

This establishment is founded on the principles of liberty; on the very principles you have maintained.

tained. It was made by the people of Great Britain, to secure the possession of their liberty, as well as their religion. Had contrary principles prevailed; either those which tend to subvert the constitution, by raising prerogative, and which were justly objected to some of the tories formerly; or those which tend to subvert it, by undermining liberty, and which are as justly objected to some of the whigs now; this establishment could never have been made. Who are enemies and who are friends therefore to publick liberty and to the present establishment? Are you their enemy, who defend not only the general principles of liberty, but the particular principles and the particular ends, on which and for which this establishment was made? Are your adversaries friends to either, when they only seem to admit some general notions of liberty, that they may promote with greater effect, on particular occasions, the doctrines of slavery; and when they endeavour to destroy the principles and to defeat the ends of the present establishment? The revolution and the acts of settlement have secured us against the dangers, which were formerly apprehended from prerogative. To what purpose are measures and principles of policy daily pleaded for, which would expose us to greater dangers than these? Why are such incessant pains taken to show by what means liberty may be undermined, and our constitution destroyed, even now, after all we have done, and all we have suffered, to secure one, and to improve the other? I shall not give particular answers to

these

these questions; nor offer to assign the private interest, which the persons who are guilty of this may have at heart; for I will, upon no occasion, even seem to follow the example of your adversaries: nor presume to deliver my suspicions; though real and well-grounded, as the intentions of other men. This alone I will repeat; that they, who argue and hire others to argue in this manner, do in fact promote some interest, which is repugnant to the ends for which the people of this nation established the protestant succession, and the present settlement of the crown. They have not yet attacked the religion, but they manifestly attack the liberty of their country; and as much as these two are interwoven together, though it be true, that, whenever our religion is in danger, our civil liberty must be so likewise; yet it is as true, that religion may be safe, and civil liberty in danger.

I have nothing more to add upon this head, before I proceed to that which shall conclude my letter, except my desires that you will persist, and my hopes that you will succeed in the cause you have undertaken; the cause of your country, the cause of truth and of liberty. The means you employ are those of argument and persuasion; the lawful, and the sole lawful means, which can be employed to rouze an indolent, to inform a deceived, to reclaim a corrupt, or to reconcile a divided people. Let the factious continue to assert, as they have had already the impudence and the folly to do, in one of their ministerial pamphlets,

pamphlets, that the faults they are pleased to ascribe to the people of Great Britain render an army necessary*. Instead of endeavouring to persuade and to win, let them endeavour to force and corrupt their countrymen. The spirit of liberty abhors such means, and the cause of liberty would be dishonoured by them. If this nation was as corrupt and depraved as it is said to be by those who do their utmost to corrupt and deprave it; if our country was in that declining state, and the freedom of our government as near it's period as they affirm, there would remain no part for any honest man to take, except that of sitting silently down and perishing in the common shipwreck; but surely this is not yet our case, unless we are induced to believe it so; unless we make our ruin irretrievable by struggling no longer against it. There are men, many, we think, who have not bowed the knee to Baal, nor worshipped the brazen image. We may therefore hope, that there is still a blessing in store for us. In all events, Mr. D'Anvers, you are sure of one advantage, which no violence, no injustice can take from you; the inward satisfaction of having served your country, to the utmost of your power, by those lawful means which the constitution of it's government allows, and by no others.

If I hear in that retreat, to which age, the circumstances of fortune, and, above all, the temper of my mind determine me, that you succeed, I shall rejoice in the common joy. If

* See Observations on the present State of Affairs.

I hear

hear that you fail, my concern for you will be lost in the common calamity.

The article with which I propose to conclude my letter is of such a nature, that I cannot omit it, on this occasion, with any regard to truth, justice, honour, and the sentiments of a most reasonable indignation. The writers, who are employed against you, have received, with an unlimited commission to rail, particular instructions to direct their Billingsgate chiefly at two gentlemen. The art of blackening characters, by privat closet-whispers, hath been always practised, when power and confidence have been given to the insolent and the base. Perhaps it may have been thought proper, at this time, to confirm the effect of such insinuations by an echo from the press; and to prevent a general national clamour from sounding in some ears, by raising an artificial clamour round about them; but whatever the design may have been, sure I am that this strain of malice could not have been employed against men, who value it less, or who hold in greater contempt both the contrivance and the contrivers. This they may do, because they are falsely and maliciously accused; but he, who is the object of a just clamour and of national hatred, and who cannot turn his eyes on himself, without confessing to himself that he is a principal cause of the grievances of his country, must tremble at a clamour which he knows ought, and which he hath reason to fear will, sooner or later, prevail against him.

The calumny against one of the gentlemen, mentioned above, is confined to two heads; that he hath left his friends and party, and that he is urged to oppose the minister by the stings of disappointed ambition. How ridiculous is the charge, and on whom can such stuff impose? Hath he changed his notions of right and wrong in matters of government? Hath he renounced the principles of good policy, which he formerly professed? His greatest enemy is defied to show that he hath; and yet, unless this can be shown, nothing can be more impertinent, or more silly, than the imputation of leaving his friends and party. If he pursues the same general principles of conduct, with which he first set out, and is in opposition now to some few of those, with whom he concurred then, they have left him, because they have left the principles they professed. He left neither. For instance, he inveighs against publick profusion and private corruption. He combats both with a constant inflexibility, which might have done honour to a Roman citizen, in the best times of that commonwealth. Hath he left his friends in doing this? No; they who oppose him in it have left both him and virtue; and such men, though they have sometimes had the honour to concur with him, could never be his friends.

Is the latter part of the charge better founded? Is it not a manifest begging of the question, and a begging of it on the least probable side? He assisted a minister to rise to power. He opposes this

this minister in power. Ergo, spite and resentment are his motives. May not the abuse, which he apprehends this minister makes of his power, may not measures, which he fears are wicked, knows are weak, and sees obstinately pursued, be his motives? May not dangerous ambition, insatiable avarice, and insolent behaviour be his provocations? May not this gentleman think himself the more obliged to contribute to this minister's fall, for having contributed so much to his elevation? Let me ask farther, whom we shall soonest suspect to have been actuated by sentiments of private interest? the person accused, or his accuser? Whose circumstances most demanded, whose family most required an increase of wealth and fortune; those of the accused, or those of the accuser? Who hath given greater proofs of avarice to gather, and profusion to squander; the accused, or the accuser? In whom have we seen stronger evidences of that vindictive temper, which prompts to personal spite and resentment; in the accused or the accuser?—If we may form any judgment of the gentleman accused, there is not the least colour of reason to suppose, that his opposition proceeds from a spirit of ambition, or a design of pushing himself into the administration. He hath already possessed two very considerable employments in the state; one of which he voluntarily laid down, as by his conduct in parliament, against some measures of the court, he forced the ministers to take the other away, having behaved with unspotted integrity

in both; and if I am rightly informed of his resolution by those who seem to know him very well, it will hardly be ever in the power of the greatest man in England, or of the best friend he has in the world, to persuade him to accept of a third.—There is an ambition, with which these spreaders of calumny and their masters are intirely unacquainted; the ambition of doing good and the receiving the reward in fame. He, who hath this ambition, can never be disappointed in the other; and if any man, in our age and country, hath reason to be satisfied with his success in the pursuit of this ambition, it is the gentleman of whom we speak.

Whenever the defamation, which hath been displayed against the other gentleman is examined with the least knowledge of facts, or the least impartiality of judgment, it will appear equally false, and perhaps still more scandalous; for, in this case the slanderers take an ungenerous and mean advantage, which they have not in the other; the advantage, which his singular situation gives them. They, who would have declined a contest with him, while he was in a condition to answer for himself, have not blushed to declaim against him in another condition. They have experienced, in his case, that the unfortunate are not friendless. They may live, perhaps, to experience, in their own, that the guilty are so.—Another advantage, which these slanderers take against this gentleman, arises from the various scenes of life, through which he hath passed; some distant in place; some

some secret in their nature. Here calumny hath more room to assert, and innocence less opportunity to defend. Common honesty in some cases, and even decency in others, shut the mouth of the man who carries these qualities about him; and even more in his own cause than in that of another person; but calumny is subject to none of these controls; and we speak on our own knowledge, when we affirm, that, in the present case, the false imputations, which the accusers bring, are screened from absolute detection by nothing but the honour of the accused.

Let us take notice of some of the crimes, (for crimes and heinous crimes they would be, if the facts were in any degree true) which are laid to the charge of this gentleman.

His ingratitude and treachery to the late duke of Marlborough and the earl of Godolphin stand first in the roll. I believe no man acknowledges more sincerely than he the superior merit of these two illustrious men, or wishes more ardently, that they were now alive, and had the conduct of the affairs of Great Britain; but I know no obligation of gratitude or honour, which he lay under to continue in their administration, when the measures of it were altered. They might have reasons, perhaps good reasons, for altering their measures. He could have none in point of honour, whatever he might have had in point of interest, for complying with that alteration. Some of the enemies of this gentleman came into the world on such a foot, that they might think it preferment

to be the creatures of any men in power. He, who came into it upon another foot, was the friend, but not the creature of these great men; and he hath had the satisfaction of proving himself such on different occasions, and without ostentation, at least to one of them, at a time when the creatures of great men usually renounce them; at a time when they could do him neither good nor hurt. That he came to court on the call of the late queen in opposition to them, and exerted himself in her service, when they served her no longer, will not be objected to him by any man, who thinks more allegiance due to the prince than to the minister. If the present minister hath a mind to avow a contrary doctrine, he hath my consent; but then let those who engage with him remember on what terms they engage.—On the same false principle is another accusation brought. This gentleman had no patron, or patroness, but the late queen. He neither projected, nor procured the disgrace of her last minister, nor knew that it was resolved, whatever he might suspect, till he heard from herself that it was so. Much more might be said on this article; but we choose to pass it over for many reasons, and, among others, for this; that while we defend the living, we are unwilling to say any thing which might be drawn by these slanderers into an insult on the dead.

The last charge of ingratitude, brought against this gentleman, is hard to be answered seriously. Thus much, however, shall be said truly and seriously. He acknowledges, with the deepest

sense

sense of gratitude possible, the clemency and goodness of his late majesty; but sure he hath reason, if ever man had reason, to disclaim all obligation to the minister. The mercy of the late king was extended to him unasked and unearned. What followed many years afterward, in part of his majesty's gracious intentions, was due solely to the king. That they were not fulfilled, was due solely to the minister. His ambition, his causeless jealousy and private interest continued a sort of proscription, with much cruelty to the person concerned, and little regard to the declarations, which his royal master had been pleased so frequently to make.

That this gentleman was engaged in the cause of the pretender, is true. That he served him unfaithfully, is false. He never entered into these engagements, or any commerce with him, till he had been attainted, and cut off from the body of his majesty's subjects. He never had any commerce, either direct or indirect, which was inconsistent with these engagements, while he continued in them; and since he was out of them, he hath had no commerce, either direct or indirect, in favour of that cause. On such an occasion as this it is decent, not arrogant, to challenge all mankind. I do it therefore, in the behalf of this gentleman, to produce one single proof, in contradiction of any one of these general affirmations. For the truth of some, I may appeal even to those, who have been in the service of his late, and are in that of his present

majesty; and particularly to a noble lord *, who by the post he was in, when most of these transactions passed, must have had the best opportunities of knowing the truth of them, and by whose testimony I am willing that the gentleman I defend should stand or fall; a decision to which, I am sure, he will himself be ready to submit his life, and, what is more, his honour.

I make you no excuse for the length of my letter. The justice I have done, or endeavoured to do, to those, who have been vilely calumniated, and particularly on the occasion of your writings and of mine, will be a sufficient excuse of itself.

I am, SIR, &c.

* The late Marshal earl of Stair.

A FINAL

ANSWER

TO THE

REMARKS

ON THE

CRAFTSMAN'S VINDICATION;

AND TO

All the Libels, which have come, or may come from the same quarter against the person last mentioned in the Craftsman of the twenty-second of May 1731.

A FINAL

ANSWER

TO THE

REMARKS, &c.

IT is impossible to have read the papers, which have been published against the writings of the Craftsman, and not have observed, that one principal point hath been laboured with constant application, and sometimes with a little art. The point I mean hath been this; to make all the disputes about national affairs, and our most important interests, to pass for nothing more than cavils, which have been raised by the pique and resentment of one man, and by the iniquity and dangerous designs of another. Nothing, which could be said or done to inculcate this belief, hath been neglected. The same charges have been repeated almost every week, and the publick hath been modestly desired to pay no regard to undeniable facts, to unanswered and unanswerable arguments, because these facts and these arguments were supposed, by the ministerial writers, to come from men, to whom these hirelings ascribed, against all probability, the worst motives, and whose characters they endeavoured to blacken without proof. Surely this proceeding rendered it necessary, at least not improper, at the end of

those remarks, which were to conclude the collection of the Craftsman, to say something concerning the persons, who had been so particularly attacked on account of the part which they, who railed at them, were pleased to suppose that these gentlemen had in the writings contained in that collection. This, I say, was necessary; at least proper; not in order to raise a spirit, as it is impertinently suggested in the libel which lies before me; but to refute calumny, and to remove at least some of those prejudices, which had been raised, or renewed, on the occasion of these writings, and which were employed to weaken the effect of them; an effect, which may be said with truth to have been aimed at the noble pair of brothers; since it keeps up a national spirit of inquiry and watchfulness, which it is the interest of these persons, as it hath been their endeavour, to stifle; and which it is the interest of every other man in Britain to preserve in himself, and to nourish in others; an effect, which cannot be said, without the greatest untruth, to have been aimed against the present settlement; since the highest insolence, which can be offered to his majesty, is to attempt to blend his interest and his cause with those of his unworthy servants, as the tools of these unworthy servants are every day employed to do, and probably at his majesty's expense.

Something was said therefore by the Craftsman, in his journal of the twenty-second of May, to the purpose I have mentioned. If he went out of his way, (for he ought most certainly to confine himself

to

to things, and meddle with persons as little as possible) he went out of it on great provocation. He carried truth and reason along with him; and he used a moderation and a decency, to which his adversaries are strangers.

To set this matter in a full light, let us consider what he said; let us consider how he hath been answered; and, by fairly comparing both, let us put the whole merits of this cause upon one short but decisive issue. It will be time afterward to make a few observations on the clamour raised; on the reasons and designs of it; in a word, to detect the mean artifice and silly expedients, to which the two honourable patrons of the remarker are reduced. In doing this, I shall neither affect to declaim, nor to inveigh, though I have before me an inexhaustible fund of matter for both, and the law of retaliation to bear me out. As I am persuaded the men I have to do with can raise no passion in the person concerned, so have I no need of endeavouring to raise the passions of others.—But to proceed.

The Craftsman took notice of those accusations, which are brought against the gentleman he mentions in the second place.—I meddle not with the defence of the other, which hath been undertaken by an abler pen.—Some of these he answered in general only; and yet he answered them as particularly as he ought to have done for reasons of honour, which are touched upon by him, and which shall be a little more opened by me.

But there were other points, not at all affected by

by these reasons, on which no explanation was necessary to be given by the accused, and on which the Craftsman had a right to demand proofs from the accusers. They were points of a more determined nature; such as admitted of no different constructions; such as could not be altered by circumstances. They were of a more publick nature; such as the men who brought the accusations must have it in their power to prove, if they were true; and such therefore as must be false, if the men, who brought the accusations, were not able and ready to prove them.

On these the Craftsman insisted. He affirmed propositions directly contrary to the accusations brought. He appealed to unquestionable authority for the truth of what he affirmed; and to one in particular, which should have been treated with more respect by the remarker, since it will outweigh, at home and abroad, a thousand such authorities as those of his patrons. He challenged all mankind to produce one single proof, in contradiction of any one of the general affirmations.

Was there any thing unfair or indecent in this proceeding? Was there any thing in it, which could provoke the choler of those, who are friends to truth and justice? If they, who brought these accusations, had been such, an opportunity was presented to them of convicting the guilty man at the very tribunal before which his cause had been pleaded. By producing proof on these heads, they had it in their power to condemn him upon all the rest; and if this part of the charge

was

was made good, the opinion of mankind would have been fairly enough decided as to the other.

Issue being joined therefore in this manner, the accused person must be found guilty of all the crimes laid to his charge; or his accusers must be found guilty of slander, of calumny, and of the worst sort of assassination.

Thus the Craftsman left the matter.—Let us see what hath been said in answer to him.

I pass over the many scurrilous productions of those weekly ministerial scolds, who are hired to call names, and are capable of little more. The elaborate libel, entitled, "Remarks on the Craftsman's Vindication," seems to be the utmost effort of their and their patron's collected strength; and though I have waited several days to see if they had any more scandal to throw out, yet I never doubted an instant from what quarter this remarkable piece came into the world.

The whole pamphlet is one continued invective, and deserves no more to be called Remarks on the Craftsman, or an answer to him, than the railing and raving and throwing of filth by a madman deserve to be called an answer to those, who unwarily pass too near his cell. All that malice could ever invent, or the credulity of parties, inflamed by opposition, receive, is assembled. Truth is disguised by misrepresentation, and even many things, which the noble pair know to be false, are affirmed as true.

But you will ask, perhaps, whether the challenge is not accepted, and whether proofs are not brought

brought to contradict the plain and positive affirmations made by the Craftsman? I answer, the challenge is accepted, and the remarker assures us, that he hath brought proof in numerous instances against these affirmations; which is the more generous, because the Craftsman exacted but one single proof in contradiction of any of them.

The first of these affirmations was, that the gentleman concerned never entered into engagements, or any commerce with the pretender, till he had been attainted and cut off from the body of his majesty's subjects.—Let us examine the facts, which we find scattered up and down in the remarks, which may be applied to prove, in opposition to this affirmation, what hath been so often asserted, that this gentleman was a zealous jacobite and an agent of the pretender, even in the reign of the late queen.

The first fact of this kind is this. He left the kingdom. His high treason, among other crimes, was confessed by his shameful flight.

Had the libeller proved this high treason, I might agree that the gentleman's leaving his country was a consequence; but I can never admit that it is a proof of his guilt. Could no other reason for leaving his country be given, except his guilt, his leaving his country would be a strong presumption against him. But many other reasons will soon occur to those who remember the passages of that time; and reasons there are of a more private nature still, which would

would be very far, to say no more, from reflecting dishonour on a step, which is called, by these foul-mouthed advocates of power, shameful and ignominious. One thing it may be proper to assure them of, that they may pretend to mistake the Craftsman, and to misapply his words no more. It is this. The gentleman never declined a contest with the two honourable patrons of this libel. One of them was, in those days, below his notice; and he never found, upon trial, that he had reason to apprehend being foiled by the other. But we must not yet dismiss this article.

If the proof we are examining proved any thing, it would prove too much. If to decline, in certain circumstances, a trial, if to go into voluntary exile, either before a trial, or even after condemnation, were absolute proofs of guilt, the conduct of many greater and better men than the person now accused would deserve our censure, and that of calumniators, as vile as these libellers, would merit our approbation. Metellus and Rutilius must be condemned. Apuleius and Apicius must be justified.

This sort of proof therefore not appearing sufficient to make good the charge, that this gentleman was engaged with the pretender before his attainder, great pains are taken, and much rhetorick is employed to show, what we shall not presume to contradict, that he ought not to have engaged in that cause after his attainder. Neither did the Craftsman insist on this circumstance as a defence of the person accused. He fixed this

date of the engagements mentioned, in contradiction to those who had falsely affirmed, that these engagements were much more ancient. But he neither urged it as a defence, nor pleaded it as an excuse; and yet I am persuaded, that this very circumstance had some weight with his late majesty, when that excellent prince, the mildness of whose temper, and the clemency of whose nature, would have rendered him amiable in the most private station, and made him almost adorable in that great elevation, to which the providence of God had raised him; when that excellent prince, I say, was pleased, on his own motion, and without any application from the person here spoken of, to extend his present, and promise his future favour to him.

Though the Craftsman did neither say nor intend what has been objected by the remarker to him, yet he might perhaps mean something more than hath been observed; and if he did mean it, he meant to inculcate upon this occasion a very useful general truth. Let us grant that the man, who engages against his country, even when he has been oppressed in it, or driven out of it by violence, is not to be defended; that these are occasions, wherein we ought to kiss the rod, which scourges us, and reverence that authority, which we think has been unjustly exercised against us. But then let it be granted likewise, that human passions are so strong, and human reason so weak, that men who suffer persecution, or who imagine they suffer it, are seldom able to keep within these bounds of

heroical

heroical moderation. They will be apt to seize the opportunities which may be offered, of resisting, or of attempting to repair the injuries done them. They will flatter themselves that they do not vow their revenge against the people, the innocent and collective body of their countrymen, nor go about to subvert the constitution of the government. They will persuade others, nay they will persuade themselves, that they do not seek revenge, but redress; nor aim to destroy the law, which punishes, but to prevent the abuse of it, which persecutes. Thus will men, who actually suffer, be apt to reason; and if the case be common to numbers, they will be apt to proceed from reasoning on such principles to act upon them. Wise governments therefore have been careful to distinguish between punishment and persecution; have never suffered the former, however just, necessary, or severe, to carry the least appearance of the latter. Ludlow was justly punished. My lord Clarendon, whom the remarker hath so strangely yoked with the regicide, was unjustly, ungratefully, and cruelly persecuted. We may pronounce, without uncharitableness, that the former would have taken any opportunity of subverting a second time the constitution of his country; not from resentment alone, but from principle. The latter would have been moved by no resentments to disturb that frame of government, which he had contributed so much to restore. The former example therefore hath nothing to do in this place; and if I admit the latter, it will only serve to show us

how men should act, not how they do act. It will be one example of virtue, opposed to innumerable instances of frailty. Innumerable, indeed, are the instances of men in all ages, who, having been driven out of their country by violence, have endeavoured, even by violence, to return to it. This is the general and known course of nature; depraved indeed, but human: and since it is so; if we allow that they, who disturb a government, because they think themselves persecuted, deserve no excuse, we must allow that those, who give occasion to this disturbance by persecution, deserve very little.

I hope I may deserve some for this digression, into which the remarker led me; and I return to my subject, by saying that neither the Craftsman hath pretended, nor do I here pretend, to excuse the engagements which this gentleman took after his attainder, and which his late majesty so graciously pardoned; but that his taking these engagements after his attainder is no proof, that he was under them before; and that his going out of the kingdom, in the late king's reign, is no proof that he was a zealous jacobite, and an agent of the pretender in the late queen's reign.

The libeller, finding himself unable to make this charge good, lessens the charge that he may suit his proof to it. If he cannot prove that the gentleman was in the interests of the pretender before his attainder, he will prove at least, that he had a strong propension to those interests; and how does he prove even this? He asserts, that in

the

the year 1702 this gentleman was "one of the "virtuous one hundred and seventeen, who gave "their votes to throw out the bill for settling the "protestant succession, &c." False and impudent assertion! A few pages before he pretends to have the journal book of the house of commons before him. Had he it before him now? if he had, how can he affirm, in direct contradiction to it? If he had not, how could he venture to affirm any thing concerning this matter? The bill for settling the protestant succession in the present royal family passed the house of commons in the month of May 1701, not in 1702; and it passed nemine contradicente, to bring in a bill "for the farther security of his majesty's person, "and the succession of the crown in the protest-"ant line, and extinguishing the hopes of the "pretended prince of Wales, and all other pre-"tenders, and their open and secret abettors." This bill was accordingly brought in, and the persons who, by order of the house, prepared and brought it in, were sir Charles Hedges and one Mr. St. John. In the progress of this bill through the house, it appears, that there were some debates and divisions about particular clauses and amendments; but the bill was passed without any division: so infamously false is the assertion made by this libeller, that there was no division of a hundred and seventeen, or of any other number, for throwing out either the bill which settled the succession, or the bill which was made for the farther security of it. There was a division in-

deed, of a hundred and seventeen against a hundred and eighteen, upon a clause added by the lords to a bill for enlarging the time for taking the oath of abjuration, &c., and this happened in the year 1702; but what relation hath this fact to the fact asserted? Whether the gentleman voted against this clause, or not, I am unable to say; and it is to no purpose to inquire; for the clause regarded only such persons as had neglected to take the abjuration oath in time, and provided, that if such persons had forfeited any office, benefice, &c., to which any other persons had been preferred, the former should not be restored by taking the advantage of this act. If this pretended proof is not another instance of the vilest calumniation, the libeller himself confesses, that the Craftsman's challenge was properly made; and that there is not one proof in the world against his general affirmations.

Another fact, which is advanced and most pathetically declaimed upon, for reasons not hard to be discovered, is likewise applied to maintain the same charge. "This gentleman," says the libeller, "had the impudence to oppose his present most "sacred majesty, when he demanded a writ of "right—The writ of summons to parliament. He "afterward caused the elector of Hanover's "minister to be forbid the court, for no other crime "than having demanded that writ." And did this gentleman oppose this writ? Nay, did any other servant of the late queen oppose it? False and impudent is the assertion. It was ordered to

be

be made out the very day* it was demanded. If the minister, who demanded the writ, was forbid the court, was this gentleman the cause of it? Is every disagreeable circumstance to be ascribed to him in an affair, which was too important not to be laid by the proper minister, that is by the chancellor, not the secretary, before her late majesty and her council; and in which it may be supposed, that her majesty's resentments were alone sufficient to determine such a resolution? Besides, if the minister received the affront mentioned, was it singly and abstractedly for demanding the writ; or was it founded on the manner of demanding, and on many other circumstances, some expressed and some hinted at in the letters, writ soon afterward by the late queen to her late electoral highness the princess Sophia and to his present majesty, which lie before me in the printed annals of queen Anne's reign? Was the reception, given by his late majesty, then elector, to the minister who made this demand at his return home, such a one as showed his majesty's approbation of this measure, and his disapprobation of what had happened here upon it?—I say no more.

We have now gone through all I can find in this libel, which seems not so much as to aim at making good the first head of accusation, on which the Craftsman made his challenge.

On the second head, the Craftsman affirmed, that the "same gentleman never had any com-"merce, either direct or indirect, inconsistent

* See annals of the reign of queen Anne.

" with the engagements he took after his attain-
" der, while he continued in them." Now this affirmation, instead of being disproved, is evaded. " It is foreign to me," says the remarker—Is it so?—Have not all his scribbling associates charged this gentleman over and over for being treacherous to the pretender; for being engaged with him, and at the same time a spy and a partisan, such is the language they use, of the late king? Is not the flat contradiction given to this lie a part of the challenge made by the Craftsman? Hath not this libeller accepted the challenge? Hath he not called it a weak, a foolish, and a slavish defence? May he evade it after all his boasting? Is he not bound to make it good in every part, or to own the charge of calumny, which I make on him, on the whole scribbling crew, and on those who pay them? What he or they will own, I neither know nor care. What the publick will determine is evident.

On a third head of accusation against this gentleman, the Craftsman affirmed, that since he was " out of the engagements last mentioned, he " hath had no commerce, either direct or indirect, " in favour of that cause." Now, upon this head, though the accusation be not given up in terms, yet is it as little maintained, or supported by proof as the last. The libeller, indeed, calls the gentlemen a leviathan of treason; displays the terrible dangers which would have attended the reinstating him; presumes to call it a libel on the late king's memory, to say that he had such intentions;

tentions; and yet dares not deny, that his majesty signified his having such intentions. In short, with much bombast, he makes the penegyrick of his patron for defeating these intentions. I shall not condescend to make one single remark on this rhapsody of scurrility and adulation. Such poison carries it's antidote along with it into the world; and no man will be at a loss to judge, whether publick or private motives determined the servant, in this case, to defeat the intentions of the master. Whichever they were, he, who can believe that the gentleman so often mentioned has upon him any of that obligation, which the Craftsman disclaims for him, deserves to be pitied; and he, who can bring himself up to affirm it, deserves to be despised. But before I leave this article, it may not be improper, nor unseasonable, to inquire, by what criterion good subjects to his majesty and faithful friends to the present establishment are to be distinguished and known. Are all those to be reputed such, who assumed the greatest zeal for the protestant succession formerly? This cannot be; for many of the tories have this title; and all who ever wore that name are proscribed by the system we have advanced—Are all those to be reputed such, who were alike zealous for the protestant succession, and who have besides made constant profession of the principles of whiggism?—This cannot be neither; since many such as these are daily stigmatized with the reproachful names of malecontents and incendiaries; and since endeavours are used, by false deductions

ductions and by arbitrary interpretations, to prove them enemies to the government, and in effect arrant traitors.—What is this criterion then? I am able to discover but one, and it is this; being for, or being against the noble pair of brothers, the two honourable patrons of the remarker. Without the merit of approving their conduct, no man is to be reputed a faithful subject or a friend to his country. With this merit, and with that of a blind submission, even they, who have been the most obnoxious, may be received; and they, who have been called enemies to the government as loudly as any others, may be inrolled among it's friends. This practice of endeavouring to confine the interest of the government to as narrow a bottom as that of two ministers, has been of late most audaciously pursued. It has been said in direct terms, that "if his late majesty "had put the administration into any other hands, "he would have been unjust to those brave men "who had done and suffered much to serve him; "and that he would not have deserved to wear "the crown, if he had not employed the men whom "he did employ*."—Here, again, there might be room for some particular reflections, if I was disposed to make them. But I avoid this invidious part as much as my subject will allow me to do; and shall therefore content myself with desiring these bold writers, their inspectors and patrons, to consider what the necessary consequences of such positions are. If they dare to assert, that

* London Journal, May 15, 1731.

his

his late majesty would have been unjust; that he would not have deserved to wear the crown, if he had not employed the men he did employ: what might they not assert if his present majesty should at any time think fit, in his great wisdom and goodness to his people, to remove some of those very men, whom his royal father did employ? The assertion is not even extended to party. It would have been still indecent if it had. But it is confined to a certain number of particular men; as if the zeal for the protestant succession in the present royal family had not been directed, as it most certainly was, to the national advantage; but had been intended, as to be sure it was not, for the advantage of particular men, and to perpetuate the administration in a private family. This is such language, as I believe was never held before, and as no man would presume to hold now, if the encouragement to it did not proceed from those, by whom it should be discountenanced and punished.

There is another fact, which I must not omit to take notice of in this place; because, though it is not one of those on which the Craftsman made his challenge, yet it hath been positively asserted by him, and half of it at least as positively denied by the remarker.

The Craftsman said, "that the mercy of the "late king was extended to the gentleman we "speak of, unasked and unearned." That it was unearned the remarker thinks probable; and in thinking so he gives the lie to all his fellow scribblers, who have so often affirmed the contrary. That it

it was unasked, he says, is a downright falsehood. He hath the journal-book of the house of commons before him; and there he finds, "that the house "was acquainted, by his late majesty's command, "in April 1725, that this gentleman had, about "seven years before, made his humble applica- "tion and submission, &c., which his majesty so "far accepted, as to give encouragement to hope "for some future mark of his majesty's favour and "goodness."—In this he exults; but here again the effrontery and falsehood, which he charges on others, will recoil on himself. Who drew this ministerial message I know not; nor how far the style of it may be necessary, according to the forms usual on such occasions; but the remarker might have known, if he had consulted even his patrons, that his majesty's mercy had been extended to this gentleman two years before the seven there mentioned; and that his mercy did not consist in encouragement to hope for some future mark of his majesty's favour and goodness, but in a gracious and absolute promise of his favour in the full extent, which the circumstances of that gentleman required. I may be the more cold in affirming this fact, because the noble lord *, who delivered the message I quote, is still alive; as some other persons are, to whom his late majesty was pleased to own, that this message had been delivered by his order, and to express his gracious intentions conformably to it.—But to proceed.

It appears most undeniably, that of the three

* The present earl of Winchelsea.

heads,

heads, on which the Craftsman gave, and the remarker accepted the challenge, the remarker hath shown himself unable to prove the first by any true facts, and hath scandalously attempted to do it by false ones; that he hath given up the second; and that he hath not so much as attempted to prove the third.

Let us ask now, shall men, thus plainly convicted of calumny on accusations brought so often and charged so peremptorily by them, expect belief, when they endeavour to defame in any other case? Shall they, who are convicted of accusing falsely in cases, which are plain in their nature, where no proof can be wanting, and where no pretence can be alleged for not producing it, expect that the publick should condemn any man, and especially a man who is under so many circumstances of disadvantage, peculiar to his singular and unexampled situation, because they affirm him guilty in cases, which are intricate in their nature, and where reasons of honour, of prudence, and of decency, may all concur to impose silence? How often have the noble pair defended themselves, and been defended by others, on this principle; that no man ought to charge another, unless he is able and ready to prove the charge? How often have they called for proof on this principle, and triumphed that it was not immediately brought? Now, although this defence may not be sufficient in every case, where matters of present transaction are concerned, and where the persons attacked are in actual possession of the greatest

greatest power; yet surely it may be thought with reason, to be a sufficient defence, when matters long ago transacted, and long ago censured too, are concerned; when the persons who attack are in actual possession of the greatest power; and the person who is attacked hath none of those offensive or defensive weapons at his command, which power furnishes in so abundant a manner.

The remarker thinks, that no "reasons of honour, "prudence, or decency, ought to shut the mouth "of innocence; that shame and guilt alone are "silent in the day of inquiry."—When this day of inquiry is to come, and who is to be the subject of it, I know not; but let him learn that there are many cases, wherein it is not honest, and many others may occur wherein it is not prudent, to say all that might be said either in defence or in excuse; that is, when the defence or excuse of ourselves must affect others, not concerned in the debate. In such cases the most innocent will rather bear the imputation of imaginary crimes, by keeping silence, than be guilty of a real crime, by breaking it; and to carry this as far as it can be carried, instances might be produced of men, who have died rather than accuse others, whose blood was thirsted after more than theirs.

Much hath been said, and great complaints have been made, of the torture, as it is called in this libel, given to another gentleman's actions. If, by this, be meant ransacking into all the private and publick passages of his life, and wresting every

every one into a crime; far be it from me to approve in his case, what I abhor this libeller for doing in the case of another. But is it really so? Have we seen accusations of treachery and ingratitude toward several, who are dead, and toward any, who are living, insisted upon, in the former case? Has it been reproached to the patrons of the remarker, that they wormed out of power a person, to whom they were nearly allied, and ought to have been firmly attached by gratitude and friendship? And yet is that a subject, which affords nothing to be said? Are there no circumstances, which might be aggravated at least? Are there no strong colours, which might be laid? Even I should not be at a loss to do it, if I thought it fair to do it; if I thought it honest to push any man to a silence, of which I might take a seeming advantage, or to a necessity of justifying or excusing himself by saying what, supposing him innocent, he ought not to say. Are there no facts relating to former transactions of great importance not commonly known, and yet not absolutely secrets, which remain still unmentioned?—In short, is it not apparent, that there are men, who accuse, indeed, when the immediate subject of debate leads, and provokes them necessarily and unwillingly to it, while there are others, who wait for no such necessity, but accuse merely to defame.

It would be tedious, not difficult, to go through this whole invective; to deny with truth many things, which are falsely affirmed; and, by giving a just

a just turn to others, to set them in a very different light from that wherein the author exposes them to publick view; to explain what he perplexes; to distinguish what he confounds. But I shall not take this task upon me, for the reasons I have given, and for others which I am going to give.

As to the conduct, which the person, against whom such torrents of ribaldry are poured forth, held toward those who were at the head of affairs, while he was in business, I shall only add to what hath been said already, what no man of candour will deny; that the heat and animosity, which perpetual contests and frequent turns of party raise, have carried many, perhaps the person who is blamed, perhaps the persons who blame him, to do what, in any other situation or temper of mind, they would carefully avoid: in a word, that the just man hath been, on such occasions, sometimes unjust; the good-natured man ill-natured; and the friendly man unfriendly. Few there are, I fear, who could with a safe conscience take up the first stone upon such a trial. Few there are, who are blameless. But here is the difference. The just, the good-natured, the friendly man returns to the character, out of which he started. The unjust, the ill-natured, the unfriendly man persists. The first reflects with sorrow on what the last reflects with triumph; and while one wishes undone what the heat of party carried him to do, the other is glad of the excuse of party, such as it is, to indulge the viciousness of his own nature, and to repeat unjust, ill-natured, and unfriendly actions to the living, and even to the dead.

There

There is an example before us, which may serve to illustrate what I have said.—Great advantage is taken of a memorial sent to the late queen, by the late earl of Oxford, wherein many hard reflections are made on others; but the hardest of all on the person here referred to. He is painted in the worst colours, and accused to the queen of the greatest faults. Should I descend into the particulars, I might show that the accusations were groundless, and point out, perhaps, the unjust causes of suspicions which were taken, as well as the motives to the writing that memorial, which I wish had never been written, for a reason very different from that which the Remarker would be ready to assign. But I shall not descend into any such particulars, nor give a double advantage to the malicious, who would be just as well pleased to have any handle given them by the living of inveighing against the dead, as they are ready to seize, on every occasion, that which was given them, so many years ago, by one, who is now dead, of inveighing against the living.

The persons, who had the honour to serve the late queen, in the last period of her life, have been these twenty years the subjects of great clamour. If the differences, which happened among them so long ago, gave in some measure, as I apprehend that they did, both occasion and force to this clamour, it would be strange conduct, indeed, in those of them who remain alive, and in the relations and friends of those of them who

are dead, to preserve the spirit of difference, and to assist in reviving this clamour.

The day will come, when authentick history will relate the passages of those times, without regard to the partial views of any party, or the particular defence of any man. Till this day does come, every one must decide, or suspend his judgment, as he sees reason to do; and they, who may suffer by these judgments, must bear it with that temper and respect, which is due from every private man to publick censures; nay, even to publick prejudices.

But what hath all this to do with the characters and conduct of the noble pair? Suppose the men in power, two reigns ago, to have been angels of darkness, will it follow, that the two honourable patrons of the Remarker are angels of light? What then is the meaning of so great a clamour, affectedly raised on so slender an occasion as the Craftsman of the twenty-second of May gave; wherein little was said, and that little with much moderation, after much provocation? Why are so many pens employed, and so great pains taken, to divert the attention of the publick from present to past transactions; from national considerations to personal altercations?—The reason is obvious; and no other reason in nature can be assigned. The noble pair have been hard pushed, on their management of publick affairs, both at home and abroad. Not only their errours have been pointed out; gross, palpable errours; but a long series of errour; a whole system of cool, deliberate, conducted,

ducted, defended, expensive errour hath been laid open to publick view. What I believe never to have happened before, hath happened on these occasions. The noble pair have been admonished in time, and shown the precipice, into which, whoever led, they were both falling. The consequences of their measures have been foretold as early as possible, and even while the causes were laying. Surely this conduct on the part of their adversaries savours more of publick spirit than of private resentment; and yet when they have taken advantage of it, they have stopped short and triumphed in their escape, as they did in the case of the Irish recruits. These very admonitions, which gave them time and opportunity to do so, have been modestly attributed to private resentment alone; though nothing can be more manifest than this; that private resentment would have found it's account better in silence, would have preferred accusations to admonitions, and would have waited longer to have struck more home.

Sometimes, instead of stopping short, they have gone on, answering for and being answered for, till the events have justified the predictions; till the inconveniencies, disadvantages, and difficulties, against which the noble pair had been warned in vain, have followed and increased upon them; till even their apologists have been forced to allow some errours, and till they themselves have confessed their boasted system to be wrong, by changing it, and by boasting of the change. Even after all this, they have complained of clamour; and

they still complain, as if there had never been the least occasion for it given by them.—How their new schemes are planned, and how they will be pursued; whether these able men have failed hitherto, because they set out on mistaken principles of policy, or whether they have failed for want of skill to conduct the rightest, we shall soon see.

But these are not the only circumstances, which have borne, and still bear hard upon them.—In the course of these and other disputes, it seems to have been plainly and fully proved, that such principles have been established, and such doctrines have been taught by the ministerial writers, as tend manifestly to destroy the freedom of the British government. Such are, the dependency, I mean the corrupt dependency, of parliaments on the crown; the necessity of standing armies, notwithstanding the danger of them to liberty; and some other points, which I need not recapitulate. It is sufficiently known how much, and with how much reason, the far greater part of mankind have been alarmed at these attempts; which, if they succeed, must hurt not only the inferiour and temporary interests, but the greatest and most permanent political interest, which a Briton can have at heart; that of the constitution of this government.

As these things have been objected strongly on one side, so endeavours have been used on the other, to disguise and to palliate them, or to evade the consequences drawn from them. But

these endeavours have not succeeded. How, indeed, should they succeed? As well might those, who make them, expect to persuade mankind that slavery and beggary are preferable to liberty and wealth, as to make the world believe, that these blessings can be preserved to Britain by the very means, by which they have been lost in so many other free countries.

Since this therefore cannot be imposed; since the minds of men cannot be convinced of such absurdities, they must be diverted, if possible, from the subject. A new cry is therefore raised, or an old one rather is revived. Disputes, which inflamed the minds of men, while the affairs they relate to were transacting, and the conflict of parties was the most fierce, are renewed at a time, when they can be of no benefit to the publick, and when the same motives of party subsist no longer. One man, in particular, is made the subject of new invective. Nothing, which malice can suggest, and ill-nature and ill-manners utter, is omitted to render his person odious, and to represent his designs as dangerous. In the same breath we are told, that this odious, this dangerous man is endeavouring to come into power once more. He stands again "a candidate for grace and "trust. He would again administer the publick, "abandon it's allies, and sacrifice it's honour. "Nothing will satisfy him but the power, which "he once abused, and would again abuse; the "trusts, which he once betrayed, and would again "betray." These are represented, with equal

modesty and fairness, to be his requests; and the hero of the Remarker, that is, the Remarker's paymaster, who administers the publick so righteously; who never abandoned it's allies; neither the emperor nor France; who never sacrificed it's honour to one, nor it's interest to both; who never abused his power, nor betrayed his trust, through ambition, through pride, through private interest or private pique; this person is applauded for his opposition to such requests, for his just and fatal discernment.

What fatality there may be in his discernment, I know not; but surely there is a fatality, which attends those who indulge themselves in speaking and writing without any regard to truth. How could it happen else, that the Remarker should so egregiously contradict himself, and destroy in his fortieth page the whole drift of his thirty-ninth? This bold and rash scribbler takes upon him to marshal and to characterize insolently the friends of the man he rails at. If I was not of that number myself, I should probably say more on the subject. This, however, I am under an obligation to say; that the friends of this gentleman must be such to his person. They cannot be so to his power. That he takes it as the greatest compliment, which can be made to him, to have a sympathy of nature and a conformity of principles and designs with them attributed to him; that he thinks their friendship an honour to him; such an honour as the warmest of his enemies have cause to envy, and do envy; such an honour as

the

the highest of his enemies would be heartily proud to obtain, and have not been able to obtain.

The friends now of this gentleman, whom he is sometimes said to lead, and who are sometimes said to employ him as their tool, just as it suits the present purpose of scandal to say; these very friends, it seems, the very men, who defend him, "would never raise him above his present low "condition, nor make him the partner of their "success."—However they may employ him, the Remarker and his patrons know how they mean to reward him.—Since this is the case, since they know it to be so; for what reason, in the name of wonder, is all this bustle made about so insignificant a tool?—Why so many endeavours to raise a jealousy, and give an alarm, as if this man was aiming again at power?—Why so much merit ascribed to the noble pair, for keeping him out of it?—His own friends would not raise him to it.—How ridiculous then is the affectation of his enemies, who value themselves on their opposition to him?

Let the noble pair stand or fall by their own merits, or demerits. I dare answer to them and to the world, upon better foundations than those of the Remarker's laying, that their continuance in power will never break the spirit of this man, nor their fall from it excite his ambition. His ambition, whatever may have been said or thought about it, hath been long since dead. A man must be dead himself, who is utterly insensible of all that happens, either to the publick or to himself; but

but he who seeks nothing but retreat, and that stability of situation, which is essential to the quiet of it, hath surely no ambition. Now that this is the case, and hath been long the case of the gentleman, concerning whom I speak, I know to be true, and I affirm boldly. He never had the least, I say more, he never would have the greatest obligations to any country, except his own; and yet so desirous was this man of rest and quiet, that he was contented to enjoy them where fortune had presented them to him. A little frankness might have kept him abroad all his life, without complaint. Much art has been employed to confine him at home, and to tease him there. If, forgetting all former persecutions, he resented the last, would he be much to blame?

I am not conscious of having said, in this paper, a word against the truth; and I am sure that I have the same truth on my side, when I assert that this man, whom the libeller represents to be so turbulent, so outrageous, and of such pertinacious ambition, however he might have been willing formerly to have had the obligation to the noble pair, of enjoying, by their assistance, the full measure of his late majesty's intended goodness, would decline with scorn, after all that has passed, to be reinstated in his former situation, at the intolerable expense of having the least appearance of an obligation to them. Neither they, nor their advocates, can be half so solicitous to keep him out of power, and even out of a state of aspiring after power, as he is determined against the first, and indifferent about the last.

I am

I am sensible, that all this may appear a little improbable to the persons I oppose. It will be hard for them to conceive, that the man, who has once tasted power, can ever renounce it in earnest. No wonder they should think in this manner. Those who find nothing in themselves to rest upon with satisfaction, must lean on power, on riches, or both, and on other external objects. Nay, those who have of the two vices, ambition and avarice, the meanest in the most eminent degree; and who would be glad to quit their power, and to retire with their gains, may be afraid to quit it, because they have abused it. They may be so miserable as to see no security out of power, nor any other in it, except that precarious, that temporary security, which is the last and usual refuge of desperate men; the continuing the same violences to maintain, by which they acquired their power; the keeping up of dissensions, and the embroiling of affairs; those noble arts, by which they rose.

But there are men in the world, who know that there is something in life better than power and riches; and such men may prefer the low condition, as it is called by the Remarker, of one man, to the high condition of another. There are men who see that dignity may be disgraced, and who feel that disgrace may be dignified. Of this number is the gentleman, whom I have undertaken to defend; who possesses his soul without hopes or fears, and enjoys his retreat without any desires beyond it. In that retreat he is obedient

to

to the laws, dutiful to his prince, and true to his oaths. If he fails in these respects, let him be publickly attacked; let publick vengeance pursue and overtake him; let the noble pair indulge for once their passions in a just cause. If they have no complaints, of this nature, to make against him, from whence does this particular animosity proceed? Have they complaints of any other kind to make, and of a private nature? If they have, why is the publick troubled on this account?—I hope the Remarker's mask is now taken off; that the true drift of all this personal railing is enough exposed; and that the attention of mankind will be brought back to those more important subjects, which have been already started, and to those which every day may furnish.

After what has been here said, the gentleman, in whose defence I have appeared, can have no reason of honour to enter, by himself, or his friends, into these altercations; and if my opinion can prevail, should these libellers continue to scold, and to call names, they should be left to do it, without reproof or notice. The answer now given should stand as a "Final answer to all they "have said, and to all they may think fit to say "hereafter."

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

Printed by Luke Hansard & Sons,
near Lincoln's-Inn Fields.

THE

WORKS

OF

Lord Bolingbroke.

A NEW EDITION,

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

1.

THE

WORKS

OF

Lord Bolingbroke.

A NEW EDITION,

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

2.

THE

WORKS

OF

Lord Bolingbroke.

A NEW EDITION,

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

3.

THE

WORKS

OF

Lord Bolingbroke.

A NEW EDITION,

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

4.

UI
University of California
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388
Return this material to the library
from which it was borrowed.

REC'D LD-URL
OCT 18 199
APR 29 1994

UCLA-College Library
DA 27 B63 1809 v.2
[redacted]

College
Library

DA
27
B63
1809
v. 2

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
A 001 005 737 0

Uni
S